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ABSTRACT  
   In many respects, the current public child welfare system closely resembles that 
of over 100 years ago. Then, as well as now, nonprofit child welfare agencies are the 
critical providers of service delivery to vulnerable children and their families. 
Contemporary nonprofits, however, are confronted with social and fiscal pressures to 
conform to normative practices and behaviors of governmental and for-profit 
organizations. Simultaneously, these agencies may also feel compelled to behave in 
accordance with a nonprofit normative ethic. Yet, scholars and practitioners are often 
unaware of how these different forces may be shaping the practices of child welfare 
agencies and, the nonprofit sector in general. 
This multi-paper dissertation examines how managerial and organizational 
practices of child welfare nonprofits are influenced business, government, and other 
nonprofit organizations and the extent to which processes process of institutional 
isomorphism in child welfare nonprofits are happening. Data was collected from a 
national ample of 184 child welfare administrators to explore marketization practices, 
collaboration behaviors, and managerial priorities of these agencies. Multinomial logistic, 
ordered logistic, and ordinary least squares regression, and historical analysis help shed 
light on the contemporary practices of these agencies. 
 The results reveal that these agency’s behaviors are shaped by government 
control, influences from the business community, identification with a nonprofit mindset 
(i.e., nonprofitness), funding streams, and various other factors. One key finding is that 
identification with a nonprofit mindset encourages certain behaviors like collaboration 
 ii 
with other nonprofits and placing greater importance on key managerial priorities, but it 
does not reduce the likelihood of adopting business management strategies. Another 
important finding is that government control and funding does not have as strong as an 
influence on child welfare nonprofits as expected; however, influence from the business 
community does strongly affect many of their practices.  
The implications of these findings are discussed for child welfare agencies and the 
nonprofit sector in general. The consequences of nonprofits operating similarly to 
business and government are considered.  
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
In the early 1990s, a group of sociologists began advocating for a new perspective 
on institutions. These researchers recognized that institutions were similar if not identical 
to culture (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b) and should be identified more broadly as “not 
just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and 
moral templates that provide the ‘frame of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 947). In sum, they maintained that human agency is a function of both 
the rules of the game (i.e., laws and regulations) and one’s social construction of reality 
(i.e., norms and beliefs, and cultural-cognitive systems); moreover, when these 
institutions are taken together they inform and constrain behaviors of individuals and 
organizations (Scott & Davis, 2007). Therefore over time organizations in similar fields 
may become institutionalized to the norms and practices of other agencies through a 
social process of replicating patterns and activities i.e., an isomorphic effect encourages 
homogeneity rather than heterogeneity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
Around this same time period, the U.S. government was also experiencing 
growing pains. Public administrators were being encouraged to reinvent themselves by 
adopting a more entrepreneurial spirit and business-oriented practices (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992). Additionally, the world-wide movement of New Public Management 
further pushed governments in this direction, sparking debates around the role of 
competition, privatization, accountability, hybridity, networks, and threats to traditional 
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values of public administration (Lynn, 2006). While academics debated the merits of 
public sector reforms and reinvention practices, public administrators were enacting 
programs that they believe would make government more efficient and effective. For 
example, the Clinton administration created the National Partnership for Reinventing 
Government taskforce and later, President Bush introduced his Presidency’s Management 
Agenda which placed greater emphasis on performance and results (see Kettl, 2005). In 
many respects what developed in the U.S. during the 1990s and early 2000s resembled a 
transformative effect of government agencies and leadership embracing business-like 
practices and values. That is, the rules and social constructions regarding how 
government should be run (e.g., norms, beliefs, and cognitive scripts) began to converge 
with the expectations of how for-profit organizations should operate. 
This dissertation uses the sociological perspective of new institutionalism to 
explore how similar processes may be occurring in the nonprofit sector, particularly child 
welfare agencies. Unlike government, however, child welfare nonprofits face pressures 
from both the public and private sectors. Scholars have long noted the tendency of 
nonprofits to replicate the structures and practices of businesses and government (e.g., 
Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001; Cooney, 2006; Morrill & McKee, 1993). But, if nonprofit 
organizations succumb to isomorphic forces and begin to replicate norms and behaviors 
of public and for-profit agencies, then the very essence of what makes nonprofits unique 
and a necessary part of American democracy may be undermined. This research explores 
the extent to which the process of institutional isomorphism in child welfare nonprofits is 
happening. And, it adds to the conversation about the sectoral blurring by 
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operationalizing the convergence of the sectors through various mechanisms as well as 
describing how administrators within child welfare agencies relate to an underlying 
normative nonprofit identity. 
Even though charitable and philanthropic organizations are the original providers 
of services to vulnerable children and their families (Mangold, 1999), we know very little 
about the processes and challenges of private and nonprofit service provision at a national 
level nor do we fully understand the outcomes of children in the system (McBeath, 
Collins-Camargo, & Chuang, 2011). While this research is unable to address the latter 
concern, it does examine what is happening to a national sample of child welfare 
nonprofits as they strive to serve this vulnerable population. Broadly, this dissertation 
examines how managerial and organizational practices of child welfare nonprofits are 
being influenced by various isomorphic pressures from business, government, and 
nonprofit organizations. This multi-paper dissertation is set-up so that each paper 
addresses a specific research question and is self-contained.  
The introductory and first paper offers a historical account of the state-market-
civil society model of governing child welfare services in America. The image of 
government, civil society, and private organizations collaborating to accomplish specific 
goals cannot be thought of as only a contemporary practice. Rather, the roots of a 
tripartite governance model have a long history in American policy. What seems to be 
changing is how scholars today are referring to these interactions as evolving and 
adapting into what some consider entirely new relationships. On the other hand, a few 
governance scholars are skeptical of substantive and tangible changes in government's 
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supposed increasing reliance on civil society and its simultaneously decreasing control 
and authority over these relationships. Thus, this paper explores the question of how 
governance patterns between the public and private sectors, particularly voluntary 
organizations, have developed over time with a focus on services to dependent, orphaned, 
and abused children. This question will be addressed by examining historical trends and 
themes in the relationships between the state and private child welfare services, looking 
at continuities and discontinuities, with a particular concern for the entrance of for-profit 
entities into the mix. Evidence is offered that the historical and contextual nuances of the 
foster care public service system reflects evolving state-market-civil society interactions 
rather than a radical shift in the modes of governing over time. This historical 
background is critical because it offers a unique context for exploring contemporary 
practices of child welfare agencies as well as provides an overview of how the system of 
service provision became so complex.  
In light of this historical narrative, the following three papers will address the 
contemporary operations of child welfare agencies and their relation to the sectors. The 
first paper examines how broad, structural forces are affecting how child welfare 
agencies are run, what they value, and how nonprofit administrators view the work they 
do. The forces of marketization and governmentalization are shaping the management 
and behavior of nonprofit and voluntary organizations; and yet, little empirical research 
has been conducted regarding how and the extent to which these forces are actually 
changing the management of nonprofit organizations, or, more specifically, whether the 
distinctive ethos of the nonprofit sector is being lost. This paper explores how different 
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funding mechanisms, the influence of a business mindset, government control, and 
identification with nonprofit values and purposes affects whether nonprofit organizations 
adopt business management practices. Evidence is found that the influence of the 
business community is encouraging managers to implement business strategies while 
government control and funding have less predictive power when it comes to adopting 
business management practices. Surprisingly, a nonprofit mindset – or nonprofitness – 
has no effect on the likelihood of using business-based management strategies.  
The second paper builds upon prior work in the field to craft a theoretical 
framework for examining nonprofit intra-agency collaboration that infuses both 
traditional explanations with new approaches for why organizations collaborate. For 
some nonprofits, collaboration has become a necessity for survival. The reasons why 
these organizations collaborate are frequently explained in the literature through resource 
dependency and institutional theories, and to a much lesser extent, as a function of a 
network perspective or a desire to improve organizational outputs and outcomes. Yet, 
very few studies of nonprofit collaboration consider all of these explanations cohesively 
and empirically. Moreover, what is missing from these analyzes is the new institutional 
sociological and organizational theory perspective on behavior which argues that agency 
and individual actions are profoundly shaped by their perceptions of social norms, values, 
and past organizational outcomes in addition to the more commonly researched 
phenomenon of structural and rule-bound institutions. This paper asks how different 
theoretical explanations, both alone and together, explain nonprofit collaboration. The 
findings show that while a changing external environment and funding from business 
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organizations increase intra-agency collaboration among nonprofits so too does 
identifying with normative commitments of the nonprofit sector, having a board member 
from another nonprofit, and experiencing improvements in service quality from past 
collaborations. Conversely, having a board member from the business community and 
experiencing improvements in administrative quality from prior collaboration reduces the 
collaboration rate among nonprofits. Implications of these findings for child welfare 
agencies and the broader nonprofit sector are discussed.  
The final and third paper examines the influences that shape managerial priorities 
of child welfare agencies. Theory supports the notion that the societal sectors are blurring 
and blending and therefore questions the usefulness of employing the sectors as a 
theoretical construct. This paper grapples with this critique of the sectors as theoretically 
beneficial by using nonprofit, child welfare administrators’ perspectives on how 
normative institutions and values espoused by and through business, government, and 
nonprofit organizations inform their decision-making priorities. Evidence shows that 
these administrators identify with nonprofit sector values and may be compelled to 
conform to pressures placed upon them by their relation to government, business, and 
other nonprofit organizations. Results suggest that greater identification with a nonprofit 
normative ethic (i.e., nonprofitness) is positively associated with managerial priorities of 
achieving mission and goals, serving clients, and being strategic financially while greater 
collaboration with other nonprofits actually lowers the value placed on accomplishing 
organizational mission and making financially sound decisions. Greater perceptions of 
government control and influences from the business community are positively 
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associated with financial priorities but were not found to be statistically associated with 
the other managerial priorities. Additionally, having a board member from a nonprofit 
organization is positively associated with being client-focused while having a business 
board member is positively associated with being mission-focused. Different funding 
sources were found to have no effect on managerial priorities. The implications for theory 
and practice are discussed.  
 The four papers in this dissertation are written independently; therefore, the 
concluding chapter will not summarize the specific findings of each. Rather, the 
conclusion will discuss some of the broad policy, managerial, and theoretical 
implications of this research. It closes with reflections and suggestions for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2 
THE GOVERNANCE STORY OF FOSTER CARE IN AMERICA 
 The time for a more comprehensive, historical account of governance relations in 
America is upon us. Claims that governance is a-political, surpassing government, 
offering a new way of governing, and presenting us with less hierarchical forms of 
governing persists without evidence to support these contentions (see Klijn, 2008; Lynn, 
2010a, 2010b, 2011; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Many scholars are skeptical of new 
governance models. Rather, they argue for a consideration of historic, processual and 
contextual, and evidence-based views of the evolving relationships between government, 
civil society, and businesses (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Bevir, 2010; Cooper, 2003; 
Heinrich, Lynn, & Milward, 2010; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007; Lynn, 2010b, 2010c; Pollitt, 
2003). Instead of lessening calls for examining state-society relationships from a state-
centric point of view, the philosophical debates among scholars only increase the demand 
for theoretically and empirically-grounded governance studies. 
 Governance theories have the potential to offer insight into service delivery and 
policy implementation. Osborne argues that examining new public governance requires a 
systematic analysis of the “the public service system” with an emphasis on “co-
production [as] a core element” (2010a, p. 416). Osborne describes the public service 
system as the key unit of analysis for studying governance which includes exploring 
public policy processes, public service organizations, technologies, management, 
networks, and their interrelationships. Co-production indicates “an arrangement where 
citizens produce their own services at least in part…[it] could also refer to autonomous 
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service delivery by citizens without direct state involvement, but with public financing 
and regulation” (Pestoff, Osborne, & Brandsen, 2006, pp. 592-593). Therefore, 
investigating the administration of public policy through a combination of historical 
accounts of state-society relationships, along with analyzing the whole public service 
system, would provide a solid basis for governance research. Moving the governance 
literature forward thus requires theory-grounded evidence of a public policy area that 
captures the interactions between government and the private sector (Robichau, 2011), 
which includes the voluntary sector. 
 In order to meet this challenge, I have chosen to evaluate child welfare policy in 
America, specifically in regard to the provision of services to needy, abused, and 
dependent children. There are numerous reasons for assessing the development of what 
we now call foster care services from a governance standpoint. First, there is a long and 
dynamic history of governance patterns between charities and government in providing 
services to poor, abused, and orphaned children. Secondly, relationships between public 
and private institutions have evolved over time, but the patterns of governing for the most 
part have remained consistent. Additionally, welfare reform introduced greater 
competition by allowing for-profit organizations to compete and collaborate with other 
government and nonprofit agencies in service provision. Further, lessons from studying 
child welfare policy have implications for both governance and social welfare literatures. 
And finally, there is a growing recognition that foster care is in “crisis” (Curtis, Dale, & 
Kendall, 1999; Roche, 2000; Williams, 2001). The need for systematic care of children is 
not going to disappear anytime soon (Courtney & Malucicio, 1999) and there are strong 
 10 
calls for action from policymakers, bureaucrats, child welfare workers and advocates, and 
last but not least, American citizens.  
 The purpose of this essay will be to demonstrate that governance relationships 
have continuously played a valuable role in America’s child welfare policy, and if 
anything, current times reflect an evolution of these patterns rather than a new 
phenomenon. Moreover, tracing child welfare services from a historical, governance 
perspective offers insight into how state-market-civil society connections have been and 
are being shaped presently. In this paper, I will first establish a theoretical basis for 
studying governance based on the three modes of governance: hierarchies, networks, and 
markets. Next, I will provide a historical and legislative description of child welfare 
services while paying specific attention to public-private ties. The last section will 
intertwine the progression of services for abused and needy children with the 
corresponding mode of governing in order to tell the governance story of foster care 
services in America.  
A Foundation for a Governance Framework 
Governance usages and applications are numerous. By some accounts there are 
over fifty different concepts related to governance (Bevir, 2009). This may in part be due 
to the fact that governance should be studied as a ‘public service system’ as suggested by 
Osborne (2010a). In a system, smaller parts help the larger aggregate function properly; 
and in the case of governance, it does take separate operating units to enable the greater 
system to work. Phrases used to describe governance include: “all patterns of rule” 
whether formal or informal (e.g., Bevir, 2010; Imperial, 2005); “ordered rule” and 
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“collective action or decision making” (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008; Löffler, 2009; 
Milward & Provan, 2000; Stoker, 2004); the “exercise of authority” (e.g., Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2007; Stivers, 2008); and “statecraft” (e.g., Stivers, 2008). These depictions of 
governance do present a basis for mutual understanding; however, due to the fact that the 
term governance connotes many things to many people, a practical definition is 
constructive. And, given the argument that employing a governance lens can inform our 
understanding of state-society relations regardless of sector, a broad definition of 
governance is most beneficial. Governance can be described as “the action or manner of 
governing—that is, of directing, guiding, or regulating individuals, organizations, or 
nations in conduct or actions” (Lynn, 2010b, p. 671). Governance is not limited to a 
governmental context; however, this definition suggests expansive implications for 
analyzing policies, institutions, and organizations at different levels and contexts i.e., the 
public service system. The intention here is to focus upon governance patterns between 
the federal, state, and local governments with private organizations. 
Modes of Governance  
 Due to the broad appeal and application of governance theories to different arenas 
(e.g., business and anthropology), establishing a theoretical framework for examining 
explicit governance arrangements in the political or governmental context encourages a 
deeper level of understanding. One approach for studying public governance is to explore 
specific patterns or mechanisms of rule by governments (Robichau, 2011). How 
governments choose to allocate its resources can be divided into three modes: hierarchies, 
networks, and markets (Dixon & Dogan, 2002; Jordan, 2008; Kjær, 2004; Lynn, 2011; 
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Osborne, 2010b; Peters, 2010). These mechanism of rule have more generally been 
referred to as ‘forms of economic organization’ (Powell, 1991), ‘coordination of social 
life’ (Thompson, Frances, Levačić, & Mitchell, 1991), and organizational types or forms 
(Exworthy, Powell, & Mohan, 1999). Therefore, the modes of governing are applicable 
to most organizational contexts but will be utlitized here for their relevance to 
government’s direct participation in and indirect allowance of social service provisions. 
 These modes of governance dictate that government must first decide whether it 
will provide a service (e.g., as a sole supplier, co-producer, or contractor of services), and 
then, it must choose which mechanism of governance i.e., markets, networks, or 
hierarchies will be best for dealing with a policy challenge (Löffler, 2009; Robichau, 
2011). This “governance of governance” or “regulation of self-regulation” is defined in 
the literature as meta-governance. In essence, meta-governance involves the “process of 
steering devolved governance processes” and is “directed at controlling the environment 
of action in the public sector, rather than that action directly” (Peters, 2010, pp. 37-38, 
italics added). Therefore, the state may select among these modes or employ any number 
of them at one time but it remains government’s choice to do so. The distinction among 
these modes is crucial in explaining the history and environment of state-society 
arrangements in America.  
 Hierarchies. Arguably, the most widely utilized governance mode is hierarchy. 
Hierarchy refers to a system where people or things are ranked or categorized one above 
another through clear lines of authority and control. Hierarchy can be an internal 
organizational structure or operation that is highly applicable to how governments meta-
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govern. Hierarchies are broadly found across organizations, governments, networks, and 
markets. There are certain governance scholars who contend that the use of hierarchies as 
a governance tool is shrinking in favor of a more fragmented and decentralized system 
(Bogason & Musso, 2006; Klijn, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). Others however note 
that hierarchy remains a common and effective governance mechanism for democratic 
nations and public policy implementation (Kjær, 2004; Lynn, 2011; Robichau & Lynn, 
2009); moreover, some claim there is even a ‘resurgence’ or ‘thickening’ of hierarchy in 
relation to the growing “regulatory state” (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Light, 2008). 
According to Lynn, the literature on hierarchy in government splits into two viewpoints 
that are at once complementary and divergent. The first group maintains that hierarchy is 
sanctioned as a “rationalized instrument of authority,” while on the other hand, it is an 
“institutionalized expression of liberal democratic principles of accountability” (2011, p. 
229). Putting the merits of each of these positions aside, hierarchy assists both democratic 
and non-democratic governments in their operations. Within the U.S., hierarchy enables 
bureaucratic models to operate at the local, state, and federal levels. 
 Hierarchy enables government to accomplish many tasks through centralization 
and top-down decision-making. For example, hierarchy is a mechanism employed to both 
monitor and coordinate other governance tools like networks and markets (Kjær, 2004). 
In the United States, hierarchy facilitates implementation and management of federal 
policies to the state and local levels (Hill & Lynn, 2005; Robichau & Lynn, 2009). 
Hierarchy enables states and local government to disperse resources and monies to other 
organizations and agencies, make decisions, and provide services while simultaneously 
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holding itself and other actors accountable to higher levels of government. Even when 
government chooses to contract out social services, it is the one who selects, directs, and 
pays for services (Kennedy, 2006). In effect, hierarchy assists democratic governments in 
meta-governing from a distance or ‘controlling the environment of action’ since they can 
rely upon formal arrangements to manage structures and operations. It allows for 
accountability, specialization, rationalization, reliability, monitoring and coordination 
(Kjær, 2004; Lynn, 2011; Powell, 1991); conversely, it may also lead to a lack of 
discretion, unresponsiveness, and inflexibility (Bevir, 2009). Naturally, hierarchy is not 
exclusive to governments nor should bureaucracy and hierarchy be conflated (Lynn, 
2011). Yet, “hierarchical bureaucracies still dominate the public sector” (Bevir, 2009, p. 
102). Hierarchy characterizes federal, state, and local governing environments and 
actions, and in some cases, permits decentralized activities by lower level actors and 
agencies. 
 Networks. The second mode of governance—networks—receives considerable 
attention from governance and public administration literatures. Networks in the public 
sector come in many shapes and sizes: policy networks, interorganizational service 
delivery and policy implementation networks, governing networks, and public 
management networks (for discussion see Agranoff, 2007; Frederickson, 2005; Klijn, 
2008; S. P. Osborne, 2010c). With numerous typologies, approaches, and definitions, 
they have become amorphous (Catlaw, 2009). Agranoff (2007, p. 3) warns that even in 
this “era of networks,” they serve as a supplement to rather than a replacement of 
hierarchies. A simplistic view of networks are that they describe groups of interdependent 
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actors and their existing relationships (Bevir, 2009, p. 137). Correspondingly, a more 
descriptive explanation of networks are “the process of facilitating and operating in 
multiorganizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved 
easily, by single organizations” (Agranoff, 2007, p. 3). A more informative way to 
consider networks may be to develop a minimal definition based on commonly agreed 
upon attributes that do not conflict with one another. Aaron Wachhaus (2009) takes this 
approach by combing through ten journals and 125 articles in public administration and 
policy looking for fragmentation and coherence in the network literature. He finds that in 
the arenas of governance and policy, the key attributes of networks are exchange, 
interaction, interdependency, complex and nonhierarchical. From an overall governance 
perspective, networks imply the engagement of multiple institutions or actors who may 
come from different sectors to achieve a goal in a nonhierarchical manner. 
 Besides illustrating activities of governments, networks can also thrive as a 
governance tool of nonprofit and for-profit organizations. In essence, networks facilitate 
a nonhierarchical space of exchange, interaction, and interdependency for organizations 
and actors to engage with one another in order to cope with the challenges of a complex 
society. Yet, government’s participation in or its monitoring and coordinating of 
networks suggests there may be some forms of hierarchical oversight and even 
authoritative relationship within networks. Any exploration of government’s decision to 
employ networks should be examined with this exception in mind. There are differences 
between public and for-profit networks: public networks are harder to evaluate because of 
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the diversity and politicized interest of their constituents while for-profit networks can be 
assessed according to a firm’s financial performance (Provan & Milward, 2001).  
 The arguments in favor of networks are that they encourage decentralization, 
bottom-up decision-making, trust, reciprocity, innovation, and self-organization 
(Agranoff, 2003; Anheier, 2005; Bevir, 2010; Bogason & Musso, 2006). The drawbacks 
are that they may raise equity, equality, accountability, and democratic legitimacy 
concerns (Bogason & Musso, 2006; Eikenberry, 2007; Hendriks, 2009). Thus, a 
government’s use of networks does not necessarily equate with less government but 
rather poses different challenges for governmental administrators (Kjær, 2004, p. 46). 
The utilization of networks as a governance tool is not limited to a governmental realm. 
Both for-profits and nonprofits can employ networks to accomplish their own goals as 
well. 
 Markets. As a mode of governance, markets signify government’s use of them in 
governing and not their mere existence in societies. Markets themselves can be an 
administrative tool within government. As an illustration, the federal government may 
encourage competition among agencies or states government for limited resources; 
additionally, a local government may opt out of providing a service thereby creating a 
market for someone else to provide those services. Government’s application of markets 
as a governing mode takes on various forms such as outsourcing, contractual 
relationships, grants, public-private partnerships, and collaborations. The key element of 
these arrangements is the mutually approved exchange or contract of goods or services 
between government and the organization (Powell, 1991). The literature on these market 
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arrangements in government is extensive so they will not be reviewed here (for 
discussion see Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bertelli & Smith, 2010; Greve & Hodge, 2010; 
Imperial, 2005; Kettl, 1993, 2010). Overall, this movement can be conceptualized as 
privatization, government reinvention, or third-party governance. 
 Governing by markets entails relationships with both nonprofit and for-profit 
agencies. The benefits government receives through using market tools are named the 
three E’s: economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Kjær, 2004; Rhodes, 1997). The 
guiding assumption is that businesses and nonprofits will yield outputs and outcomes that 
are more cost efficient and effective than the public sector. Nonprofits are thought to 
provide high quality services because they are mission-driven while for-profits are 
motivated to high performance by their bottom lines (see Anheier, 2005). Craig and 
Herbert (1999) argue that bureaucracy is problematic because it has a program rather than 
a child orientation and government agencies are funding rather than mission-driven. 
Nonetheless, governance by markets requires public sector agents to become “smart-
buyers” (Kettl, 1993), “managers” (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009), and “brokers” (Jackson, 
2009) of purchased services. Simultaneously, this governance mode raises questions of 
democratic legitimacy and representation as well as equitability concerns. Although there 
is little evidence that privatization of social services is better than governmental provision 
of services, this has not, however, decreased the movement towards privatization 
(Kamerman & Kahn, 1998) especially in the health and human service realm (Salamon, 
2002). 
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 Mode comparison. Networks, hierarchies, and markets have different key 
features that may be beneficial or detrimental to government depending on the 
circumstances. Each mode does reflect a unique viewpoint towards how government is or 
is not directly responsible and accountable to the public, and thus, may require distinctive 
responses and actions from government and its agents. It can be more challenging to hold 
government fully accountable and responsible when services are provided through or 
along with third-parties in market or network arrangements. Table 2.1 below encapsulates 
the main attributes of the three modes of governance. 
Table 2.1 
Stylized Comparison of Forms of Economic Organization (i.e., The ‘Modes of 
Governance’) 
Key Features Market Hierarchy Network 
Normative basis 
Contract-
Property rights 
Employment 
relationship 
Complementary 
strengths 
Means of 
communication 
Prices Routines Relational 
Methods of conflict 
resolution 
Haggling-resort 
to courts for 
enforcement 
Administrative fiat-
supervision 
Norm of reciprocity-
reputational 
Degree of flexibility High Low Medium 
Amount of commitment 
among the parties 
Low Medium to high Medium to high 
Tone or climate 
Precision 
and/or 
Suspicion 
Formal, bureaucratic 
Open-ended, mutual 
benefits 
Actor preferences or 
choices 
Independent Dependent Interdependent 
   Source: Adapted from Powell (1991, p. 269). 
 Although each key feature described in this chart deserves explicit attention, I will 
only highlight these characteristics briefly (for discussion, see Powell, 1991) and will 
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revisit some of them in the final section of the paper. The prescriptive and descriptive 
basis for markets flow from agreed upon exchanges of goods and services while in 
networks these norms are based upon capitalizing on each party’s strengths and 
contributions, even though these distinctions may be less clear. According to Powell, the 
normative basis of hierarchy is the employment contract and thus one’s relationship to 
and with others in the organization. One’s position and affiliation with those above and 
below can determine one’s actions and choice in service delivery or policy viewpoint. 
Each mode of governance induces different communication styles that relates to how 
conflicts are handled. Market resorts to exchanges and interactions through pricing 
mechanism i.e., placing values on goods and services. Hierarchies rely upon authority 
and management to shape interactions and set boundaries for procedures and practices. 
Networks have a separate approach where relationships matter and future arrangements 
are based upon norms of trust and reciprocity. Correspondingly, flexibility and 
commitment within among the modes will vary. Markets offer independent choices based 
on the premise of precision, accuracy, and efficiency. Decision-making in hierarchies is 
dependent upon status within the organization; thus, following formal rules and structures 
which are based upon clear lines of authority and departmental boundaries is paramount. 
Conversely, preferences in networks entail interdependency among actors since parties 
share in the benefits and burdens of the situation. 
 The American government—federal, state, and local levels—has enlisted these 
modes of governing for centuries. At times, government may have multiple modes 
operating simultaneously. Networks, markets, and hierarchies are not only contemporary 
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governance mechanisms, but their usages in child welfare policy are more applicable and 
historical than one might think. 
Child Welfare Services: Foster care 
 Child welfare services generally refer to foster care, in-home services, child 
protective services, abuse and neglect prevention, adoption, and family preservation 
services. The ‘placing out system,’ which later came to be termed foster care services, 
involves the removal of children and youth from their homes in favor of other living 
arrangements that may or may not be temporary or permanent. On any given day between 
2000 and 2008 there were approximately 463,000 to 552,000 children in U.S. foster care 
system (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2010). Upon examining the wider child 
welfare system of entries and exits into the system, waiting periods, termination of 
parental rights, and those adopted out, government served around 798,000 children in FY 
2006, 784,000 in FY 2007, 748,000 in FY 2008, and 700,000 in FY 2009 
(Administration for Children and Families, 2010). Consequently, in any given year 
government is responsible for the lives and well-being of around 750,000 children and 
youth. Government’s impact in this area would be much higher if one took into account 
its effects on a child’s parents and family members.   
 The cost of caring for America’s children is over $20 billion dollars a year with 
money coming from federal, state, and local governments (Scarcella, Bess, Zielewski, & 
Geen, 2006). This cost would be greater if one took into consideration the private monies 
and in-kind services nonprofits bring to the table. In essence, society at-large becomes 
responsible for children’s outcomes and treatment while in government’s custody. Thus, 
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as some child advocates and workers for foster teens argue, “we are communal parents” 
(Krebs & Pitcoff, 2006, p. xxi). Recognizing our part as ‘communal parents’ increases 
the urgency for an appropriate response and further clarification about how to attain 
better outcomes for youth; moreover, it also raises questions about which types of 
organizations should be providing care. 
Although introduced into the legal world in 1809, the doctrine of acting in the 
“best interest of the child” slowly became a part of the American psyche over the course 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Askeland, 2006). In the past, caring for foster 
children and adoption reflected adult and group needs for labor, lineage, and continuity 
rather than a basic desire to create more fulfilling lives for children (Askeland, 2006). 
The idea of childhood itself has changed throughout time and varies by society (for 
review of changing perspectives on childhood see Chudacoff, 2007; Stearns, 2006). Even 
as we struggle to find consensus on what the “best interest of the child” means (Satz & 
Askeland, 2006), what becomes clear is that current tensions are not unlike tensions of 
the past. For example, who should have more of a voice in child welfare: states or the 
federal government? Is kinship care better than other foster care services? Whose rights 
triumph: parents’ or childrens’? What role should government versus nonprofits and for-
profits serve in foster care services? The answers to these questions are contested and 
represent the inherent tensions of child welfare services. 
 Foster care services are the public service system that will be examined. The 
context of who provides foster care services and how they do it is important. Both 
governmental and nonprofit agencies have been responsible for caring for abused and 
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needy children throughout American history; however, this pattern will be changing with 
the introduction of private, for-profit managed care providers. Three topics will be 
explored in a way that not only reflects the development of foster care services, but also 
speaks to the institutional relationships between government, voluntary, and private 
organizations. First, a historical overview of child welfare services will be examined. 
This will be followed by a review of emerging issues in foster care and, finally, a 
synopsis of the public-private child welfare system. This essay will show how foster care 
services have evolved and been shaped by Americans’ views of children and government. 
Historical Perspective 
 Americans’ contemporary concern for needy and abused children echoes the same 
tension of the past with the additional complexities of a modern welfare system. The 
involvement of the state or religious and charitable organizations in the private lives of 
citizens and their families has been and will most likely continue to be a highly 
contentious matter.  To understand America’s current governance of foster care, one must 
first grasp the origins of the system itself. As in past times, poverty still plays a 
significant, if not the most important role, in determining when a child needs to be cared 
for outside of their home. Therefore, it is not surprising that researchers consistently find 
poverty is one of the most significant indicator of with whom and why a child gets placed 
in foster care (Cahn, 1999; Courtney & Malucicio, 1999; Curtis, 1999; Lindsey, 2004). 
Poverty, along with America’s political and cultural milieu, continually shapes the 
conversation of how and which voluntary, governmental, and/or for-profit institutions 
should provide child welfare services. Tracing the historical development of the patterns 
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of governance in child welfare informs us of the systematic problems and complexities of 
a private-public approach. As this historical review will reveal, for the majority of 
American history states have been permitted to establish their own child welfare policy 
agendas (Murray & Gesiriech, 2004), thus allowing voluntary organizations to maintain 
their lead position as service providers. 
Colonial America-late 1800s. In both historical and modern day practices, 
poverty and its effects, inevitably influenced child placement out of the biological 
parents’ home. American colonial rules regarding children in need, whether orphaned or 
poor, followed “Elizabethan Poor Laws” establishing that dependents relied on their 
birthplace for support via almshouses, outdoor relief, indentured service, or farming-out 
(Askeland, 2006; Curran, 2009; Hegar, 1999). In many ways, children especially those 
who were dependent, orphaned, or were ethnically different than white Anglo-Saxons 
were treated as a commodity. The most common pattern of care was for younger children 
to be placed in poorhouses, and then as they became older, they would transition into 
indentured service. While in the poorhouses and infirmaries, children were placed 
alongside the sick, elderly, and insane. Localities aimed to provide services to children at 
the lowest cost possible (McGowan, 2005). When adoptive-like relationships did exist, 
there were no options for formalizing them, following in the tradition of Europeans, until 
Massachusetts passed an adoption law in 1851 (Askeland, 2006). Adoption did not 
officially become a part of the child welfare system until the 1920s.  
 Although few in number, orphanages appeared in colonial America before the 
Revolutionary War; however, orphanages grew exponentially as the predominant form of 
 24 
temporary or permanent care for dependent children from the 1830s until the late 
twentieth century with most of them separating children by race and religious beliefs 
(Askeland, 2006; McGowan, 2005).1 In fact, from before 1850 to 1904, the majority of 
services for dependent and neglected children were provided by religious charitable 
groups rather than government organizations (see Crenson, 1998, p. 42). Orphanages 
were different than poorhouses because they housed dependent children only; moreover, 
they gave children opportunities for building relationships, personal character, and a 
sense of permanency (Lee, 1999; London, 1999). Providing services for children’s 
welfare originally began in the private, philanthropic sector (Embry, Buddenhagen, & 
Bolles, 2000; Leiby, 1978; Mangold, 1999), starting as early as the 1800s and has 
continued (Flaherty, Collins-Camargo, & Lee, 2008). The mindset of the time labeled 
child welfare provisions as a service that belonged locally and within the private, mainly 
religious arena. Curran (2009) claims that between 1865 and 1890 the number of nation-
wide orphanages tripled. Although many state and local governments gave some grants to 
charities to provide services throughout the 1800s, the main provisions and funding of 
child welfare programs originated from the private sector (Flaherty, et al., 2008; 
Rosenthal, 2000; Young & Finch, 1977). 
 During the 1850s and even up to the late 1920s, many dependent children were 
relocated from urban to rural areas as a form of child placement known as the orphan 
trains.2 A census in 1882 found that a minimum of 100,000 children were housed in 
public and private institutions (Lindsey, 2004).3 Nevertheless, families took children in 
for a myriad of reasons ranging from a sense of Christian charity to needing assistance on 
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their farms. Significantly, the majority of the children placed out of urban areas were 
survived by at least one parent and thus were not orphaned per se (Holt, 2006). The main 
creator and advocate for this form of placement was Charles Loring Brace from the New 
York Children’s Aid Society (CAS). CAS, a private charitable agency, created a model 
for relocating children via orphan trains that was emulated in varying degrees by other 
charities such as Boston’s Children Mission to the Children of the Destitute and New 
England Home for Little Wanderers (Holt, 2006). However, the criterion for child 
placement was loose without rules on guardianship and accountability. According to 
Holt, families who asked for children received them upon arrival, granted they were 
“approved by the local arrangements committee or parish priest, and who agreed to meet 
the placing agency’s expectations for child care and education” (2006, p. 19). These 
volunteer committees could be found throughout towns in upstate New York and the 
Midwest. Typical committees composed of a mayor, minister, newspaper editor, banker, 
and store-keeper were thought to have first-hand, local knowledge of applicants; thereby, 
they could choose proper foster homes and if problems emerged the community would 
then be able to handle them (Olasky, 1999). This approach reflected a very localized and 
decentralized decision-making process with little state intervention. 
 Criticism of orphan trains from state governments, state boards of charities, and 
the social welfare community ensued. These concerns mirrored the developing 
professional movements in social work and sociology of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Many Catholics denounced Brace’s placing-out system as a way to 
proselytize Catholic children to Protestantism (Tiffin, 1982). In response, Catholic 
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charities established “their own powerful, largely institutionally based welfare structures, 
particularly for children...[and] where they were able…obtained public funding for the 
care of their wards” (Rosenthal, 2000, p. 287). Between in-state agencies complaining 
about depleting their resources on out-of-state children and social workers pushing for 
more progressive and scientific approaches to solving social problems, states 
(predominantly in the Midwest) created laws regarding adoption and how institutions 
placed children within their borders. Although orphan trains ended during the end of the 
1920s, they set the stage for out of home placement for needy and dependent children and 
are considered the modern-day precursor of foster care (Holt, 2006). 
Several state and local governments gave grants to charities to provide social 
services to children throughout the 1800s (Flaherty, et al., 2008; Rosenthal, 2000; U.S. 
Department of Commerce and Labor & Bureau of the Census, 1905). Bremner (1971, pp. 
277-283) discusses a few cases of states subsiding private charities in the late 1800s.
4
 
Louisiana gave $98,250 to orphanages, homes for the elderly, and benevolent societies in 
1870 but no other appropriations were made after that year. California supported orphans 
and abandoned children in institutional care to the sum of $70 to $100 per year. 
Institutions that were receiving government subsidies ranged from $130 per child per 
year in New York to $160 per year in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, and Indiana. In New York, some institutions received funding while others did 
not, and of those receiving funding, two classes emerged in 1889. Some agencies (eight) 
received less than half of their funding from government while others (seventeen) 
received more than half with these latter groups being said to be wholly supported by 
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public money.
5
 But, the reason why states subsidized services may be more telling than 
the actual giving of monies to charities. Writing on this time period and the relationship 
between states and charities, the well-known social reformer Grace Abbott wrote: 
 Most of the states drifted into the policy of aiding private institutions because 
they were unwilling to accept responsibility for the care of the dependent, and 
because it seemed to be cheaper to grant some aid to private institutions than for 
the state to provide public care. Also in the days when any form of public relief 
was thought to carry a stigma which private assistance did not, it was considered 
by some a superior form of care. By the end of the nineteenth century, leaders in 
social welfare began to appreciate the difficulties inherent in the subsidy system 
and that, once started it was very difficult to abandon. Private agencies increased 
and expanded when public funds became available, and as the money was easily 
obtained they accepted children without sufficient investigation of the family 
needs and resources and kept them permanently or long after they could have 
been returned to their families. This was costly to the taxpayer, but even more 
important, large numbers of children were deprived of normal home life by this 
reckless policy.” (1938, p. 15, italics added) 
 
Abbott’s commentary on state-society relationship in child welfare services of the past 
reflect reoccurring tensions running throughout America’s history. Government’s choice 
to subsidize services to charitable organizations exposes a deeper, fundamental system 
challenge i.e., who should be in charge, who provides the best services, who should be 
held accountable, and how much should it cost. 
  Early 1900s-1930s. As the recognized guardian of children, both religious and 
secular institutions became parental substitutes with the authority to decide on a child’s 
fate. Children who were wards of the state were more likely to be placed with foster 
families while those placed with private religious agencies were more likely to live in an 
institutional setting (Boudreaux & Boudreaux, 1999). It has been argued that there were 
more than 750,000 orphans without parents in 1920 alone (Lindsey, 2004, p. 12). During 
the Progressive Era the differences between foster care and adoption were solidified; 
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moreover, “foster care was no longer portrayed as an expression of religious charity. It 
too required guidelines grounded in methodology” (Holt, 2006, p. 27).  The escalating 
presence of social work professionals lead to an increase in bureaucratization and 
guidelines for whom and how one could adopt children; furthermore, many would-be 
adoptive parents turned to the private market via doctors and lawyers to adopt children in 
a less stringent and more confidential atmosphere (Creagh, 2006).  
 Many Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century suggested 
government’s place in child welfare should be less than that of the religious private sector  
(for discussion, see Tiffin, 1982). For example, the first White House Conference on the 
care of dependent children in 1909 took a public stance in favor of relief from private 
rather than public institutions (Bremner, 1971). Additionally, public funding and 
supervision of private charities received much attention, and at times, was highly 
controversial (Bremner, 1971, p. 269; Tiffin, 1982). These combined concerns further 
awarded authority and credibility to philanthropic agencies to assume leadership and 
innovative positions in children services rather than government. For instance, voluntary 
institutions developed the placing-out system via orphan trains during the 1850s, the 
Massachusetts Board of Charity first paid families for housing children in their homes in 
1868, and in 1875, New York Prevention of Cruelty to Children was established as the 
first child protection agency in the world.6 Additionally, the Child Welfare League of 
America played a leading role in establishing the first national child welfare standards of 
practice in the 1920s-1930s. Voluntary agencies also played a vital part in developing 
adoption agencies that would find homes for multiracial children at home and from 
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abroad following the world wars (Creagh, 2006). Private associations were often the ones 
stimulating local interest in care of dependent children (Tiffin, 1982).  
 Various states practiced different models of care and allocation of responsibility 
between state, county, and local governments (for discussion see McGowan, 2005). 
However, significant changes occurred in governmental involvement during the 
Progressive Era that shaped the states’ future part in child welfare services. First, the 
establishment of the Children’s Bureau in 1912 set precedence as the first federal agency 
in support of all children’s well-being and their mothers. Some of their activities 
originally included advocating for maternal and infant mortality reduction, improving 
child health, fighting against child labor practices, and investigating orphanages and 
juvenile courts (for review of this agency, see Lindenmeyer, 1997). Second, the 
Children’s Bureau advocated for the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921 which 
created the first federal grant-in-aid for states in regards to child health programs.7 The 
law required states to pass legislation that provided a plan for program implementation as 
well as matching funds (Lemons, 1969). Combined, the Children’s Bureau and Sheppard-
Towner Act created a sense of public responsibility for all children and federal payment 
for child welfare services was established; however, these initiatives did experience 
opposition from some voluntary social welfare agencies and states’ rights advocates 
(Bremner, 1971; McGowan, 2005).8 Proponents of state regulation argued that 
supervision of public and private agencies could eradicate abuses, standardize methods of 
treatment, and improve child-caring activities while some supporters of private agencies 
fiercely guarded the legality of governmental financial assistance but saw state 
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intervention as an overall threat to their survival (Tiffin, 1982, pp. 200-205). Specifically, 
religious institutions argued that state intervention was an infringement on their 
constitutional right of religious liberty (Tiffin, 1982). 
 Only during the Progressive Era did states and/or city departments start 
monitoring private, charitable activities (Holt, 2006). A form of public control began to 
develop as child welfare agencies were required to receive approval before incorporation 
and obtain annual licensing (Bremner, 1971). Additionally, states became more involved 
in direct service provision. Tiffin notes that by 1923 there were “138 public institutions 
and 82 public child-placing agencies in existence. Of these, 44 were run by the states; 
156 were controlled by various counties; and 20 were managed by municipalities…a 
virtual doubling [in the number of children being served by government]” (1982, p. 
205).9 And finally, the Social Security Act of 1935 provided Aid to Dependent Children 
(ADC) and federal grants to all states for foster care services and administration.10 In 
1962, ADC was changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Thus, the 
participation of the federal government in child welfare services became guaranteed, but 
it did come at a cost. Gruber and Hungerman (2007) discovered a crowding-out effect as 
New Deal policies led to increasing spending by government, charitable spending by 
churches for social services shrank as much as 30 percent. 
 During the same time period the debate over how best to aid children led child 
welfare advocates to argue that children were better served in home environments via 
foster families or assisting birth mothers though state-funded mother’s pension laws 
(Mink, 1995). Creagh’s (2006) historical account captures the intricacies of this time 
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period best. Initially, the financial situation of the mid-1930s caused the number of youth 
in orphanages to swell to an all-time high of 144,000. She finds that it was not 
uncommon for parents to use both orphanages and foster homes to help with their 
children during rough times with plans for family reunification later. The decade of the 
1930s brought about the end of a free foster care system in favor of a subsidized one. 
Following the crisis spurred on by the Great Depression, most orphanages were 
financially worse off leading some to close their doors while others diverted their 
resources to children not being adequately served by foster care (i.e., those with special 
needs or disabilities). Differences also emerged among social workers and Christian 
women who worked in the maternity homes. While religious reformers were seen as 
“sentimental, antiquated... [women who]  treated unwed mothers as innocent victims of 
seduction and abandonment. Social workers saw these same women as neurotic, 
delinquent, ignorant, and unfit to raise their own children…[They] counseled clients to 
sign relinquishment agreements” (Creagh, 2006, p. 34). Many agencies would “withhold 
financial assistance from uncooperative mothers, while offering those interested in 
adoption free room and board” (Creagh, 2006, p. 35).11 Adoption rates among white 
children soared while the reasons couples adopted shifted from a charitable gesture 
towards a way of establishing and enjoying one’s own family (Creagh, 2006).  
 The first thirty years of the twentieth century reveals increasing federal and state 
presence in the lives of children and voluntary agencies and their workers. By 1938, 26 
states had child welfare divisions in charge of supervising and providing child welfare 
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services (Bremner, 1974, p. 617). McGowan finds that states transitioned from a local 
system of service provision to a county-based one; moreover,  
state departments of welfare assumed increased responsibility for setting 
standards, licensing, and regulation of public and voluntary child care 
facilities…[there was also an] intensification of the traditional separation between 
the public and voluntary service sectors, especially in the eastern and mid-western 
states, where the voluntary agencies were firmly entrenched. (2005, pp. 21-24)  
 
Despite some controversy, the public sector’s enmeshing in the domestic and private 
lives of American families by the end of the 1930s became more common and accepted 
by the public (McGowan, 2005).  
 1940s-1960s. Child welfare services grew during these decades. Growth came in 
the form of increases in professional service providers, in-home services, services for 
unmarried mothers, quality of services, and expansion of research and empirical studies 
of foster care; meanwhile, states strived to develop a more comprehensive and 
coordinated child welfare with equal access for all children (Lindsey, 2004; McGowan, 
2005). Following World War II, foster care emerged as the dominant form of care for 
children removed from their homes whereas orphanages virtually disappeared from the 
American landscape. Similar philosophical approaches of the Progressive Era and 
Settlement House Movement towards foster care services carried over. Mainly, they 
emphasized that children belonged with their families and every effort should be made to 
place children back with their parents as soon as possible. Although the 1940s and 1950s 
were a relatively stable time in the foster care system, criticism of the system expanded 
during the 1960s (e.g., children were in “limbo” with no permanent placement plans or 
they were being treated inequitably).12 This period was marked by significant changes in 
 33 
the voluntary sector’s function as states took on more responsibility for services and 
further demographic changes ensued (McGowan, 2005).  
 Some changes in the voluntary and public sector in the late 1960s are worth 
special attention for their influence on the future of child welfare services. In McGowan’s 
(2005) historical overview of child welfare services, she notes why these changes were 
important. First, some private agencies provided exceptional services to a small group of 
select clients. However, those same services, even at a minimum level, went undelivered 
to the majority of needy families and children in public and other charitable institutions. 
Second, despite the increasing role of funding and direct service provision of child 
welfare services by the public sector, the voluntary sector maintained control over 
“program planning and development, services priorities and policies, and program 
monitoring and evaluation…under the auspices of local coordinating councils and 
welfare planning bodies. Consequently, there were minimum efforts to insure case 
integration or program coordination” (McGowan, p. 30). As in past, the voluntary sector 
still enjoyed relative control of whom and how child welfare services would be provided 
although public sector participation expanded.  During the 1960s, the federal government 
expanded its involvement and coordination of social welfare services albeit in piecemeal 
nature. As illustration, there were at least 60 federally operated or assistance programs for 
families. Under a 1962 amendment to the Social Security Act, grants to states for child 
welfare services would increase from $30 million in fiscal year 1962-1963 to $50 million 
a year after 1968 (Bremner, 1974, pp. ix, 629). 
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 Third, citing a study of public, voluntary, and sectarian agencies in Boston by 
Ryan and Morris (1967), McGowan notes how two child welfare networks existed that 
were indicative of the broader national environment of service provision. One network 
focused on serving the “suburban, white-collar, unmarried mother-adoptive family 
population; and the other, the urban-poor ‘child-in-family-in trouble population’” (p. 30). 
The conclusion reached by this research was that there was no comprehensive child 
welfare service network in Boston; moreover, many families and children were going 
unserved. If Ryan and Morris’s research was truly representative of child welfare services 
in other parts of the U.S. as suggested by McGowan, then reforms were more than 
justified. And finally, the 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act validated the 
constitutionality of government purchasing services for child welfare providers in the 
voluntary sector. Previously, some states had practiced this form of contracting-out or 
grant-giving through city and county governments, but they were only allowed to do so at 
the local level since it was considered unconstitutional in several states (Abbott, 1938). 
 1970s-the present. The decades of the 1970s through 1980s brought about 
additional government funding and provision of child welfare services; however, from 
the 1990s onward the state began to privatize its social service provisions (Flaherty, et al., 
2008). The overall trends throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s sought to rationalize 
child welfare services via increasing accountability, efficiency, and objective-based 
outcomes. The introduction of the “Battered Child Syndrome” into mainstream America 
in the 1960s led to an increase in the number of children being taken away from their 
parents when abuse was in question and the passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and 
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Treatment Act of 1974 incentivized states to develop their own mandatory child abuse 
reporting laws. However, the federal law did not operationalize the definition of child 
abuse and/or neglect. Inevitably, this changed “foster care from a largely voluntary to an 
often involuntary system” (Rosenfeld et al., 1997, p. 449) as children came into the 
system by court order rather volunteer arrangements made by parents and family 
members (Bremner, 1974, p. 666). By the 1980s, many public child welfare organizations 
had transitioned from foster care service providers to child protective service agencies 
that investigated child abuse reports (Lindsey, 2004).13  
 Another significant fact about foster care was raised during the 1970s with the 
growing awareness of “foster care drift.” ‘Drift’ refers to the long periods of time 
children were being separated from their families, possibly moving from one foster home 
to another, with no clear goals for returning the child or finding a permanent home for 
them. Child welfare advocates became appalled by the knowledge that foster care was 
growing dramatically and children in the system were being placed in multiple homes, 
even though child attachment and permanency was being recommended as the most 
critical practice by experts (Curran, 2009). As the public called for better and more 
expansive provision of services and protection of children being abused and/or neglected, 
some political and interest groups in areas of civil rights feared more state intervention 
into the private lives of families (McGowan, 2005).  
 While previous funding encouraged states to work with all children who were at 
risk, new expectations were that services should be provided only to children where state 
intervention was absolutely essential for protection and care of children (McGowan, 
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2005). Until the 1980s, parents could seek out help from the foster care systems during 
times of need; however, child abuse and prevention legislation led to greater state 
commitment in taking children out of their homes and placing them in foster care after 
the courts found abuse or neglect (Satz & Askeland, 2006). Moreover, reports of child 
abuse and neglect have continually risen from “1.2 million in 1980 to 3.1 million in 1995, 
a 258.3% increase” (Curtis, 1999, p. 10). Lindsey concludes that legislation for child 
abuse prevention did not achieve its end goal: 
Despite the increased reporting of child abuse, child fatalities have not been 
reduced. Rather, as a result of the increased reporting, agencies are overburdened 
and underfunded. Child welfare agencies have been forced to abandon fighting 
child poverty, a goal present since the field’s inception. There is little evidence 
that this shift of direction or resources has achieved the goal of providing safety 
for child and a reduction in child abuse. If such evidence existed, we could be 
satisfied…(2004, p. 155) 
With this historical perspective in mind, how children are and were being cared 
for has changed. In the past, children and youth have been placed in institutions, 
orphanages, group homes, and foster homes. However, more recently, the relationship 
between poverty and the increasing need for foster care has led to the introduction of 
state-approved kinship or informal care provisions. When parents are unable to provide 
care or are considered unfit, family service provisions are being employed. Kinship care 
is one of the “oldest traditions in child rearing and the newest phenomena in formal child 
placement practice”; moreover, among African American populations, informal or 
kinship care is even more common than for whites and Hispanic children (Hegar, 1999, 
p. 17). Data from the Census Bureau indicates that “more than two million children in the 
United States now live in kinship care arrangements; 10 percent of these, or 
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approximately 200,000, are foster children (Boots & Geen, 1999, p. 1). Others have 
estimated the range of kinship care to be between 2.3 to 4.3 million children (Hegar, 
1999). The governmental practice of using relatives as foster parents increased in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Boots & Geen, 1999; Schuerman, Rzepnicki, & Littell, 1995). 
The rise in popularity for paying kin to foster their family’s children, however, does come 
at a cost for some children. It is speculated that children’s outcomes may be adversely 
affected, including longer time periods for family reunification and decreasing overall 
adoption rates (Courtney, 1999, p. 137).
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 Foster care services of the 1990s to present day are best portrayed in the welfare 
reform movement, increased emphasis on adoption through legislative initiatives, and 
privatized, managed care models of service provisions. From 1974 to 2008, a minimum 
of 25 different statutes and amendments were enacted that affected child abuse, adoption, 
foster care, and family preservation services.15 These issues will be more thoroughly 
addressed in latter sections. 
Some conclusions about the history of foster care services in America are worth 
noting here. Primarily, an examination of the history of caring for needy and neglected 
children demonstrates the leading function charitable institutions played in the provision 
of services. As the original providers of services to dependent children, voluntary 
organizations still have a widespread, if not increasing role, current child welfare 
services. The relationship between public and private agencies is continually changing. 
Creagh states that “what began as evangelical child-saving in the mid-1800s was 
transformed during the course of the twentieth century into a professional, 
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bureaucratized, complex network of efforts to confront illegitimacy and dependency” 
(2006, pp. 43, emphasis added). Moreover, the public’s view of government and private 
organizations place in child welfare services is a complicated, developing one. 
Depending on the specific child welfare topic and time period, the public’s opinion 
regarding which services government should or should not be involved with changes. 
Unfortunately, practitioners and scholars to date “still do not know with any precision 
when foster care is appropriate, for how long it should be administered, or what services 
should be combined with it” (Lindsey, 2004, p. 168). 
Contemporary Issues in Foster Care 
 Welfare reform. There have been multiple federal laws which have influenced 
the delivery of welfare services to needy and dependent children. But, perhaps, one of the 
most influential pieces of legislation has been the 1996 welfare reform act, Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (hereafter PRWORA). 
PRWORA eliminated many of the entitlement programs such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and Emergency Assistance while giving greater authority to 
states over providing welfare services. For example, Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) replaced (AFDC). It created time limits for public assistance programs 
and work force development became an essential component.16 The effects of welfare 
reform had strong impacts on state and local governments, as they have had to fund more 
of child services than in the past (Courtney, 1999; Scarcella, et al., 2006). Another 
influential component of PRWORA, referred to as the “Charitable Choice” provision, 
urged states to contract with Faith Based Organizations in the delivery of welfare 
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services. Mangold (1999) and Scarcella et al. (2006) also note the significance of 
PRWORA since it amended the Social Security Act by adding the word ‘for-profit’, thus 
permitting private sector, for-profit organizations to receive federal funding for the 
provisions of foster care. Additionally, amendments to the Social Security Act, 
specifically Title IV-B and Title IV-E, affected states' federal funding for family 
prevention and support services and costs for out-of-home placements and adoption 
(Flaherty, et al., 2008).  
 Status of current system. Key themes in the literature describe challenges faced 
by those seeking to improve the lives for children and their families. First, the foster care 
system is organized as a temporary solution for improving a child’s well-being, and yet, 
many children become permanent residents of the system (Pecora et al., 2010; Rosenfeld, 
et al., 1997). Secondly, America is experiencing a shortage of foster homes, which can 
only be expected to grow as the number of children in foster care increases (Rhodes, 
Orme, & Buehler, 2001). Federal legislation such as the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
of 1997 encourages children to be placed in permanent homes quickly while also creating 
shorter time lines for the termination of parental rights. It can be argued that biological 
families do not receive the financial and emotion support needed (e.g., public assistance 
or counseling) to prevent their children from being placed in the system in the first place 
nor do they have sufficient time to rehabilitate in order to get their children back 
(Bartholet, 1999; Cahn, 1999; Courtney, 1999; Lindsey, 2004; Pecora, et al., 2010; 
Rosenfeld, et al., 1997; Weinberg, 2007). In fact, “the federal government allocates less 
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than five percent of its child protective services budget to family preservation, while the 
remainder is spent on foster care” (Cahn, 1999, pp. 1213-1214). 
Another challenge the system faces is that “children of color are 
disproportionately represented in foster care in many communities, and they experience 
less positive outcomes” (Pecora, et al., 2010, p. 13). It can be argued that the basis of this 
phenomenon is deep-seated structural problems associated with poverty and racial 
inequalities (see Cahn, 1999).
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 And finally, the effectiveness of the system in helping 
children achieve positive outcomes produces mixed results; however, Pecora et al. (2010) 
argue that “addressing the mental health needs of youth in care may be the place to start” 
(p. 13). Frequently the data on foster care do not measure what they purport to be 
measuring, are not longitudinal, are not generalizable to the broader foster population, 
and lack a systematic understanding of the child’s well-being upon entry into the system 
i.e. a baseline assessments (for further explanation see Rosenfeld, et al., 1997; Usher, 
Randolph, & Gogan, 1999). Curran (2009) notes that one of the ongoing critics of 
modern child welfare system is that “it is not foster care in and of itself that produces 
poor outcomes for children but rather a dysfunctional, underfunded child welfare 
bureaucracy run by poorly trained and over-whelmed staff” (¶ 7). The lack of resources 
and well-trained staff represent just some of the areas needing attention in order to 
improve services. The questions advocates and scholars are trying to answer are whether 
foster youth as adults have more negative outcomes than the general population, how 
does different types of placement affect children and youth, and what are the implications 
of a privatized foster care system. 
 41 
The Public-Private System 
The privatization or marketization of services from government to nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations, especially in the form of contracting out social services, has 
progressively been sweeping across the nation at all levels of government (D. M. Van 
Slyke, 2003). The privatization of foster care, like in other social service areas, has been 
receiving some public attention. Individuals may question the ability of for-profit 
organizations to provide quality services while also trying to make a profit. Nevertheless, 
foster care is unique because “it was always a ‘privatized’ system, never an exclusively 
public one” (Mangold, 1999, p. 1295). As previously mentioned, providing poor children 
with aid began in the private sphere with local charities, and then, service provision 
expanded to include local and state government paying charities for their work with 
needy children. Finally, with the founding of the U.S. Children’s Bureau in 1912 and the 
passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal government became fully engaged 
in the business of foster care (Rosenthal, 2000). In most states, government and 
nonprofits became reluctant partners in providing child services at times.
18
  
The relationship between government and nonprofits in the twentieth century has 
been an ever changing one. Foster care today resembles a division of labor where 
government is frequently involved with case management and investigations while their 
private agency counterparts (i.e. mainly nonprofit) provide services such as counseling 
and other treatments facilities through governmental contracts (Rosenthal, 2000). In FY 
2003, federal foster care expenditures alone were projected to cost $4.6 billion and half of 
the states’ total reported spending on child welfare services comes from federal funding 
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(Hochman, Hochman, & Miller, 2004). The most recent development in foster care is the 
entrance of for-profits as state provider of services. Their arrival raises concern regarding 
service quality, emphasis on efficiency, and family and child well-being outcomes. One 
central policy questions in the area of child welfare reform is “whether privatization of 
social welfare services is a mechanism to promote innovation and efficiency or is [it] a 
weakening of the commitment to public social welfare programs” by citizens and 
government (Embry, et al., 2000, pp. 109-110). The answer to this question will no doubt 
be one that plays out over the next few decades. A final area of uncertainly stems from 
unease over what will happen to the nonprofits, who were the original providers in child 
welfare services, as they are forced to compete and/or collaborate with businesses over 
governmental contracts (Mangold, 1999).  
 The challenges of privatization. Government’s choice to privatize its social 
services is a function of many things and takes on numerous forms.
19
 Contracting out 
services however is the most common pattern of privatization (Kamerman & Kahn, 1998; 
Winston, Burwick, McConnell, & Roper, 2002). In child welfare, a frequently used 
approach to describe popular privatization models is managed care. This strategy takes a 
holistic approach to services where the end goal is to advance integrated services while 
reducing costs; moreover, the Child Welfare League Managed Care Institute claims that 
all states are “exploring whether—and how—to apply managed care to child welfare” 
(Kamerman & Kahn, 1998, p. 28). Based upon a survey of 49 state child welfare 
administrators or their designees in 1998 and 1999, McCullough and Schmitt (2000) 
found that 29 states planned or have implemented one or more privatization initiatives in 
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their jurisdictions. Privatization of child welfare services is rapidly expanding with 
uncertain outcomes for states and their clients. Given these risks to an especially 
vulnerable population like children in foster care, this section will more thoroughly 
discuss the risks associated with private, managed care systems. 
 Succinctly, privatizing social services is thought to increase efficiency, cost 
effectiveness, flexibility, professionalization of workers, closer relations with those being 
served, innovation, and better management practices (Flaherty, et al., 2008; Rosenthal, 
2000; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). More specifically to the realm of child welfare policy, the 
potential benefits of contracting out are “fiscal incentives that support permanency goals 
and discourage long-term foster care” (Petr & Johnson, 1999, p. 263). Despite the many 
advantages privatization offers government, there are equally as many disadvantages for 
both government and clients being served. Paradoxically, the challenges governmental 
officials face when contracting out ranges from accountability and oversight problems to 
de-professionalization of care workers to lack of competition between providers. 
Accordingly, at local and state levels, lack of competition may decrease governmental 
options of who can provide social services to citizens in the first place. Taking the 
criticism a step further, Baines, Evans, and Neysmith argue that restructuring and 
lessening government’s services for public caring leads to an “increased individualization 
of social problems and an erosion of a community conscience and responsibility” (1998, 
p. 14). Finding ways to incorporate public caring into privatization models, and 
correspondingly public discussion, rarely receives the attention that it deserves. 
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 One of the main obstacles privatization presents for government is how to create 
sufficient oversight, accountability mechanisms, and transparency with the organizations 
it is contracting out with. Many child welfare advocates are apprehensive about the 
motives of profit maximizing companies providing services to children and youth 
(Mangold, 1999; Petr & Johnson, 1999). Another concern for privatizing foster care is 
that it increases the likelihood that private sector corporations will be nationally based. 
Therefore, headquarters and decision-making may be further away from their locally-run 
service branches, making monitoring and accountability complicated. At the same time, 
this opens up the possibility that a child’s foster care placement (e.g. in group homes) 
will be further away from their parent’s and family’s home (Mangold, 1999). 
Historically, the federal government has emphasized process or output indicators such as 
child placement and time spent in foster care; however, since 2002 the federal 
government has instituted more comprehensive outcomes indicators for foster children 
and their families with an emphasis on safety, permanence, and well-being (Pecora, et al., 
2010).
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 Additional barriers that government must overcome when introducing private, 
managed care systems are the “lack of accurate data on costs, caseload trends, service 
utilization and outcomes in the current child welfare system” (Flaherty, et al., 2008, p. 
813). 
Finding proper measures of optimal child welfare outcomes, along with missing 
data on what costs structures should look like, is problematic for public agencies and 
officials who are working with and creating contracts for private sector providers. For 
example, in a study of the introduction of performance-based, managed care into 
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nonprofit child welfare agencies in Michigan, McBeath and Meezan (2010) find results 
that warn against being overly focused on efficiency. Their research shows that the 
pressures placed on foster care agencies and its administrators showed that reuniting 
children with their parents requires more service work than adoption and kinship care. 
Alarmingly, agency pressures led performance-based incentive organizations to choose 
the easier route of adoption and/or kinship care rather than reuniting children with parents 
(see also McBeath & Meezan, 2006; Smith & Donovan, 2003). 
 Broadly speaking, multiple studies find that public managers sometimes lack the 
capacity to negotiate the right contract designs with companies (Romzek & Johnston, 
2005; Van Slyke, 2003). Moreover, “the conceptualization of ‘success’ in relation to 
client outcomes and program performance in performance- and nonperformance-based 
environments has gone largely unexamined” (McBeath & Meezan, 2010, p. i103). In 
sum, it hard to tell what incentives should be placed in contracts, what outcomes are 
optimal and measurable, and how to properly monitor a program successes and failures. 
Courtney and Maluccio (1999) bluntly describe the scenario as such: 
Public child welfare administrators may look like lambs going to the slaughter in 
negotiations with large for-profits managed care entities, given the almost 
nonexistent relationship between performance and funding that has heretofore 
been typical of child welfare services and the consequent inexperience of public 
child welfare authorities in managing performance-based contracts. Moreover, 
given the sordid history of corruption in government contracting with for-profit 
entities in other areas (e.g., national defense), public officials will be wise to think 
carefully about the implications of opening up the foster care system to the profit 
motive. (pp. 237-238) 
 
The notion that government will be outwitted, or unable to compete with the financial 
resources and technical expertise of businesses during contract negotiations for child 
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welfare provisions, cannot be ignored. If government fails to properly negotiate 
procedures, costs, professionalism, and desired outcomes for children, then the negative 
implications for youth in the system could be detrimental.  
 Another consideration of the privatization of foster care services is the impact it 
may have on child welfare professionals. In an environment that has already experienced 
some de-professionalization of its service professionals and also lacks empirical support 
in favor of specialists work over paraprofessionals, “child welfare workers [are] 
particularly vulnerable to the power of managed care to undermine professional 
standards. It would be a shame if managed care ended up lowering the qualifications of 
child welfare workers…” (Courtney & Malucicio, 1999, p. 238). Courtney and Maluccio 
warn just how critical de-professionalization of child welfare services would be in a 
public system that is already in crisis and is experiencing a growing proportion of 
children coming into the system with special needs (e.g., mental health). Similarly, in a 
purposeful sample of 15 caseworkers and observations of caseworkers in juvenile court in 
Illinois from both government and private agencies, Smith and Donovan (2003) find 
these front-line child workers are often overloaded with multiple goals, caseloads, and 
time pressures; therefore, they tend to de-prioritize working with parents, seeing children 
as their main clients. This habit goes against best practices for caseworkers since they are 
encouraged to maintain partner-like relationships with parents (Smith & Donovan, 2003). 
These workers have to resort to coping mechanisms and do face pressures to “get kids off 
of the state’s budget” (p. 546).  
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The implications of these studies are many. If nonprofits and government 
providers are currently under such enormous pressure to perform, how will private sector 
organizations choose to deal with the complexity of the system and performance-based 
incentive structures? Will they rely more on paraprofessionals to lower case numbers for 
all and will they sacrifice service quality at the front-line to meet the bare-minimum 
requirements of government? The complete answers to these questions are unknown. 
An Account of Governance in Foster Care Services 
 The evolution of child welfare services tells an interesting and often untold story 
of American governance. Government has engaged in various modes of governing at the 
federal, state, and local level throughout history to complete its tasks. Uniquely, service 
provision for dependent and abused children began in the private, charitable realm, 
advanced as a concern for the public sector, and now is transitioning to the private, for-
profit and nonprofit sphere with governmental supervision. This evolution, however, 
cannot be neatly divided into one sector’s complete supremacy over the other; rather, it 
demonstrates the prevalence of mixed modes of governing in child welfare policy 
involving both the public and private sectors. Therefore, as Bremner notes,  “relations 
between responsibilities assigned the three sectors [i.e. for-profit, nonprofit, and public] 
are neither rigidly defined nor permanently fixed but shift from time to time to meet 
changing circumstances and needs” (1988, p. 216). This statement exposes the complex 
state-society relationships representative of the fluctuations in foster care service 
provision. By reflecting upon the modes of governance, I will outline how specific 
governing mechanisms have developed in foster care. 
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 The governance story may best be told through a diagram. Based on the historical 
narrative of foster care, combined with a governance lens, Figure 2.1 displays how 
service provisions have transformed in America. The chart is broken down historically by 
the most common governing mechanism for that time period. Furthermore, when 
multiple modes are characteristic of a particular time period, the modes are listed in order 
of relevance. The bullet points depict the major themes of that era discussed in earlier 
sections. The last portion of this paper will explore the connection between each mode of 
governance with its historical context in child welfare services.  
Networks 
 One of the most surprising findings in governance research on foster care is the 
pervasiveness of networks in child welfare services throughout history. Networks were 
the most significant mode of governance in early American history and retain their 
relevance today. The approach to child welfare services remains highly decentralized to 
states and local levels of government and other service providers although hierarchies 
presently specify some rules and procedures. Defined previously, networks basically 
serve to bring multiple groups of interdependent actors together for a common purpose in 
a nonhierarchical manner. Early historical child welfare networks were probably more 
informal and less distinguishable in characteristics than they are presently. However, if 
we apply Wachhaus’s (2009) key network attributes found in the literature, then the 
resemblances between networks of the past and present times become richer.   
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of child welfare services 
 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century networks expose complex and 
interdependent relationships between local and state government with voluntary 
institutions and community volunteers in the exchange of service provisions for 
dependent children and their families. It was in everyone’s interest for dependent children 
to be kept off the streets and out of trouble. These interactions occurred in 
nonhierarchical manners. For example, localities (i.e., city governments and/or 
communities) or parents could choose where their children would be placed (e.g., a 
particular religious organization) with little state intervention; moreover, many charitable 
agencies assumed guardianship of youth and therefore were at liberty to place them in 
private homes or orphanages as they saw fit. All of these activities happened in the 
broader governance and policy realms of child welfare services. Therefore, the case can 
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be made that at a fundamental level, networks among and between communities, 
agencies, and localities represented an important governing mechanisms of early 
American child welfare policy. Furthermore, networks have been able to maintain their 
significance in current policy even though the actors and arrangements between society 
and government have slightly altered.  
 To begin, networks of charities, which were mostly religious organizations, led 
the way in taking care of poor and needy children of their localities (see Crenson, 1998, 
p. 42). The division of religious service provisions often divided along denominational 
lines (e.g. Lutheran, Protestant, and Catholic). For example, in the late 1800s, Catholic 
Charities united in order to create structures and processes for delivering services that 
would assist them in receiving governmental grants (Rosenthal, 2000). Networks, based 
on norms of reciprocity, trust, and relationships, correspondingly influenced who parents 
chose to turn their children over to, how services would be presented to children, and 
sometimes, it affected which children could receive services from particular charities. 
These networks of providers played a crucial role in getting a community’s attention on 
the plight of children and stimulating support for their services (Tiffin, 1982). There were 
other non-religious groups that assisted with taking care of needy children such as Jewish 
and other ethnic organizations, but their numbers were much smaller. Once the orphan 
trains started, networks within communities (e.g., committees) chose whether to accept 
children and with which families they would be placed (Holt, 2006; Olasky, 1999). 
Moreover, state Children’s Home societies, which were not of the religious orientation, 
became widespread during the late nineteenth century. Children’s Home societies were 
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“not state sponsored but rather were statewide private organizations” focusing on child 
placement in “well-to-do” families and temporary shelter services (Boudreaux & 
Boudreaux, 1999, p. 176). In principle, there was a community-based, decentralized 
approach to service delivery.  
 In the early 1900s, networks of charities persisted as the main service providers 
for dependent children even though they progressively began to receive more funding 
from government. Additionally, larger charities such as the New York Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children started similar branches in other major cities while other 
organizations like the Child Welfare League of America advocated for national standards 
of child welfare practices for all charities and government agencies. Although voluntary 
institutions have served as the main provider of services to children throughout the 
majority of American history—via foster care services such as orphanages, child 
placement, and group homes—early on they received very little regulation and 
monitoring (Holt, 2006). McGowan (2005) notes that even up to the 1960s the voluntary 
sector remained empowered to offer services in a manner they chose with little 
governmental involvement.  
 Currently, networks of nonprofit agencies serve as key child welfare service 
providers across state lines. For example, Childhelp is a national nonprofit agency who 
serves abused and neglect children with programs in over nine states. Child welfare 
networks now include actors from government, nonprofit, and for-profit agencies; and in 
some instances, nonprofits are serving as the lead-organization network for children and 
family service delivery (see Chen & Graddy, 2010; Graddy & Chen, 2006). The 
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suggested benefits of these networks are that they can encourage a more integrated 
system based on bottom-up decision-making, self-organization, innovation, and a sense 
of community.  
Markets 
 The U.S. government has been employing market tools in the governance of child 
welfare policy for over two hundred years.
21
 In fact, there is a history of some states and 
counties turning to the market and paying charities through grants to assist needy and 
abused children, but knowing the extent and level of funding to charities from these states 
is more difficult to disentangle. On a national scale by 1903, public subsidies accounted 
for 21.7 percent or $2,187, 784 of the total cost (approximately $10 million) of 
maintaining children’s institutions while the other $8 million in costs were paid for by 
private philanthropy and religious communities (U.S. Department of Commerce and 
Labor & Bureau of the Census, 1905, p. 29). Therefore, the majority of money for child 
welfare services came from private contributions and organizations. Conceivably, the 
most significant aspect of government’s adoption of markets in child welfare policy is the 
specific types of market relationships government has commissioned throughout history. 
State and local government’s choice to not be a direct service provider early on seems as 
significant as their choice to capitalize on the benefits of markets later in history. 
 It became more commonplace for states and localities to employ what may be 
considered a lose form of market governance-via grants to charities-to deliver services to 
children at the turn of the nineteenth century and onward. Interestingly, while offering 
some grants to charities, state and local governments did so with very little participation 
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in the operations or monitoring of how, and to whom, voluntary organizations provided 
services to. A market approach to governing, or in some cases government’s indirect 
choice not to be too involved in early service provision thereby subsidizing private 
agencies, allowed for a high degree of flexibility in how services were provided as well 
as independent decision-making by actors in foster care delivery. Abbott warned in the 
1930s that “the private agency is free to perform a really useful function only if it 
supplements the program of the public agency and does not attempt to serve large 
numbers…A subsidized private agency is in fact neither public nor private” (1938, p. 17). 
Voluntary agencies, as Abbott claims, could not be distinguished as public or private 
entities; moreover, charitable organizations were the main providers of child welfare 
services and thus were serving large numbers of children unrestrained by governmental 
administration. Until the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921 and the Social Security Act of 
1935, the federal government had not offered money to states in order to serve dependent 
children. Throughout most of American history, states have been in charge of 
implementing child welfare policies (Murray & Gesiriech, 2004) and they have 
repeatedly turned to the market for service provisions. By the mid-twentieth century, state 
governments relied upon charities to provide services through market mechanisms with 
more distinguishable contract transactions, but they also supplied their own public service 
provisions and choose to monitor the actions of volunteer agencies more closely.  
 Presently, child welfare services are offered extensively through contracts and 
public-private partnerships between states and nonprofit agencies in which states act 
more as managers and monitors of services than providers. Additionally, following 
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welfare reform in 1996, governments began turning to for-profits organizations as new 
service providers. For example, many states have privatized large portions of child 
welfare services via market mechanisms such as contracts (e.g. Florida, Illinois, Kansas, 
and New York) while other states have taken a more limited approach to privatization 
(e.g. New Mexico, Missouri, Wisconsin, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Washington, 
D.C.) (see Flaherty, et al., 2008). In 2006, Florida privatized its child welfare system 
under an experimental federal waiver and appears to be experiencing much success. They 
choose to focus upon philanthropic partnerships between government, nonprofits, and 
businesses through community-based models of care that emphasizes family preservation 
services (Florida Philanthropic Network, 2010). However, the state remains the 
responsible party for abuse and neglect investigations while the courts decide on whether 
to remove a child from their home.  
 In the case of Arizona, nineteen ‘collaborators’ from nonprofit and for-profit 
agencies receive governmental contracts to find foster families and license them while the 
states’ main purpose is to choose providers and sign-off on what agencies recommend 
(M. Reyes and M. Reck, personal communication, February 8, 2011). In sum, the 
privatization movement in child welfare services does show changes in the state’s choice 
among particular market mechanisms such as subsidization, public-private partnerships, 
and contracting-out; however, the case cannot be made that this phenomenon is entirely 
novel since state and local governments have been employing markets throughout 
history. 
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Hierarchies 
 Hierarchy is not on the decline as a governance mode in child welfare policy. 
Instead, U.S. government has increasingly relied upon hierarchical models throughout the 
twentieth century. Hierarchy is enlisted by federal, state, and local governments as a 
mechanism to employ networks and markets, decide which children are placed in the 
system and for how long, provide direct services, enforce regulations and legislation, and 
develop payment structures and processes for public and private sector agency providers.  
 The rise in hierarchical models of governing child welfare began in the states 
during the early twentieth century. The adopted values of the Progressive Era espoused 
public concerns for the welfare of poor and needy children and families that required 
more direct governmental assistance and state monitoring of private organizations, i.e. 
there were growing tensions over government’s laissez-faire welfare policies (Tiffin, 
1982, pp. 195-197). Entering into a new sphere of intervention in domestic and private 
lives of citizens, states passed mother’s pension laws and continued subsidizing charities 
but in an atmosphere of more supervision and suspicion regarding the legitimacy of using 
public funds for private charities (Tiffin, 1982). Further, the federal government became 
more immersed in state actions regarding child welfare. It established the Children’s 
Bureau in 1912, passed the Child Labor Act of 1916, and created federal payment 
structures for states to support dependent children and their families.  
 In the following decades, both state and federal governments began to develop 
more rules and standards of practice for private agencies while increasing their 
responsibility for direct service provisions (McGowan, 2005). During the 1950s and 
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1960s, it became paramount that states ensure all children were receiving equal access 
and treatment in the system regardless of race or disability (Lindsey, 2004). Many child 
welfare nonprofit opposed legislation that promoted using federal funds to purchase 
services and these nonprofits “looked primarily to expand the public sector as the primary 
vehicle to enhance comprehensive services” (Rosenthal, 2000, p. 294). Additionally, 
federal legislation of child welfare (e.g. adoption, child abuse, foster care services, etc.) 
increased at a rapid pace starting in 1970s. The choices for how children in the system 
could be handled become more dependent on government routines and administration 
which further decreased the amount of flexibility private agencies had in service delivery. 
More recently, government’s decision has been to contract-out services to networks and 
markets as a key strategy for meeting the needs of dependent and abused children 
 Significantly, it is not the expansion of legislation or governmental participation 
in service provisions alone that makes hierarchical modes of governing commonplace. 
Rather, these actions signal government is both accountable and responsible to the public 
for how child welfare services are being delivered. Government formally exercises 
authority, rank, and administration i.e., its hierarchical position over private providers as 
a monitoring and coordinating mechanism. Uniquely, government and its actors uphold 
their supervisory functions as chief investigator of child abuse and neglect reports and as 
the sole decision-maker regarding child removal from homes. It is in this division of 
labor that government is able to maintain some sense of control over the child welfare 
apparatus. Furthermore, the benefits of hierarchy help explain why states have turned to 
this governing mechanism, especially over the last half century. Hierarchical models 
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allows governments at all levels to divide labor in a rational manner, be accountable 
without having to engage in all forms of direct service, and employ other governance 
modes in service delivery. Conversely, the limitations of hierarchy (e.g., lack of 
discretion and flexibility) further elucidate why states choose to employ all three 
governance modes in child welfare provisions given that networks and markets are 
thought to be a solution to hierarchical weaknesses. In conclusion, hierarchy is depicted 
as the most prevalent governance model currently because it grants government a 
hierarchical position over other service providers and modes of governing. It allows the 
states to maintain accountability and authority over service delivery and to federal 
authorities while taking them out of the direct business of providing services themselves. 
Conclusion 
 Applying the modes of governance framework to child welfare policy tells an 
often untold story of evolving governance patterns in America. Reflecting upon the 
historical and contextual nuances of the public service system of foster care provisions 
offers evidence of developing state-market-civil society interactions rather than radical 
shifts in governance modes over time. Noticeably, multiple governing mechanisms seem 
to operate simultaneously throughout the majority of American history and will most 
likely continue to do so. Reviewing public policy and service delivery within one sector 
or with an ahistorical approach would not have been as insightful as embracing a 
historical, governance perspective that descriptively captures the multiple layers and 
muddled relationships between government and voluntary agencies. Moreover, the 
entrance of for-profit providers into foster care is just another evolution of the 
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governance story, especially given government’s reliance on market mechanisms for over 
a hundred years. Government’s employment of multiple modes of governance does not 
however lessen its responsibility and accountability to the public for the outcomes of 
dependent, abused, and neglected children and youth in its custody. 
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Chapter 3 
 
MARKETIZATION STRATEGIES AND THE INFLUENCE OF BUSINESS 
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES  
The contemporary governance and identity of nonprofit organizations and their 
relationships with government and private, for-profit firms are changing. Government is 
increasingly turning over service provision to nonprofits and businesses (Van Slyke, 
2003), especially in human services (Salamon, 2002). Indeed, a sizable majority of states 
report publicly funding various private, nonprofit child welfare agencies (U.S. DHHS & 
ACF, 2001). For their part, nonprofit and voluntary organizations (hereafter NPOs) 
across the sector are under pressure to secure funding through contracts and to become 
more entrepreneurial in their efforts to generate revenue. These pressures come in the 
form of marketization or commercialization (Salamon, 1993; Weisbrod, 1998; Young & 
Salamon, 2003), vendorism, and bureaucratization (Frumkin, 2005; Salamon, 1995; 
Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Nonprofit agencies are urged to provide more and better services 
to a greater number of individuals demanding their services while simultaneously being 
compelled to do so in a similar fashion to government and businesses entities. The 
nonprofit and voluntary sector is being driven to meet a ‘double bottom line’ where some 
view the financial management and commercial practices of operations to be as equally 
significant as the social benefits they offer to society. Yielding to the demands of the 
market and government could jeopardize, or at the very least challenge, the delicate and 
somewhat distinctive moral and functional balance these organizations try to maintain. 
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Salamon (2005, p. 96) referred to this as the “growing identity crisis” nonprofit America 
is facing. 
Environmental pressures play a pivotal role in shaping the nature of NPOs. 
Institutionalist scholars argue that behaviors, especially in the context of organizational 
life, can be altered by regulations and rules, norms and belief systems, and finally, 
cultural-cognitive systems that combine shared understanding and taken-for-granted 
processes in social life (Scott & Davis, 2007). Therefore, when organizations become 
institutionalized to other norms of behaviors and practices of other agencies, it is through 
a social process of replicating patterns of activities (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Jepperson, 
1991; Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, & Boli, 1987). When NPOs succumb to isomorphic 
forces and replicate norms and behaviors of other agencies in the public and for-profit 
private sectors, their practices may homogenize leaving them at risk of losing what made 
them unique in the first place. It is not surprising that scholars have been noticing the 
tendency of nonprofits to replicate the structures and practices of businesses and 
government for years (e.g., Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001; Cooney, 2006; Morrill & 
McKee, 1993). Concerns have been raised about how NPO’s response to these changes 
and pressures will impact the distinctive ethos or identity of the nonprofit sector – what 
can be called nonprofitness, in general, and the ability of nonprofit organizations, in 
particular, to advance their missions and service their clients (e.g., Anheier, 2005; 
Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Frumkin, 2005). Theory suggests nonprofits are being 
impacted by marketization and government control, and yet, we know very little about 
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the specific managerial practices and values employed to cope with external and internal 
environmental forces.  
This paper explores how these broad, structural forces affect how nonprofit and 
voluntary organizations (child welfare agencies in particular) are run, what they value, 
and how nonprofit managers and administrators view the work they do. Broadly, this 
research explores the extent to which outside and inside forces are shaping the adoption 
of business-based management strategies among child welfare agency administrators. I 
study this topic by first reviewing the forces affecting nonprofit organizations such as 
marketization and strong governmental influences; and then, I examine what, if any role, 
nonprofitness (i.e., identifying with a core set of nonprofit values and purposes) has on 
the adoption of business management strategies. Next, I provide a brief overview of the 
reasons why examining child welfare agencies offers a rich context for study. Following 
the literature review and research hypotheses, methods and data are presented along with 
statistical results from a national survey of child welfare agency managers. Three 
multinomial logistic regressions and one ordered logistic regression model are used to 
explore the business management practices of charging fees for services, engaging in 
cause-related marketing alliances with business, replacing volunteers with professionals, 
and running their agencies like a business. Finally, the implications for the nonprofit and 
voluntary organizations and, child welfare agencies in particular, are discussed. A story 
of the business of child welfare nonprofits begins to unfold that depicts a “sector” in flux, 
and at risk of becoming something other than what has been traditionally described as 
“nonprofit.” 
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Literature Review: Nonprofit Practices and Values 
There are many forces shaping the management of nonprofit and voluntary 
agencies. Environmental pressures influence the types of decisions managers can make 
and in turn could also dictate their views and beliefs about nonprofit and voluntary 
agencies as a whole. While the study of the marketization of the nonprofit sector is 
growing, the implications for how management practices are being shaped by these 
pressures has received limited empirical examination. Managers are encouraged to secure 
resources (e.g., financial and human capital) while adhering to organizational missions 
and values (Herman & Heimovics, 2005). Management scholar Kevin Kearns argues that 
nonprofit executives are “among the most entrepreneurial managers to be found 
anywhere, including the private for-profit sector”(2000, p. 25). Thus, it raises questions 
regarding what business management strategies looks like in nonprofit and voluntary 
organizations. Some examples of these practices include charging fees for services, 
professionalizing the workforce, creating alliances with businesses, and applying a 
business approach to daily decision-making. 
There are several factors that lead managers to adopt business practices. First, 
nonprofit and voluntary organizations are undergoing a marketization of their programs 
and services. Secondly, NPOs appear to be under pressure to act more like government 
and bureaucratize their agency’s practices, especially in the area of human and social 
service delivery. And finally, these trends are leaving many wondering what it means to 
be a “nonprofit” in today’s America. These themes are first broadly explored and then 
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considered in the context of child welfare nonprofits. Research hypotheses are proposed 
in each section.  
The Marketization of the Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
One trend significantly influencing the operations of nonprofit and voluntary 
organizations is commercialization or marketization. Marketization or “the penetration of 
essentially market-type relationships into the social welfare arena” (Salamon, 1993, p. 
17) of the nonprofit and voluntary sector gained tremendous momentum in the 1980s and 
has continued apace. Some examples of commercialization include the generation of 
commercial revenues such as using fees for services, selling products and services, and 
engaging in business ventures.  
Charging fees for services is one of the more commonly practiced 
commercialized activities among NPOs. Over the last 20 years, fees for services have 
accounted for over 50 percent of revenue growth in the sector (Aspen Institute, 2001), 
and for social service agencies in particular, fee income makes up 35 percent of their 
revenue growth (Salamon, 2003). During this same time period, more businesses 
ventured into areas traditionally relegated to NPOs, especially in the area of human and 
social services (Frumkin, 2005; Ryan, 1999). NPOs now regularly compete with for-
profits, other nonprofits, and even government agencies for resources, clients, and 
publicly funded contracts.  
Accordingly, nonprofit executives are encouraged to become social entrepreneurs 
(Dees, Emerson, & Economy, 2001), employ market-like strategies for creating success 
(Brinckerhoff, 2000; Kearns, 2000) and make money (Ashton, 2011). Workers in NPOs 
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must now strike a balance between achieving their mission and servicing clients while 
also being innovative, resourceful, and opportunistic (Dees, et al., 2001). Additionally, 
the sector itself has undergone a professionalization of employees as a response to 
various commercialization pressures (Salamon, 2005). Many who work in nonprofit and 
voluntary organizations are proud of the professionalization of the sector and view it as 
an advancement of the field whereas others approach this change with a bit more caution 
(Frumkin, 2005). Excessive professionalization of NPOs is problematic because it raises 
concerns about the sector: 1) being a legitimate representative of the community’s needs; 
2) it questions the ‘voluntary’ nature of agencies who are composed of working 
professionals; 3) it increases the costs of handling social problems; and 4) it changes the 
focus from meeting basic human needs locally to a level of a social problem that must be 
handled by professionals (Salamon, 2001, 2003).  
 As a consequence NPOs are increasingly utilizing market-like approaches and 
values in running their organizations (Weisbrod, 1998). A byproduct of these and similar 
pressures is the expansion of partnerships and alliances with businesses to market an 
image, product, or service for mutual benefit. These cause-related marketing ventures 
help businesses achieve strategic purposes while allowing NPO’s to promote goals and 
social causes. Although businesses have been an important financial contributor to NPOs 
for decades, there seems to be a shift on the part of private firms from “benign 
benevolence” to partnering for strategic reasons that lead to corporate success and 
“reputational capital” (Salamon, 2003, p. 65; Young, 2002, p. 6). The growth of 
nonprofit-business partnerships brings with it the increasing use of business language and 
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terminology. For example, Dart (2004) uses a case study of a Canadian nonprofit human 
service organization to create four categories that seek to capture the meaning of being 
“business-like” in nonprofit organizational context: business-like program goals, 
business-like service delivery, business-like management, and business-like rhetoric. 
Other nonprofit behaviors that resemble business-like characteristics are creating 
“business plans” that include attracting investments, measuring outcomes, identifying and 
reducing risk, employing business approaches, studying market and financial feasibility, 
and “showcasing the management team” (Rooney, 2001, pp. 275-276). Business practices 
and values may be becoming a part of the nonprofit sector’s identity, and if they are not 
already, they could be soon. The very nature of the relationship between businesses and 
nonprofits seems to be shifting and this swing could lead to competition replacing the 
presumed benevolent spirit of NPOs (Bush, 1992).  
 Even though there is agreement about the emergence of these trends in the 
nonprofit and voluntary sector, the consequences are not so clear. One side maintains that 
tapping into market-solutions will allow NPOs to survive and flourish. Thus, nonprofits 
can achieve greater resource stability, efficiency and innovation, focus on serving clients, 
legitimacy, and possibly accountability to the public (Aspen Institute, 2001). In the book, 
Enterprising Nonprofits: A Toolkit for Social Entrepreneurs, it is argued that thinking 
and acting like a business can help nonprofits in the following areas: learn to take more 
calculated risks; develop solid strategic planning; identify and focus on customers’ needs 
and wants; measure performance in meaningful ways; and be more accountable to key 
stakeholders (Dees, et al., 2001). And while having a business mindset does clearly 
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provide NPOs with many opportunities to improve, it does come at a cost. Frumkin warns 
that in some nonprofits, “intense commercialization has eroded the moral high ground of 
these organization and transformed nonprofits into shadow businesses” (2005, p. 10). 
Furthermore, marketization might lure nonprofits away from advancing their mission, 
serving the poor and hardest-to-reach clients, using volunteers, promoting democracy and 
advocacy, maintaining valuable community networks, and placing more emphasis on 
accepted management techniques over delivering services (Alexander, Nank, & Stivers, 
1999; Aspen Institute, 2001; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). But, at what point do 
nonprofits become what Weisbrod (1988) warned as ‘for-profits in disguise’? With this in 
mind, I explore the “influence of the business community” on NPO’s management. The 
following propositions are tested: 
Hypothesis 1: The influence of the business community will increase the adoption 
of business management strategies by nonprofit managers. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Receiving funding from for-profit businesses will increase the 
adoption of business management strategies by nonprofit managers. 
 
These hypotheses suggest that pressures and funding from the business 
community are encouraging the use of business management strategies in child welfare 
agencies. The power of the market, and concurrent business logic and rhetoric, lies in its 
promise to propel organizations to better compete and therefore be more successful. If 
organizations choose not to adopt these market approaches, then they run the risk of 
being left behind, or worse, having to close their doors.  
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Going Public 
The practices of marketization in NPOs are familiar, but the effects of an agency’s 
level of publicness on nonprofit management are not as well studied. While it must be 
noted that “public service itself has undergone a business-like transformation” (Haque, 
2001, p. 65)  following the notion of market-driven and results-oriented modes of 
governance, NPOs have been simultaneously confronting commercialization and 
increasing governmentalization. A staple of public administration and management 
literature, publicness captures the idea that all organizations, to varying degrees, are 
public (Bozeman, 1987). Organizations experience governmental influence through 
various avenues of regulation, taxation, outsourcing, procurement, public policies, and 
contracts; making the state an ever-present factor of organization life. Moreover, the 
notion of publicness is thought to impact internal organizational operations and 
managerial values of institutions (Boyne, 2002). Bozeman’s “dimensional” model of 
publicness, i.e., mechanisms of ownership, control, and funding, is often used to compare 
organizational and managerial behaviors on outcomes between public and private 
agencies (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2011; Coursey & Bozeman, 1990; Rainey, 2011). 
And while NPOs are not governmental per se, they could be impacted by their level of 
publicness and their management choices may reflect governmental involvement.  
In sum, becoming more “public” can pull nonprofits and voluntary organizations 
away from their core mission. This is frequently considered in the context of government-
nonprofit contracts and their corresponding relationships. Many have studied and 
expanded upon the theory of publicness for comparing public and for-profit organizations 
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(e.g., Andrews, et al., 2011; Aulich, 2011; Boyne, 2002; Haque, 2001; Moulton, 2009; 
Nutt & Backoff, 1993), but few have empirically examined it in the context of NPOs.
 22
  
The main reason for this is that many view NPOs as strictly private organizations, and 
while this may be theoretically true, they do also serve public purposes and offer public 
goods. In trying to capture the complex relationships and blurring boundaries between 
nonprofits and government, Young (2006) argues that these relations should be viewed 
through three dimensions: supplementary, complementary, and adversarial. At times 
nonprofits provide public goods above the level of government offering (i.e., 
supplementing government services), in other cases nonprofits complement government 
by partnering or contracting with them to deliver a good or service; and finally, nonprofit 
advocacy may take on an adversarial role to public policy and thus government may seek 
to induce or prod private, voluntary action in a particular direction (Young, 2006). 
Therefore, NPOs have both public and private dimensions to them. 
 Recently, Bozeman and Moulton (2011) sought to further clarify the boundaries 
of organizations by opposing explanations of “publicness” to those of “privateness” (see 
also, Fryar, 2012). They argue that while publicness is understood as “the degree of 
political authority constraints and endowments affecting organizations” privateness 
captures “the degree of market authority constraints and endowments affecting the 
institution” (Bozeman & Moulton, 2011, pp. i365, italics in original text). Thus, we can 
better explain publicness by exploring privateness and its relationship to marketization. 
Bozemen and Moulton state, “All organizations are subject to influences of publicness 
and privateness and they vary in the degree to which they are subject to each. This 
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variation permits one to identify organizations as “more private” or “more public,” not 
only as a whole but also with respect to key organizational dimensions” (2011, p. i365). 
Nonprofits provide a unique avenue for exploring these key organizational dimensions 
from a different perspective than merely defined public and private agencies. 
 Not unlike the effects of marketization on NPOs, the degree of publicness, too, 
will impact NPOs. Studies show that nonprofit survival and growth can be attributed to 
government contracts and grants (Gazley, 2008; Salamon, 2003). In addition, government 
funding affords NPOs access to the political process and provides further opportunities 
for advocacy (Chavesc, Stephens, & Galaskiewicz, 2004). Increased professionalism of 
workers within the nonprofit sector is also a noted consequence of government funding; 
moreover, nonprofits that rely on professional staff and collaborate with others are more 
likely to receive government support (Suárez, 2011).  
Other research however shows another side of government involvement with 
NPOs. Too much funding or control by government can lead NPOs to become 
government vendors that may drift away from their mission, goals, and clients (Frumkin 
& Andre-Clark, 2000; Salamon, 1995). Government control can come in many forms 
such as state regulations and the degree to which government agencies and the legislature 
holds NPOs accountable. For example, McBeath and Meezan (2010) find that the 
introduction of performance-based (i.e., use of incentive payment structure), managed 
care contracts with nonprofit child welfare agencies in Michigan led organizations to be 
overly focused on efficiency rather than foster care child outcomes of family 
reunification which may be a more accurate measure of program success. In the end, 
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NPOs can become more bureaucratic, less flexible, and less autonomous from 
government (Frumkin, 2005; Grønbjerg, 1993; Smith, 2004; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). 
Research also demonstrates that reliance on government funding decreases the likelihood 
that nonprofit boards will be more representational of their communities; therefore, 
organizations which depend less on government funding and more on volunteer labor will 
have stronger boards that are more representative of their localities (Guo, 2007). 
Possibly, board representativeness could be another indicator of a business-like strategy. 
Given the pivotal role government plays in NPOs behaviors and actions, it is expected 
that: 
Hypothesis 3: Greater government control will increase the adoption of business 
management strategies by nonprofit managers. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Receiving government funding will decrease the adoption of 
business management strategies by nonprofit managers. 
 
These propositions seek to capture the effects of publicness (i.e., control and 
funding) on nonprofit management.  I hypothesize that more government control 
encourages managers to adopt business practices in order to please their government 
principals and thereby appear better managed and, overall, more efficient. This reflects a 
similar trend to what has occurred in public administration with its emphasis on New 
Public Management principles (i.e., a market orientation that stresses outcomes and 
efficiency). Conversely, accepting government funding signifies that government is 
paying nonprofits-either through grants or contracts-to provide a service. NPOs, who 
receive funding from government, may be selected for funding because they are 
nonprofits and are thereby expected to deliver quality services motivated by their 
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charitable missions. Government funding may increase a NPO’s financial stability while 
decreasing its need to use business strategies. 
Striving for a Nonprofit Identity: A Case of Institutional Isomorphism? 
Even though commercialization and publicness offer some insight into the 
powerful forces shaping the management and operations of NPOs, other influences, more 
internal to the sector’s identity and value systems, are at work as well. The identity and 
values of the sector may seem nebulous, but the literature suggests that there are 
distinctive and identifiable roles of NPOs. If it can be argued that publicness and 
privateness describe the core characteristics of organizations, is there room to incorporate 
a role for an agency’s nonprofitness, i.e., their identification with a nonprofit core? 
Dekker (2001, p. 61) ominously speculates what happens “when nonprofitness makes no 
difference.” While considering the distinctive “nature” of nonprofits must be approached 
with caution, there are ways of depicting NPOs that capture their distinctiveness from 
government and business entities (Ott & Dicke, 2012), and indeed there is an assumption 
by many of those in the field and academic community that a nonprofit mindset, to at 
least some degree, shape organizational management and action (Anheier, 2005; 
Weisbrod, 2012). This presumption affects how people think about the effects and 
changes wrought by marketization. 
Scholars have spent decades specifying what NPOs are and what they do. 
Charitable and religious organizations have historical roots dating back to colonial 
America although modern-day conceptualizations of these organizations have evolved 
(Hall, 1992; Holland & Ritvo, 2012). The United Nations (2003, p. 18) defines nonprofit 
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organizations as the following: self-governing, not-for-profit and non-profit distributing, 
institutionally separate from government, and non-compulsory. Peter Frumkin (2005), a 
prominent scholar of nonprofits, offers a framework for describing the nonprofit and 
voluntary sector. He notes that the four distinct purposes of the sector are to promote 
service delivery, social entrepreneurship, civic and political engagement, and values and 
faith; any one of these taken to an extreme is problematic.
23
 Frumkin argues that while all 
nonprofit and voluntary agencies should perform each of these functions to some extent, 
the biggest challenge in the sector is finding the right “fit” and balance between these 
four objectives (p. 180). Not only do these purposes explain what NPOs do, but they also 
speak to an inherent value construct of what being a nonprofit should mean. NPOs can 
create social capital (Putnam, 1995), social trust (Fukuyama, 1996), and social change 
while also filling in the gap between, or acting as an alternative to, government and 
business (see also, Ott & Dicke, 2012; 
Young, 2006, pp. 49-50), especially on behalf of those who are poor and under-
represented. In sum, nonprofits are theorized to serve an important role in society as 
value guardians that emphasize principles like “community participation, due process, 
and stewardship” (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004, p. 136).  
Combined, these universal purposes and principles of NPOs lay a theoretical 
ground work for exploring practices and values practitioners in the sector may identify 
with and hold in high regard. Perhaps, NPOs managers, professionals, and volunteers 
take these values and understanding of what makes NPOs special into account when 
making decisions for their agencies. Yet knowing the extent to which these values and 
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identity shape management and actions is difficult. One challenge is that nonprofits still 
have an “unsettled relationship between the state and the market” (Frumkin, 2005, p. 
163). If nonprofits succumb to pressures from business and government, then they risk 
losing the essence of what makes them distinctive and being further institutionalized to 
practices of the market and public agencies.  
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991) influential theory of institutional isomorphism 
describes how organizations have the tendency to become more homogeneous to one 
another. They hypothesize isomorphic changes occur as agencies interact more with one 
another, depend on other organizations for their resources, professionalize their field, and 
in particular, if an organizational field relies upon the state for resources, it will then have 
a higher level of isomorphism. Is it possible for nonprofit and voluntary organizations to 
maintain their distinctive purposes (i.e., some level of nonprofitness) in a setting 
pressuring them to make decisions based on market and governmental norms? To begin 
exploring this question, the following propositions are offered: 
Hypothesis 5: Higher levels of nonprofitness will decrease the adoption of 
business management strategies by nonprofit managers. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Receiving funding from other nonprofits or foundations will 
decrease the adoption of business management strategies by nonprofit managers.  
 
It is expected that managers with a greater identification with core nonprofit 
values and purposes are less likely to utilize business management strategies in their 
agencies. These administrators may have stronger beliefs concerning how their NPO 
should be managed; furthermore, they could see what they do as something distinctive 
from what administrators in business and government do. In addition, NPOs who receive 
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funding from other nonprofits or foundations are expected to be less likely to adopt 
business management strategies. This might be attributed to other nonprofit and voluntary 
agencies encouraging one another to adopt similar norms of behavior. Or, funding from 
other NPOs may allow administrators to manage without pressures to conform to the 
practices of business and government. 
Background of Child Welfare Agencies 
There are compelling reasons for studying the impact of marketization, 
publicness, and nonprofitness on child welfare nonprofit management. Private, nonprofit 
child welfare agencies offer a rich context for exploring today’s evolving state-market-
civil society interactions. First, providing services for children’s welfare originally began 
in the private, philanthropic sector (Embry, et al., 2000; Leiby, 1978; Mangold, 1999), 
starting as early as the 1800s and has continued thus forth (Flaherty, et al., 2008). Caring 
for abused, neglected, and dependent children is “always [been] a ‘privatized’ system, 
never an exclusively public one” (Mangold, 1999, p. 1295). However, in current 
arrangements, the state maintains the ultimate responsibility for a child’s mental, 
physical, and emotional well-being when they are taken away from their parents or 
families. Foster care and adoptions represents a rare case where government, so to speak, 
‘owns’ an individual and serves as a proxy for decisions made regarding that child’s 
future.  
Secondly, the actions NPOs can take to service children and their families are 
controlled by public policy decisions. Passage of welfare reform in 1996, The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (hereafter PRWORA), 
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eliminated many of the entitlement programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and Emergency Assistance while giving greater authority to states for 
providing welfare services. For example, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) replaced (AFDC). It created time limits for public assistance programs and work 
force development became an essential component. Reese (2005) argues that despite the 
lack of national data on the number of women who lost custody of their children due to 
welfare reform and their poverty-stricken conditions, state data alone reflects a significant 
number of women abandoning their children.
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 Additionally, welfare reform had strong 
impacts on state and local governments, as they have had to fund more of child services 
than in the past (Courtney, 1999; Scarcella, et al., 2006). Another influential component 
of PRWORA, referred to as the “Charitable Choice” provision, urged states to contract 
with Faith Based Organizations in the delivery of welfare services. Mangold (1999) and 
Scarcella et al. (2006) also note the significance of PRWORA since it amended the Social 
Security Act by adding the word ‘for-profit’, thus permitting private sector, for-profit 
organizations to receive federal funding for the provisions of foster care. Additionally, 
amendments to the Social Security Act, specifically Title IV-B and Title IV-E, affected 
states' federal funding for family prevention and support services and costs for out-of-
home placements and adoption (Flaherty, et al., 2008). 
Third, nonprofit child welfare agencies are meeting the needs of a critical service 
area for government. In fiscal year 2011, 646,000 children were serviced by the public 
foster care system (U.S. Children's Bureau & ACYF, 2012) and the cost of providing 
services to these children averages around $20 billion dollars a year (Scarcella, et al., 
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2006). The magnitude of children receiving services represents only a small portion of 
those actually affected by the public foster care system. The families of these children 
and youth – biological, foster, and adoptive – are also impacted by governmental 
involvement in their lives. A clear majority of states are soliciting and funding nonprofit 
organizations to provide services to children while still retaining control over Child 
Protective Services. The National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being (2001) 
offers a nationwide estimate regarding nonprofit and private delivery of child welfare 
services funded by government. In a phone interview with 46 state administrators in 
2000, they found that on a statewide basis, at least 90 percent of states surveyed used 
private providers in foster care placement, residential treatment, and family preservation 
and family support services (U.S. DHHS & ACF, 2001). Moreover, they discovered that 
approximately 80 percent of those surveyed reported using for-profit and nonprofit 
providers to offer family reunification programs, special needs adoptions, and recruitment 
of foster care/adoptive family services.  
And finally, there is a lack of national-level research on how the private and 
nonprofit provision of child welfare services is occurring (for an exception, see McBeath, 
et al., 2011). Frequently the data on foster care do not measure what they purport to be 
measuring, are not longitudinal, are not generalizable to the broader foster population, 
and lack a systematic understanding of the child’s well-being upon entry into the system 
i.e. a baseline assessments (for further explanation see Rosenfeld, et al., 1997; Usher, et 
al., 1999). Curran (2009) notes that one of the ongoing criticisms of the  modern child 
welfare system is that “it is not foster care in and of itself that produces poor outcomes 
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for children but rather a dysfunctional, underfunded child welfare bureaucracy run by 
poorly trained and over-whelmed staff” (p. ¶7). Furthermore, “Although public child 
welfare agencies have historically relied upon private agencies to deliver programs and 
services…very few studies to date have described the characteristics of the private 
agencies providing child welfare services or the challenges these agencies face” 
(McBeath, et al., 2011, p. 1). Given the tensions among agencies striving to meet the 
service needs of children and their families through a web of state-market-civil society 
interactions offers a rich context for exploring broader trends of the nonprofit sector.  
Methods and Data 
 The effects of marketization, publicness, and nonprofitness on the adoption of 
business management practices are examined through the perspective of agency 
managers. Administrators of nonprofit and voluntary child welfare agencies from across 
the country were surveyed. This sample comes from the classification of charitable 
statistics using the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes assigned by the 
Internal Revenue Service and the NTEE-Core Codes (NTEE-CC) assigned by the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Organizations were selected only if 
they were classified as a human service foster care agency with the assistance of the 
Urban Institute where the NCCS is housed and managed (Boris, De Leon, Roeger, & 
Nikolova, 2010).
25
 While many of these NPOs perform a variety of child welfare services 
(e.g., adoption, advocacy, and family preservation), their agency’s classification falls 
under NTEE and NTEE-CC codes of foster care services. The choice to sample the 
population in this manner does remove some of the larger, national agencies like Catholic 
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Charities from the known population of foster care providers. However, it is virtually 
impossible to identify large nonprofits like Catholic Charities through the NTEE and 
NTEE-CC system because they are often classified under more general charity type like 
human service agencies.
26
 This sample does not represent a precise sampling frame of 
NPOs providing foster care services, and as other have noted, this is due in part to the 
fact that there is no exact count of the number of NPOs, as well as for-profit agencies, 
offering child welfare services nationwide (McBeath, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, this 
work does begin to at least identify a portion of NPOs who are providing child welfare 
services. 
 After compiling an initial list of nonprofit foster care agency providers, I 
conducted further research online and by telephone to find email addresses of top 
administrators at each agency and to verify the NPOs provided some form of child 
welfare or advocacy service. A total of 426 managers were included in the sampling 
frame, and of that, 184 individuals participated in this research giving a response rate of 
43 percent.
27
 The data come from an online survey collected between April 12, 2012 and 
June 27, 2012. The design of my survey instrument is derived from a combination of 
literature reviews of nonprofit, public administration, and social work research as well as 
the results of research conducted by the National Quality Improvement Center on the 
Privatization of Child Welfare Services.
28
 The 54 question survey should have taken 
respondents between 20 to 25 minutes to complete. Observations come from NPOs in 38 
different states. 
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Dependent Variables 
Four dependent variables measure the adoption of business management strategies in 
child welfare nonprofit and voluntary agencies. These dependent variables are receiving 
fees-for-services, engaging in marketing alliances with businesses, need to 
professionalize agency by replacing volunteers, and running my agency like a business. 
The frequency of acquiring private fees-for-services and using cause-related marketing 
alliances with businesses are measured on a three-point scale of never, occasionally, and 
frequently. The third dependent variable is three-point scale based on whether they agree, 
are neutral, or disagree with the following statement: “there is a need to replace 
volunteers with professional staff members.” Lastly, managers were asked on a day-to-
day basis, how important is “running my agency like a business” in informing your 
decision-making. A four-point Likert scale of not important at all or slightly important, 
moderately important, or extremely important explains perceived importance of running 
their agency like a business. Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics in more detail. 
Independent Variables 
 The role marketization trends may play in the adoption of business management 
practices is examined through two variables. The first variable is an exploratory factor 
score labeled the “influence of the business community.”29 A factor score helps identify 
key constructs of a particular concept in addition to relying on intuition and theory 
(Fabrignar & Wegener, 2012). The measured variables creating the influence of business 
community index are based on Likert scales of agreement and disagreement with the 
following five statements: 1) There is greater competition with businesses for 
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government contracts and funding; 2) There is pressure to generate commercial revenues 
and fees-for-services; 3) Businesses providing child welfare services presents a challenge 
to your agency’s service provision; 4) Competition with other agencies over funding 
presents a challenge to your agency’s service provision; and 5) Large donors or 
corporations influencing management or programs presents a challenge to your agency’s 
service provision. These variables factor around one score (eigenvalue=1.53). In addition, 
the Cronbach’s alpha’s is .67 which is a fairly reliable and internally consistency measure 
of the index. Both of these scores indicate that the index is capturing the underlying 
construct of what I have termed the influence of the business community.
30
 A second, 
binary variable of whether a NPO receives funding from business corporations is also 
used to further explore the effects of marketization. 
 The impact of publicness on the adoption of business management practices is 
measured with two variables. First, a government control index is captured through factor 
score analysis. The government control index is created from six survey questions: 1) If 
your agency stopped receiving government funds, how would this affect daily operations; 
2) The level of influence of State Child and Family Services Review findings and your 
state’s Program Improvement Plan on your agency’s operations; 3) The level of influence 
of state regulations on agency operations; 4) How involved are the public child welfare 
agencies and 5) state legislatures in holding your agency’s operations accountable; and, 
6) The extent to which strong governmental influence over agency operations presents a 
challenge to effectively providing services. The reported eigenvalue from this scale is 
1.52 and the Cronbach alpha is .67. Together, these scores signify the index is fairly 
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reliable and an internally consistent measure of what I refer to as government control. 
Another binary variable that helps explore the influence of publicness is whether or not a 
NPO receives government funding from either state legislatures or public child welfare 
agencies. A majority of the literature on publicness includes a dimension of agency 
ownership in their statistical models. Given the fact that all organizations in this sample 
are private, nonprofit agencies, and that measuring ownership in the nonprofit and 
voluntary sector is difficult to account for, these models do not include the typical 
ownership variable.
31
  
 The final variables of interest addresses how managers identify with the nonprofit 
purposes and values NPOs serve in society – nonprofitness – and whether they are 
receiving funding from other nonprofits and foundations. Exploratory factor analysis is 
employed to demonstrate the extent to which managers agree with the following seven 
statements about nonprofit organizations’ role in society in that they: 1) Act as an 
alternative to government by protecting and promoting individual and community values 
and interests; 2) Experiment or be innovative in programs, processes, and service 
delivery; 3) Drive social change; 4) Serve poor, under-represented, or disadvantaged 
individuals; 5) Promote causes and policies on behalf of clients and communities; 6) 
Bring communities together and develop social trust; 7) Provide or supplement services 
government and business cannot or does not offer. Rather than viewing nonprofits 
purposes independently, the real distinctive nature of NPOs may be in the combination 
and clustering of their roles (Salamon, Hems, & Chinnock, 2000). Explaining the identity 
and values of the nonprofit sector is comparable to what Moulton and Eckerd (2012) refer 
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to as their “Nonprofit Sector Public Role Index.” Similar to their findings, the managers 
in this sample identify with the particular purposes of the nonprofit and voluntary sector. 
Combined, these measures have a high eigenvalue score of 4.31. The Cronbach alpha of 
.91 is also high indicating that the nonprofitness index is capturing an underlying concept.  
The final binary variable that explores the influence of other nonprofits and foundations 
is whether NPOs receives funding from other nonprofits and foundations. 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics  
  Mean SD Min Max N 
Dependent 
     Fees for services 1.68 0.79 1.00 3.00 151 
Marketing alliances 1.80 0.76 1.00 3.00 149 
Running agency like business 2.91 0.96 1.00 4.00 148 
Need to professionalize 1.96 0.85 1.00 3.00 163 
Independent 
     Influence of the business* 0.00 1.00 -1.98 2.97 138 
Government control* 0.00 1.00 -2.20 2.18 134 
Nonprofitness* 0.00 1.00 -4.38 1.16 156 
Receives funding from businesses 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 166 
Receives funding from 
government 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 179 
Receives funding from nonprofits 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 159 
Controls 
     Agency's operational budget size 3.54 1.47 1.00 6.00 184 
Range of services 5.11 3.07 0.00 14.00 184 
Offers advocacy service 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 184 
Provides services in rural area 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 167 
Board member from business 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 145 
Board member from government 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 145 
Female 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 143 
Executive director 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 155 
Education level 2.74 0.79 1.00 4.00 146 
Business background and training 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 153 
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Worked in business 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 149 
*Factor scores are standardized, with a mean of 0.00 and a standard deviation of 
1.00. 
 
Control Variables 
Agency and individual level characteristics are controlled for in these models. 
There are six agency level controls. The first measure is of an agency’s operating budget 
revenues for fiscal year 2011 with 45% of managers reporting revenues of less than $1 
million, 30% with revenues between $1million and $4.9 million, and 25% with revenues 
of $5 million or more. Range of services offered captures the different number of child 
welfare services an agency provides with up to 14 different choices available (mean = 
5.11 and standard deviation = 3.07).  Several NPOs offers advocacy services for children 
and families (mean = 48%). Provides services in rural area measures whether a nonprofit 
organization offer services in rural areas (mean = 31%). Two other agency level controls 
are whether they have a board member from business (mean = 82%) and a board member 
from government (mean = 32%). 
At the individual level there are five control variables for managerial 
characteristics. These controls are important because they could have different effects on 
agency practices and their reported adoption of business management strategies and thus 
needed to be accounted for. Females account for 55% of respondents. The executive 
director or president variable measures whether the respondent is the top administrator 
(65%) at their agency or have a different position. Education level is a categorical level 
variable reporting their level of education with 8% reporting less than a BA or BS degree, 
23%t reporting a BA or BS degree, 56% reporting a Master’s degree, and 13% reporting 
a PhD or Doctorate degree. The business background and training variable measures 
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whether they have a professional background or training in the area of business (11%) 
and worked in a business corporation measures whether they have worked in a business 
corporation (23%). 
Statistical Approach 
All four models of business management practices are based on categorical 
dependent variables. Two dependent variables, charging fees for services and engaging 
in marketing alliances with business, are based on a frequency of occurrence from never 
to occasionally to usually. Need to professionalize agency by replacing volunteers is 
measured on a range from whether respondents agree, neither agree nor disagree, or 
disagree with this practice. I test all these relationships using a multinomial logistic 
model given that the dependent variables in these three models do not have a natural 
ordering to them.
32
 Multinomial logistic models does limit analysis to comparing 
alternatives and relative change by examining one category at a time; nonetheless, it is 
still a useful statistical approach for studying statistical relationships among categorical 
variables (e.g., see Feeney, 2008; Guo, 2007; Stratton, O'Toole, & Wetzel, 2008).
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 Of 
the four dependent variables, only the fourth variable of running my agency like a 
business has a natural ordering based on a range of importance from one to four; hence, 
an ordered logistic model will be employed.  
 The results and interpretation of these models are presented as odds ratios. For the 
multinomial logistic models, positive and significant independent variables have values 
above one indicating an increased odd of being in the non-reference category, controlling 
for other variables in the equation. Conversely, an odds ratio of less than one signals that 
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the independent variable decreases the predicted probability of being in the non-reference 
category holding all other variables at their means. 
Results 
The findings of nonprofit adoption of business management strategies are 
presented in four tables with only the key variables of interest displayed. The full models 
are presented in Appendix A. Table 3.2 and 3.3 presents the results of occasionally and 
usually charging fees for services, and using marketing alliances with businesses, when 
compared to the reference category of never doing these practices. Table 3.4 displays the 
findings of whether managers agree or are neutral about there being a need to 
professionalize their agencies by replacing volunteers compared to those who disagree. 
The final model of running my agency like a business is presented in Table 3.5. 
Fees for Services 
Three of the key independents variables (1) influence of the business community 
index, (2) receiving funding from business, and (3) government control index are 
significantly related to charging fees for services.  First, an increase in the influence of the 
business community index leads to an increase in the likelihood of NPOs charging fees 
for services when compared to those who never charge fees for services. More 
specifically, a one point increase in the business community’s influence is associated 
with increased odds of usually charging fees for services by a factor of 2.4. Secondly, 
receiving funding from business increases the likelihood of occasionally charging fees for 
services. Therefore, agencies that receive money from business are 345% more likely to 
occasionally charge fees for services compared to those who never do. And finally, more 
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government control is associated with decreased odds of charging fees for services; thus, 
a one point increase in the government control index decreases the likelihood of usually 
charging fees for services by 67%. The other key variables of interest- receiving funding 
from government, nonprofitness index, and receiving funding from nonprofits and 
foundations-are not significant predicators of the frequency with which agencies charge 
fees for services. 
Table 3.2 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Charging Fees for Services 
Independent Variables 
Occasionally versus 
Never  
Usually versus 
Never 
     Odds     
     Ratio        SE   
Odds 
Ratio     SE 
Influence of the business community 
index 1.785 0.670  
 
  2.364* 0.943  
Receives funding from businesses   4.450* 3.292  
 
1.141 0.940  
Government control index 0.520 0.216  
 
 0.331* 0.170  
Receives funding from government 1.240 0.939  
 
0.497 0.384  
Nonprofitness index  1.266 0.403  
 
0.798 0.250  
Receives funding from 
nonprofits/foundations 0.459 0.271    1.762 1.249  
Reference category: Never; N=151; χ2 = 89.068***; Log likelihood full model -
109.484;*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01                
 
By examining the model of charging fees for services, I find support for the 
hypotheses that increased influence of the business community and accepting funding 
from business corporations leads to the adoption of business management practices by 
child welfare agencies. Businesses commonly charge for their services and products, and 
in the context of these child welfare agencies, 48% of them reported charging fees for 
services at least on an occasional basis. Contrary to what was suspected, more 
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government control does not lead to an increase in the likelihood of using fees for 
services. This could be attributed to the fact that if government is controlling an agency 
through state and federal regulations or accountability measures (e.g., specified in 
contracts), government may also discourage agencies from charging fees. It is also 
possible that government could have more control of one services area (e.g., foster care 
and adoption) and less control in another (e.g., advocacy or family support services). In 
addition, government funding may be sufficient to cover the costs associated with service 
provision making fee charges no longer necessary. 
Alliances with Businesses  
The influence of the business community index and receiving government funding are 
significant predictors of NPOs engaging in cause-related marketing alliances with 
businesses to market an image, product, or service for mutual benefit. An increase in the 
influence of the business community index increases the odds of usually engaging in 
marketing alliances with business when compared to never while receiving funding from 
government is associated with a decrease in the odds of occasionally creating business 
alliances. Respectively, a one point increase in the influence of the business community 
index increases the odds of usually versus never creating alliances with businesses by 
149%. Correspondingly, nonprofits that accept government funding are 71% less likely to 
occasionally use marketing alliances with businesses. Creating marketing alliances with 
businesses was not found to be associated with receiving government funding, 
government control index, nonprofitness index, or receiving funding from nonprofits and 
foundations. 
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Table 3.3 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Engaging in Marketing Alliances with Businesses 
Independent Variables   
Occasionally versus 
Never  
Usually versus 
Never 
Odds Ratio SE      Odds Ratio SE 
Influence of the business 
community index 1.217 0.410 
 
    2.486** 0.967 
Receives funding from businesses 0.552 0.358 
 
1.857 1.518 
Government control index 1.077 0.391 
 
1.514 0.694 
Receives funding from 
government   0.289* 0.187 
 
0.291 0.248 
Nonprofitness index 1.204 0.310 
 
1.863 0.706 
Receives funding from 
nonprofits/foundations 2.337 1.328   0.836 0.562 
Reference category: Never; N=149; χ2 = 68.179***; Log likelihood full model -
123.828; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01                
 
 Thus, I find evidence in support of hypotheses 1 and 4. An increasing level of 
business community influence does increase the likelihood that a child welfare agency 
will engage in marketing alliances with businesses. NPOs may actively seek out alliances 
with businesses because they believe it will be financially beneficially and/or improve 
their agency’s presence and recognition in the community. On the other hand, these 
agencies could feel pressured to seek out alliances with businesses out of necessity or due 
to the lack of other resources. Correspondingly, child welfare agencies who accept 
government funding may be less likely to financially need to engage with business 
marketing alliances. 
Need to Professionalize 
The influence of the business community index and receiving government funding 
are related to the likelihood of nonprofit managers reporting a need to professionalize 
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their agencies. Greater influence of the business community increases the odds of NPOs 
managers reporting they feel a need to replace their volunteers with professional staff 
members than those who disagree, holding all other variables at their means. Thus, a one 
point increase in the influence of the business community index is positively associated 
with managers agreeing that there is a need to professionalize their agency by a factor of 
4.9 times and by a factor of almost 2 times for those who are neutral, compared to those 
in the disagree category. Additionally, nonprofits that take government funding are 365% 
more likely to be neutral regarding professionalizing their staff when compared to those 
who disagree with replacing volunteers.  
Table 3.4 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Need to Professionalize Agency  
Independent Variables 
Neutral versus 
Disagree 
  
Agree versus  
Disagree 
Odds Ratio SE   Odds Ratio SE 
Influence of the business 
community index   1.949* 0.781  
 
      4.850*** 0.781  
Receives funding from businesses 0.526 0.356  
 
0.662 0.450  
Government control index 0.887 0.357  
 
0.585 0.238  
Receives funding from government  4.648* 3.722  
 
0.957 0.672  
Nonprofitness index 0.965 0.241  
 
1.294 0.358  
Receives funding from 
nonprofits/foundations 1.049 0.618    1.183 0.677  
Reference category: Disagree; N=163; χ2 = 72.690***; Log likelihood full model -
141.813;*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01                
 
As in similar business management practices, nonprofitness index, and receiving funding 
from nonprofits and foundations are not significant predictors of perceived need of 
agency professionalism. Furthermore, the government control index is not significant 
while receiving government funding is only significant in the neutral category. 
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 Among those child welfare agencies with managers who report needing to replace 
volunteers with professional staff members, evidence suggests they are being impacted 
by the business community. Not surprisingly, growing influence from the business 
community predicts the likelihood that managers will want to professionalize their 
agencies.  
Running Their Agency Like a Business 
The only key variable of interest that positively and significantly increases the 
likelihood of NPO managers choosing to run their agency like a business is the influence 
of the business community index. Generally, greater influence of the business community 
leads managers to place an increased level of importance on running their agency like a 
business. More specifically, a one point increase in the influence of the business 
community index increases the odds that managers find running their agency like a 
business as more important by a factor of 1.6. To put it another way, a point increase in 
the index means managers are 60% more likely to consider it is more important to run 
their agency like a business. In this table, two additional variables that further explain 
why managers run their agency like a business are included: having a business board 
member and receiving a business background and training. These variables are not 
significant in the other business management strategies models, but are included here 
because they depict just how powerful the business community via business education 
and board member influence is on management strategies. NPOs with a business board 
member are 375% more likely to run their agency like a business. Additionally, NPO 
managers with a business background and training are 310% more likely to report 
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running their agency like a business. The other key variables of interest were not 
statistically significant predictors of manager’s running their agencies like a business.  
Table 3.5 
Ordered Logistic Regression of Running My Agency Like a Business 
Independent variables Odds Ratio SE 
Influence of the business community index  1.596* 0.396 
Receives funding from businesses 0.598 0.286 
Government control index 0.927 0.251 
Receives funding from government 1.991 1.039 
Nonprofitness index 1.127 0.235 
Receives funding from nonprofits/foundations 0.901 0.374 
Business board member        4.752*** -2.402 
Business background and training    4.103** -2.494 
N=148; χ2 = 62.277***; Log likelihood full model -158.408; Pseudo R2 = 
0.164;*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01                
 
 Similar to the other business management practices models, greater influence 
from the business community increases the odds that administrators will report that 
running their agency like a business is important to them. Some may find it surprising 
that these managers would identify with the statement of “running my agency like a 
business” when they work in the child welfare field. I would argue, however, that this 
gives further credence to the power of a business-minded approach and philosophy within 
nonprofit and voluntary agencies. Interestingly, other factors like having a business board 
member and professional training also cause managers to identify with the value in 
running their agency like a business.  
Discussion 
The analysis presented in this paper examines whether child welfare nonprofit and 
voluntary agencies are implementing business-based management strategies, and, the 
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extent to which external and internal forces are affecting their actions. Conversations 
regarding the marketization of NPOs are not a new phenomenon; and yet, this research 
further contributes to this on-going dialogue in interesting ways. The results show that 
managers of child welfare nonprofits are charging for services and the likelihood of 
usually imposing fees are positively influenced by the business community and 
negatively associated with government control. The likelihood of managers usually 
engaging in cause-related marketing alliances with businesses increases with more 
business community influence. Child welfare managers who agree that their agency 
needs to professionalize its workforce are also being impacted by the business 
community’s influence. And finally, administrators, who report “running their agency 
like a business” is important to them, can be attributed to pressures from the business 
community, having business board members, and having a background and training in 
business. Ultimately, the best predictor of these management strategies is the influence of 
the business community (e.g., competition and pressures to generate commercial 
revenues). Part of the intrigue lies in attempting to determine the tipping point for when 
nonprofits become ‘shadow businesses’ or ‘for-profits in disguise’ and thereby lose some 
of their nonprofit identity. This research empirically supports the theory that nonprofits 
are undergoing commercialization of their practices (Ott & Dicke, 2012; Weisbrod, 1998) 
and values; moreover, I find that this is occurring in an unexpected human service area 
like child welfare nonprofits. The consequences of NPO’s adopting business management 
practices are profound. 
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The data presented in this research demonstrates the power and influence of the 
business community on the management of child welfare agencies. Similar to what others 
have suggested, “When faced with large new opportunities for commercialism, many 
nonprofits seem quite willing to shed their altruistic cover and assume the values and 
behavior of for-profits” (James, 1998, p. 285). Explaining the extent to which these child 
welfare agencies managers ‘know’ that they are being influenced by business pressures 
cannot be detected; nonetheless, the results of this investigation does seem to indicate a 
business mindset in some of these administrators. Surprisingly, measures of government 
control and funding did not reduce the adoption of business management strategies in 
most models; moreover, managers’ level of nonprofitness did not reduce the adoption of 
business management practices in any of the models. Thus, indicates that while 
publicness and nonprofitness may matter in other management practices, their influences 
on using business management practices pale in comparison with that of privateness. The 
results of the data suggest that the management of child welfare agencies is succumbing 
to isomorphic pressures placed on them by the business community. 
The data offers support for the perpetual blurring and blending of the sectors. 
Scholars have long speculated the extent to which the blurring between NPOs and 
business and NPOs and government puts civil society at risk in long run (Alexander, et 
al., 1999; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). The implications of these trends of nonprofits 
adopting business management practices are yet to be decided. For decades private firms 
have been crying foul and “unfair competition” because revenue generating nonprofits 
are not being taxed (Rose-Ackerman, 1990). Additionally, NPOs and private foundations 
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represent an area of the U.S. economy that is having substantial growth of its financial 
revenues and assets (Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, & Stanton, 2012). Government has yet 
to respond to these criticisms by revoking NPOs tax-exempt status. But given the 
decreasing revenue streams of government, along with increasing lobbying power of 
corporations (e.g., the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case), imagining a 
future where taxing NPOs is not considered a viable revenue source for government 
seems unlikely. This may be particularly relevant to NPOs that are charging fees for 
services and using for-profit subsidiaries to pay for their other services.  
 The findings of this research also have implications on a more specific level for 
organizations providing child welfare services and advocacy. It raises normative 
questions regarding what should be influencing the management of nonprofits 
organizations. One might expect that some sense of a nonprofit identity and values would 
impact a manager’s decision to utilize business management practices i.e., decrease the 
likelihood that administrators would rely on these strategies in running their agency. 
However, evidence from this research suggests otherwise. The consequences of child 
welfare agencies embracing a market orientation will likely have significant and possibly 
negative impacts on children and their families. Research has already demonstrated that 
government contracts specifying performance-based outcomes are leading to an 
increasing focus on efficiency at the cost of child outcomes (McBeath & Meezan, 2010). 
Additional research also shows the potential negative consequences of commercialization 
on individual agencies and the sector. For example, Guo (2006) surveyed 67 different 
human service organizations and found that higher levels of commercial income did not 
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significantly improve nonprofits ability to achieve their mission and service their clients. 
Others suggest that viewing clients and citizens as consumers, due in part from 
commercial and business mentality pressures, can have negative effects on civil society, 
citizens, and other major institutions (Backman & Smith, 2000; Eikenberry & Kluver, 
2004). In the case of child welfare agencies, we do not know the impact of employing 
business management practices on the outcomes of children and their families. At best it 
may have no effect and at worst it could have devastating consequences for children and 
youth in the system. If managers focus more on survival and competition with other 
agencies for resources, then they may lose focus on their primary mission and 
responsibility to children and their families. 
Conclusion 
This research responds to Dekker’s (2001) question of what happens “when 
nonprofitness makes no difference?” with “they adopt business management strategies 
and start running their agency like a business.” This study describes the pervasiveness of 
the business community’s influence on the management of child welfare agencies. It 
demonstrates how child welfare agencies have yielded to isomorphic pressures from the 
market and have therefore taken on management strategies similar to that of private, for-
profits such as charging fees for services, engaging in marketing alliances with 
businesses, professionalizing their agency staff, and running their agency like a business.  
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Chapter 4 
TO COLLABORATE OR NOT TO COLLABORATE: A MULTI-THEORETICAL 
EXPLANATION FOR COLLABORATION AMONG CHILD WELFARE 
NONPROFITS 
Just as the practice of interorganizational relationships such as collaboration, 
partnerships, and alliances among nonprofit organizations has proliferated so too has the 
study of these relationships (Cairns, Harris, & Hutchinson, 2011; Guo & Acar, 2005). 
Collaboration has been especially prevalent among human service agencies (Provan & 
Milward, 1995; Selden, Sowa, & Sandfort, 2006; Sowa, 2008) such child welfare 
organizations (Glisson & James, 1993; Horwath & Morrison, 2007). However, 
collaboration is not an end unto itself (McGuire, 2006) and when service delivery 
nonprofit organizations (NPOs), like child welfare agencies for example, have a 
proclivity towards collaboration it is ultimately based on their concern for practice (Smith 
& Mogro-Wilson, 2007).  
There are several theoretical explanations for why organizations collaborate (Guo 
& Acar, 2005; Sowa, 2009). However, consensus about how collaborations among 
service delivery partners operate and their implications is still far from being reached 
(Sowa, 2009). The most commonly used theoretical explanation for why agencies of any 
type collaborate is resource dependency (Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Grønbjerg, 1993; 
Guo & Acar, 2005). In times of scarce resources, competitive forces, and environment 
constraints, a NPO’s desire for survival can make collaboration the most viable avenue 
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for achieving resource stability, securing existence, and accomplishing mission and goals 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Another theoretical justification for why organizations, in this case NPOs, begin 
to embody new organizational forms and practices like collaboration is institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b). Most of these studies, however, focus upon 
the more structural or legal elements of institutionalism in describing collaborative 
behaviors. Scott and Davis (2007) note while these elements are important, there are 
underlying social obligations, shared understanding and logics of action that provide 
stability and meaning for social life (i.e., social institutions). Furthermore, they maintain 
that social institutions can have greater impacts on behavior than the more easily 
measured and somewhat superficial regulative and legal institutional constraints. In 
particular, utilizing an organizational theory and sociological perspective of institutions, 
it could be argued that environmental pressures in the form of informal normative beliefs 
and mimetic structures (i.e., the more deeply held and harder to measure unwritten or 
social rules of the game) placed upon agencies by different sectors could be shaping 
interagency collaboration. Some have noted a need for collaborative researchers to 
employ this sociological perspective to better assess organizational behavior (Gazley, 
2010). 
A third reason NPOs may collaborate stems from their desire to improve 
organizational services and administration. Little research, though, specifically examines 
how past organizational outcomes rather than client outcomes shape future collaborative 
behaviors. In her exploratory study, Sowa argues that most research focuses on the 
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impacts of interagency collaboration on “general systems of services (i.e., health care), on 
the nature of the services provided, and on the clients served…rather than focusing on the 
impact on the individual organizations that chose to engage in collaborative service 
delivery” (2009, p. 1014). An organization’s experiences with collaborations and the 
results produced from those arrangements will likely influence prospective partnerships.  
And finally, decisions to collaborate may be a function of a network effect. The 
embedded nature of organizations in social structures creates opportunities for developing 
networks that enable organizations to achieve goals, but these same networks could also 
constrain behaviors (Granovetter, 1985). Guo and Acar (2005) contribute to this literature 
by connecting network theory to board linkages. They find that having board members 
with greater connections to other nonprofit organizations increases the formality of 
collaborative relationships. There are other ways of thinking about how board members 
influence collaboration. The sector in which a board member works could also affect how 
frequently NPOs partner. Sectoral membership has been found to be an important 
consideration that influences organizational behavior regarding partnering with others 
(Gazley & Brudney, 2007). 
If scholarship is truly to inform practice, then understanding collaboration through 
a multi-theoretical lens is needed (Guo & Acar, 2005; Oliver, 1990; Rethemeyer, 2005). 
Moreover, some suggest that nonprofit scholars have used too narrow of an approach 
when studying collaboration and scholars and practitioners alike would benefit from a 
more generic construction of the collaboration concept (Cairns, et al., 2011; See also 
Huxham & Vangen, 2001). Collaboration comes in many forms, sizes, and levels; 
 99 
consequently, if scholars wish to further advance our understanding of interorganizational 
relationships then it will be helpful to recognize this fact. Collaboration in this paper will 
be broadly explored as a relationship or partnership between two NPOs. 
This article builds upon prior work in the field to craft a theoretical framework for 
examining nonprofit intra-agency collaboration that infuses both traditional explanations 
with new approaches for why organizations collaborate. The driving focus of this 
research is to answer how we can best explain why nonprofit organizations collaborate 
with one another. Examining data from 161 child welfare nonprofits, I will show how 
normative commitments to the nonprofit sector, organizational outcomes from past 
collaborative experiences, a changing environment, and board members’ sector affiliation 
shape collaboration frequency between NPOs. This paper will identify gaps in the 
literature by reviewing theories of why nonprofits collaborate to test a set of hypotheses 
in the context of child welfare collaborations in particular. After discussing the data and 
results of an OLS regression on NPOs collaboration frequency, implications for child 
welfare agencies and the broader nonprofit sector will be considered.  
Existing Research and Areas of Exploration 
Much of the research on collaboration among nonprofits examines their 
relationships with government or business organizations and does not speak to their 
specific, within sector relationships across a national population. Even when scholars 
have studied collaboration they have often overlooked the normative institutional 
commitments that shape organizational behavior including pressures to conform to 
nonprofit, government, or business norms. Additionally, while some have examined the 
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effects past collaborative experiences have on the future of interorganizational 
relationships, few have examined this strictly in the context of how organizational 
outcomes from collaborating will impact their future decision to collaborate (for 
exception see, Chen, 2010). While normative institutional pressures should matter, 
factors external to the organization’s environment like the nature of resources and 
changing environments will affect an agency’s decision to collaborate. And, the socially 
embedded nature of board of directors in other organizations as well as their own 
professional norms could have a compounding influence on a NPO’s decision to 
collaborate. Furthermore, agency characteristics may also shape collaborative behaviors 
but there is no scholarly consensus on how and to what extent. Finally, the context of 
collaboration matters i.e., the types of agencies collaborating with one another could also 
be theoretically telling for their niche service type and have implications for the sector at-
large. The following sections will elaborate these theoretical challenges. 
Sociological and Normative Institutional Pressures 
Using the perspective that sociological and normative institutional pressures on 
organizations are meaningful and consequential, this paper explores how NPOs 
experiences these tensions from both within and outside of the nonprofit sector. From this 
institutional perspective, nonprofits may knowingly or unknowing be pressured from 
their external environment to conform to field norms, and through conforming to these 
forces, organizational survival can improve significantly (Meyer & Rowan, 1991). Guo 
and Acar’s (2005) advance our thinking about the institutional effects on nonprofit 
collaborations by examining societal level (legal influences) and industry level (industry 
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regulation) impacts. They find evidence that these pressures do shape the degree of 
nonprofit formality of collaborations, but they do not explore specific organizational level 
influences. Unfortunately, there is little research which explains how internal normative 
institutions regarding sectoral expectations of behavior could be influencing 
organizational decision-making. Other research clearly suggests that NPOs have key 
organizational characteristics and values that make them different from for-profits and 
government entities (Ott & Dicke, 2012). There is even a theoretical assumption that 
identifying with the sector’s purpose and values would, to at least some extent, shape 
organizational management and action (Anheier, 2005; Weisbrod, 2012). Both theoretical 
and empirical literature supports the special role nonprofits serve in society.  
For example, in their review of the literature Moulton and Eckerd (2012) find 
support for a “Nonprofit Sector Public Role Index.” Their index identifies six unique 
roles NPOs have including: service provision, social change, social capital, political 
advocacy, citizen engagement/democratization, individual expression, and innovation. 
Given that individuals in their survey recognize and distinguish between these values and 
roles, NPOs may be prompted to behave in a manner that conforms to norms of their 
field. Through trying to adhere to normative commitments, nonprofits are encouraged to 
tackle society’s toughest and most challenging problems. In turn, nonprofits use 
collaboration as a mechanism to help them achieve their goals and mission as well as to 
improve agency operations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; 
Sowa, 2009; Vernis, Iglesias, Sanz, & Sanz-Carranza, 2006). It is expected that when 
nonprofit organizations identify with some level of “nonprofitness” or what Moutlon and 
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Eckerd refer to as a “Nonprofit Sector Public Role Index,” their collaboration frequency 
would increase i.e., these underlying normative pressures to adhere to the view of sector 
as charitable and philanthropic (Bremner, 1988; P.D. Hall, 2006) will shape decision-
making. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of identification with nonprofitness will likely 
increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
 
While one might expect that within sector normative commitments would shape 
an organization’s decision to collaborate, it is also feasible that external environmental 
pressures are at work. One such case could stem from the rules of behaviors and market 
practices used by private, for-profit organizations. For decades scholars have argued that 
the lines between nonprofits and businesses are blurring, and therefore, “sector-bending” 
is occurring where imitation, interaction, intermingling, and industry creation is 
transpiring as nonprofits adopt a greater market orientation (Dees & Anderson, 2003). 
This process of NPOs employing market practices and assuming a market orientation is 
referred to as marketization or commercialization. The commercialization of the 
nonprofit sector is particularly relevant for social welfare organizations as they have 
taken-up “market-type relationships” (Salamon, 1993, p. 17; Weisbrod, 1997). These 
practices and pressures come in many forms such as: generating revenue and fees for 
services (Aspen Institute, 2001); being more entrepreneurial and resourceful (Dees, et al., 
2001); competing with business and other nonprofits for funding and contracts (B.S. 
Romzek, LeRoux, & Blackmar, 2012; Ryan, 1999); and having programs and 
management being influenced by large donors or corporations (Eikenberry & Kluver, 
2004).  
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Although some recognize that nonprofit behaviors are changing and being shaped 
by these market pressures, few, if any have empirically studied how these practices are 
impacting intra-sectoral collaboration. In essence, collaboration and competition between 
NPOs theoretically sit at two ends of a spectrum. Nonprofits that see themselves in 
competition with others and adopt more of a market orientation (i.e., experience stronger 
business influences) could be more reluctant to collaborate. Without knowing if 
collaboration will give them a competitive advantage, NPOs may prefer to work alone. In 
some cases, organizations may experience more tension to compete and to conform to 
market norms, while at other times, they connect with nonprofit sector values and 
therefore aim to fulfill their mission and goals through collaboration. Thus the following 
hypothesis is proposed regarding market pressures and the propensity to collaborate: 
Hypothesis 2: Greater pressures to conform to the influence of the business 
community will likely decrease the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
 
In addition to experiencing pressures to adhere to business principles, NPOs also 
experience pressure to act in accordance with government rules, regulations, and other 
norms of appropriate behaviors. As the state increasingly hollows out many of its social 
services, nonprofits have filled in this gap and taken-up the delivery of many services 
(Milward & Provan, 2000; Yang & VanLandingham, 2011). Due to the close relational 
nature of what NPOs and government do, scholars have explored the evolving 
relationships between these sectors (Boris & Steuerle, 2006; Salamon, 1995; Weisbrod, 
1997; Young, 2006). One lens used to study government’s influence on any organizations 
is “publicness” (Bozeman, 1987). All organizations experience government through 
various control mechanisms such as regulations, taxation, public policies, and contracts, 
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it is argued that organizations are subject to varying degrees of publicness (and 
privateness) (Bozeman & Moulton, 2011). An agency’s level of publicness is thought to 
impact internal organizational operations and managerial values (Boyne, 2002).  
Yet, we know very little about how a NPO’s level of publicness or informal 
accountability procedures influence within sector collaboration. Researchers have mainly 
studied the effects of government control and its influence on NPOs in the realm of cross-
sector collaborations (e.g., Bryson, et al., 2006; Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Gazley, 2010; 
Gazley & Brudney, 2007) or contract management and performance (Brown, Potoski, & 
Van Slyke, 2006; McBeath & Meezan, 2010; Van Slyke, 2007). In seeking to develop a 
preliminary theory of informal accountability, Romzek, LeRoux, and Blackmar (2012) 
find that among social service nonprofit networks there are informal aspects to 
accountability that impact outcomes which may be just as influential, if not more, than 
formal accountability procedures. Informal accountability occurs though various 
mechanisms that promote shared behavioral norms along with systems of rewards and 
sanctions that encourage particular action among network actors. Thus, applying their 
logic to formal and informal government control of nonprofit organizations, we may 
expect the following to be the case: 
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of government control will likely increase the 
collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
  
 One challenge for NPOs is that they still have an “unsettled relationship between 
the state and the market” (Frumkin, 2005, p. 163) and this could change their 
relationships with one another. If NPOs are succumbing to normative institutional forces 
from private and public organizations, the essence of what makes them distinctive, and 
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perhaps more likely to collaborate to solve difficult problems could be on the decline. 
Conversely, when NPOs recognize that their societal contributions are in the uniqueness 
of what they do and how they do it, they may be predisposed to greater collaboration with 
one another. Scott and Davis maintain that when social scientist endeavor to study the 
normative aspects of institutions, “structures and behaviors are legitimate to the extent 
that they are consistent with widely shared norms defining appropriate behavior” (2007, 
p. 260). Thus, research is needed that explores how shared norms of behaviors and 
organizational attitudes toward nonprofits, government control, and the business 
community’s influences action; in this case, how normative pressures shape intra-agency 
collaboration. 
Organizational Outcomes from Collaborative Experiences 
 Much of the research on interagency collaboration focuses on business or 
government partnerships with nonprofits (e.g., Austin, 2000; Austin & Seitanidi, 2012; 
Austin, 2003; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Selden, et al., 2006; Sowa, 2009). The 
motivating factors for cross-sector collaboration have a diverse range of explanations: 
resource dependency and scarcity, environmental circumstances, organizational 
characteristics, sector failure, and leadership (Bryson, et al., 2006; Cairns & Harris, 2011; 
Snavely & Tracy, 2000; Sowa, 2009).  In a survey of nonprofit executives and local 
government administrators regarding cross-sector collaboration, Gazley and Brudney  
argue that “concerns about internal capacity and mission, rather than external factors such 
as statutory pressure, appear to provide the strongest rationale for entering or avoiding 
public-private partnerships” (2007, p. 411). This suggests that organizations do consider 
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how collaboration affects their ability to achieve mission and services in addition to 
improving administration and agency processes. While much of the literature points to 
the advantages of collaboration (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Vernis, et al., 2006), 
some studies note the associated  disadvantages of partnering with others (Gazley, 2010; 
Gazley & Brudney, 2007). Despite the proliferation of research on cross-sector 
relationships, the literature has not offered “conceptual clarity as to the functioning of 
these kind of relationships and little understanding of the impact of interorganizational 
relationships on the clients receiving services and the organizations engaged in these 
relationships” (Selden, et al., 2006, p. 412). This raises questions as to whether 
collaboration between NPOs either betters client outcomes or enhances the internal 
capacity of an agency to achieve its mission and operate efficiently and effectively. 
 Some research shows that nonprofit executives have a strong motivation and 
predisposition to see the benefits of collaboration (Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Snavely & 
Tracy, 2000).  Additionally, studies have considered how past relationships and daily 
experiences of frontline service delivery workers helps them in assessing their 
collaborative partners and through social processes, their views can in turn impact future 
collaboration and even create barriers at the organizational level (Sandfort, 1999; Smith 
& Mogro-Wilson, 2007). Gazley notes that scholars have only just begun to explore  how 
“attitudes towards collaboration are influenced by direct experiences, both positive and 
negative” (2010, p. 52).  In a way, experiences of individuals within organizations, 
whether they are frontline workers or top executives, will guide collaborative 
relationships at an organizational level. Moreover, the success of collaboration, to the 
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extent that it helps or hinders an agency’s ability to reach its mission, goals, or improves 
its administration and procedures may serve as a powerful predictor of future agency 
collaboration.  
Two ways of thinking about how collaboration could specifically influence an 
agency’s operations is through its ability to affect an agency’s services and 
administration.  For example, collaboration may either positively or negative influence an 
agency’s administrative processes such as its oversight and accountability mechanisms, 
overall financial operations, or program development. Furthermore, collaboration could 
also impact an agency’s services such as the way an agency addresses community and 
clients’ needs, are accountable to clients, or meets their own performance measures. It is 
speculated that when NPOs experience positive effects from prior collaboration with 
other NPOs they are more likely to engage in future collaborations. 
Hypothesis 4: A positive impact on service quality from past collaborations will 
likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
 
Hypothesis 5: A positive impact on administration quality from past 
collaborations will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other 
nonprofits. 
 
Resource Dependency  
 An open-systems approach maintains that organizations rely upon and interact 
with their environments in order to survive and achieve legitimacy (Buckley, 1967; Katz 
& Kahn, 1978; Scott & Davis, 2007). Organizations are constrained by their resources 
and external environments, and collaborating with others can provide some control over 
and certainty about resource availability and stability, and enhance chances of achieving 
mutual goals (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Theories of resource dependency have become 
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the most commonly used explanations for why nonprofit collaborate (Guo & Acar, 2005). 
Scholars have discovered that NPOs adapt their behaviors (Froelich, 1999; Grønbjerg, 
1993) and even embrace certain values and societal roles (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012) 
based on their resource providers. Funders often encourage collaborations and networks 
through giving preference to organizations partnering with others or by mandatory 
requirement for funding (Graddy & Chen, 2006; Shaw, 2003; Snavely & Tracy, 2000). 
And, when resources are scarce cooperation is more likely to occur than competition 
(Molnar, 1978). Additionally, changes in an agency’s environment or resources may 
increase collaboration (Connor, Kadel, & Vinokur, 1999; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; 
Provan & Milward, 1995) as NPOs seek stability. The following hypotheses postulate 
what happens to intra-agency collaboration when nonprofits depend on resources from 
government, business, and other nonprofits as well as experience changes in their 
environment. 
Hypothesis 6: Receiving funding from outside sources will likely increase 
collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Decreases in government financial support will likely increase the 
collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Increases in demand for services will likely increase the 
collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
 
Board Governance 
 Board members have a responsibility to ensure the overall direction and 
performance of a nonprofit and therefore aim to assist agencies in finding the right 
balance between mission achievement and sound operations (Anheier, 2005). The focus 
of nonprofit governance is to assess the big picture and steer agency’s operations rather 
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than concentrate on the day-to-day tasks and internal management processes (Hudson, 
1999). Research on board governance shows that business board members are a highly 
favored component of board composition for NPOs (Worthy & Neuschel, 1984); and that 
diversity of occupations and affiliations in board makeup is preferable overall (Baysinger 
& Butler, 1985). Siciliano (1996) finds that among YMCA organizational boards, 
occupational diversity is positively associated with social mission performance and 
fundraising outcomes. The story of how board members influence NPOs’ behavior can be 
more complex though. In a qualitative study of twelve nonprofit board of directors, 
Miller (2003, p. 444) finds that when nonprofit board members have unclear and 
ambiguous roles regarding how to measure organizational effectiveness there is a 
tendency to monitor in a manner reflective of “their personal or professional 
competencies…[e.g.,] lawyers tended to ask questions around legal or contract issues.” 
Thus, when board directors are unsure of their duties, they have a tendency to act in 
accordance with their own professional norms thereby making organizational affiliation 
and sector experience relevant. 
Recognizing the gap in the nonprofit literature on board linkages and 
collaboration, Guo and Acar (2005) discover a positive and significant relationship 
between collaboration formality and board linkages to other nonprofit organization. They 
argue that there is a network effect from the embeddedness of board directors in other 
organizations that increases collaboration. Accordingly, having board members who 
work in various sectors could have an influence on the frequency of intra-agency 
collaboration. Board members have a public relations duty to enhance their agencies 
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standing in the community (Ingram, 2009) that could contribute to a growing 
collaboration intensity among nonprofits. The assumption then becomes that board 
members will increase a NPO’s intra-agency collaboration because of the strength of 
their networks, community ties, and responsibility to improve agency standing within the 
community. 
Hypothesis 9: Having board members from each sector will likely increase the 
collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. 
 
Organizational Characteristics 
 Two organizational characteristics that could affect the frequency of intra-agency 
collaboration are an agency’s age and budget size. However, the evidence of these 
influences on collaborative relationships is mixed or nonexistent (Gazley, 2010). Several 
studies have shown that smaller nonprofits are less likely to participate in formalized 
interagency collaborations (Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Guo & Acar, 2005) while larger 
organizations are less likely to perceive barriers to collaborating with government 
(Gazley, 2010). Some scholars find that an organization’s age is not a significant 
predictor of collaboration (Foster & Meinhard, 2002) or collaborative disadvantage 
(Gazley, 2010); whereas, others find older organizations are more likely to develop 
formalized collaborations (Guo & Acar, 2005). One explanation of these findings 
proposes that smaller and younger organizations have fewer resources and therefore 
experience greater competing priorities. In addition, these organizations may lack the 
network depth that provides larger agencies with more opportunities to collaborate. Also, 
smaller organizations may have weaker perceptions of their need to collaborate in the 
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first place. Therefore, I predict the following relationship between age and budget size on 
collaboration frequency: 
Hypothesis 10: Older and larger nonprofits will likely collaborate more 
frequently with other nonprofits. 
 
The theoretical assumptions for why NPOs collaborate and the previously suggested 
hypothesis are depicted graphically in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1. Explainations of collaboration frequency 
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Nonprofitness (+) 
Influence of the business community (-) 
Government control (+) 
 
Predisposition to collaboration 
Collaboration improves service quality (+) 
Collaboration improves admintration quality (+) 
Resource dependency 
Funding mix: Recieves funding from business, 
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Changing environment: Decline in government 
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Board Governance 
Board members from each sector  (+) 
Agency characteristics 
Agency's operational budget size (+) 
Agency age (+) 
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Collaboration among Child Welfare Nonprofits 
 There are several reasons for studying collaborations between nonprofits offering 
child welfare services. The rich historical context of collaboration among these agencies 
offers a unique perspective on the current child welfare system. Many scholars argue that 
we should consider the historical, processual, and contextual governance of evolving 
state-market-civil society interactions to fully understand policy arenas (Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2009; Bevir, 2010; Heinrich, et al., 2010; Robichau, 2011). And while this is 
certainly true for state-market-civil society relationships, it is arguably just as relevant for 
within sector relationships. Unlike other social services, the original providers of child 
welfare services were the private, philanthropic organizations (Embry, et al., 2000; Leiby, 
1978) going back as early as the 1800s (Flaherty, et al., 2008). Mangold notes, these 
types of services have  “always [been] a ‘privatized’ system, never an exclusively public 
one” (1999, p. 1295). While several state and local governments provided some grants to 
charities throughout the 1800s, the main provisions and funding of child welfare 
programs originated from the private sector (Flaherty, et al., 2008; Rosenthal, 2000; 
Young & Finch, 1977). Moreover, the philosophy of child welfare provisions in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries labeled these services as belonging to the local 
level and within the private and, mainly religious domain. 
In the early 1900s, networks of charities served as key suppliers of service for 
dependent children even though they progressively started receiving state and local 
government funding. In addition, the more well-known charities at that time such as the 
New York Prevention of Cruelty to Children opened similar divisions in other large cities 
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while other organizations like the Child Welfare League of America strived to create 
national standards and practices for all agencies providing child welfare. During this 
same time period, secular Children’s Home societies became widespread. Children’s 
Home societies were “not state sponsored but rather were statewide private 
organizations” that focused on child placement in “well-to-do” families and temporary 
shelter services (Boudreaux & Boudreaux, 1999, p. 176). In principle, there was a 
community-based, decentralized approach to service delivery that relied on nonprofit and 
charitable organizations to take care of children and their families. Although voluntary 
institutions have served as the main provider of services to children throughout the 
majority of American history—via foster care services such as orphanages, child 
placement, and group homes—early on they received very little regulation and 
monitoring (Holt, 2006). McGowan (2005) notes that even up to the 1960s the voluntary 
sector remained empowered to offer services in a manner they chose with little 
governmental involvement; thus, child welfare agencies have had a choice concerning 
who they provide services to and with whom they work with to do so. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s greater government funding and provision of 
child welfare services occurred; although, it was not until the 1990s that the state began 
to privatize its social service provisions (Flaherty, et al., 2008). By privatizing, the state 
began relinquishing some of its official service provisions (excluding child protective 
services) in favor of a more integrated and collaborative relationship with private, 
nonprofit organizations that it hoped would improve service effectiveness (Waldfogel, 
1997). Most notably, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity welfare 
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reform act urged states to contract with Faith Based Organizations and amended the 
Social Security Act which now allows ‘for-profit’ organizations to receive federal 
funding to provide child welfare services (Mangold, 1999; Scarcella, et al., 2006). In line 
with reforms of New Public Management, trends in 1970s, 80s, and 90s aimed to 
rationalize child welfare services via increasing accountability, efficiency, and objective-
based outcomes. Page states that these reforms: 
Grant local collaborators the discretion to craft flexible interventions for families 
while holding the collaborators accountable for the results they achieve. In the 
language favored by some human service analysts, states are encouraging 
collaboration around clients, programs, and policies—while organizational 
structures remain more or less the same. (2004, p. 596) 
 
Foster care services of the 1990s to present day are best portrayed in the welfare reform 
movement, increased emphasis on adoption through legislative initiatives, and privatized, 
managed care models of service provisions.  
As the original providers of services to dependent children, voluntary 
organizations still have a widespread, if not increasingly important part, in the current 
child welfare system. The relationship between public and private agencies is continually 
changing. Creagh states that “what began as evangelical child-saving in the mid-1800s 
was transformed during the course of the twentieth century into a professional, 
bureaucratized, complex network of efforts to confront illegitimacy and dependency” 
(2006, pp. 43, emphasis added). Moreover, the public’s view of government and private 
organizations place in child welfare services is a complicated, evolving one. Child 
welfare networks now include actors from government, nonprofit, and for-profit 
agencies; and in some instances, nonprofits are serving as the lead-organization network 
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for children and family service delivery (see Chen & Graddy, 2010; Graddy & Chen, 
2006). In essence, networks like these facilitate a nonhierarchical space of exchange, 
interaction, and interdependency for organizations and actors to engage with one another 
in order to cope with the challenges of a complex society (Wachhaus, 2009). The 
suggested benefits of these networks are that they can encourage a more integrated 
system based on bottom-up decision-making, self-organization, innovation, and a sense 
of community. In sum, they may well nurture a normative ethic to collaborate. 
 Formal collaboration, which frequently come with political mandates, are shaping 
the delivery of child welfare programs at the state and local levels (Ehrle, Andrews 
Scarcella, & Geen, 2004; Horwath & Morrison, 2007). And while this is occurring, 
national-level research regarding how for-profits and nonprofits provide child welfare 
services is lacking (for an exception, see McBeath, et al., 2011). Furthermore, “although 
public child welfare agencies have historically relied upon private agencies to deliver 
programs and services…very few studies to date have described the characteristics of the 
private agencies providing child welfare services or the challenges these agencies face” 
(McBeath, et al., 2011, p. 1). This research takes these considerations to heart by asking 
to what extent are child welfare agencies collaborating with other NPOs to serve children 
and families, and how are environmental and normative pressures as well as outcomes 
from past collaborative experiences shaping their behaviors. 
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Methods and Data 
Sample 
 This study relied upon a national sample of nonprofit and voluntary child welfare 
agency administrators. The sample comes from the classification of charitable statistics 
using the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes assigned by the Internal 
Revenue Service and the NTEE-Core Codes (NTEE-CC) assigned by the National Center 
for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Organizations were selected only if they were classified 
as a human service foster care agency with the assistance of the Urban Institute where the 
NCCS is housed and managed (Boris, et al., 2010).
34
 While many of these NVOs perform 
a variety of child welfare services (e.g., adoption, advocacy, and family preservation), 
their agency’s classification falls under NTEE and NTEE-CC codes for foster care 
services. The choice to sample the population in this manner does remove some of the 
larger, national agencies like Catholic Charities from the known population of foster care 
providers. However, it is virtually impossible to narrowly identify large nonprofits like 
Catholic Charities through the NTEE and NTEE-CC system because they are often 
classified under more general charity type like human service agencies.
35
 This sample 
does not represent a precise sampling frame of NVOs providing foster care services, and 
as other have noted, this is due in part to the fact that there is no exact count of the 
number of NVOs, as well as for-profit agencies, offering child welfare services 
nationwide (McBeath, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, this work does begin to at least identify 
a portion of NVOs who are providing child welfare services across the nation. 
 117 
 After compiling an initial list of nonprofit foster care agency providers, further 
research online and by telephone was conducted to find email addresses of top 
administrators at each agency and to verify the NVOs provided some form of child 
welfare or advocacy service. A total of 426 managers were included in the sampling 
frame, and of that, 184 individuals participated in this research giving a response rate of 
43 percent.
36
 The data come from an online survey collected between April 12, 2012 and 
June 27, 2012. The design of the survey instrument is derived from a combination of 
literature reviews of nonprofit, public administration, and social work research as well as 
the results of research conducted by the National Quality Improvement Center on the 
Privatization of Child Welfare Services.
37
 The 54 question survey should have taken 
respondents between 20 to 25 minutes to complete. Observations come from NVOs in 38 
different states. 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable measures the frequency with which nonprofit child 
welfare agencies collaborate with other nonprofit organizations. Administrators were 
asked how frequently they collaborated or partnered with nonprofits to provide services 
to families and children: never, yearly, quarterly, monthly, and weekly.  Intra-agency 
collaboration levels are as follows: 11% never collaborate, 9% collaborate on a yearly 
basis, 11% collaborate on a quarterly basis, 24% collaborate on a monthly basis, and 45% 
collaborate weekly. Therefore, over half of these agencies work with other nonprofits to 
provide services to their clients at least on a monthly basis. For analysis, this ordinal 
variable is turned into a numerical value corresponding to number of times an event 
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occurs each year (i.e., 0, 1, 4, 12, 52). Making this variable more continuous allows for 
the exploration of meaningful relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables and produces interesting results. 
Independent Variables  
 Normative sectoral pressures. The first variables to examine normative 
commitments addresses the identification with nonprofit’s purposes and values in society 
i.e., nonprofitness. Some have argued that the real identity and distinctive nature of 
nonprofit organizations may be best understood through the combination and clustering 
of roles rather than viewing the nonprofits purposes independently (Salamon, et al., 
2000). Similar to Moulton and Eckerd’s (2012) findings and their “Nonprofit Sector 
Public Role Index,” respondents in this sample strongly identify with these purposes and 
values of the sector. Respondents were asked their level of agreement with the following 
seven statements about nonprofit organizations’ role in society: 1) Act as an alternative to 
government by protecting and promoting individual and community values and interests; 
2) Experiment or be innovative in programs, processes, and service delivery; 3) Drive 
social change; 4) Serve poor, under-represented, or disadvantaged individuals; 5) 
Promote causes and policies on behalf of clients and communities; 6) Bring communities 
together and develop social trust; 7) Provide or supplement services government and 
business cannot or does not offer. Exploratory factor analysis, along with theory and 
intuition, was employed to construct all scales.
38
 Higher scores represent more agreement 
with these statements while lower scores indicate more disagreement. Table 4.1 presents 
the descriptive statistics in more detail. 
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 Pressures to conform to market principles and practices within the nonprofit 
sector have been argued to have an effect on agency operations (Eikenberry & Kluver, 
2004). NPOs could be experiencing these normative pressures in a variety of ways so a 
summated scale is created called the “influence of the business community” that 
combines these pressures into one variable.
39
 The influence of business community is a 
sum score based on a Likert scale of agreement and disagreement with the following five 
statements: 1) There is greater competition with businesses for government contracts and 
funding; 2) There is pressure to generate commercial revenues and fees-for-services; 3) 
Businesses providing child welfare services presents a challenge to your agency’s service 
provision; 4) Competition with other agencies over funding presents a challenge to your 
agency’s service provision; and 5) Large donors or corporations influencing management 
or programs presents a challenge to your agency’s service provision. 
Research also shows that government control and accountability of an agency 
affects its operations (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). In this case, the impact of 
“government control” is examined to see if it influences how frequently nonprofit 
collaborate with other nonprofits. The government control summated scale is created 
from six survey questions: 1) If your agency stopped receiving government funds, how 
would this affect daily operations; 2) The level of influence of State Child and Family 
Services Review findings and your state’s Program Improvement Plan on your agency’s 
operations; 3) The level of influence of state regulations on agency operations; 4) How 
involved are the public child welfare agencies and 5) state legislatures in holding your 
agency’s operations accountable; and, 6) The extent to which strong governmental 
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influence over agency operations presents a challenge to effectively providing services. 
Combined these questions offer a clue into how government pressures of oversight, 
influence, and regulation may be impacting child welfare agency behaviors.
40
   
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics  
Independent Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
The influence of the business community* 15.768 4.743 5 29 138 
Government control* 14.425 3.669 6 23 134 
Nonprofitness* 40.397 7.018 10 49 156 
Collaboration effects on service quality** 14.050 2.520 7 20 159 
Collaborative effects on administration 
quality** 
22.909 3.403 14 35 153 
Receives funding from businesses 0.783 0.413 0 1 166 
Receives funding from government 0.799 0.402 0 1 179 
Receives funding from nonprofits/foundations 0.642 0.481 0 1 159 
Experienced a decline in government financial 
support 
0.570 0.497 0 1 
151 
Experience an increase in services demanded 0.824 0.382 0 1 153 
Business board member 0.821 0.385 0 1 145 
Government board member 0.317 0.467 0 1 145 
Nonprofit board member 0.517 0.501 0 1 145 
Agency's operational budget size 3.543 1.474 1 6 184 
Agency age 31.668 30.809 3 158 184 
*Higher scores indicate greater levels of agreement regarding the indicator.  
** Higher scores reflect agreement that collaboration improves agency operations 
while lower scores signify collaboration hinder agency operations 
 
 
 Organizational outcomes from collaborative experiences. Scholars have considered 
whether nonprofits choose to collaborate based on previous collaborative history, 
achieving perceived goals or outcomes, and other predisposing conditions (Bryson, et al., 
2006; Chen, 2010; Oliver, 1990). This research adds to these studies by examining how 
perceived organizational outcomes in the form of service and administration 
improvement influence future collaborative activities. The first variable is a sum score, 
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collaboration effects on service quality, which measures the degree to which 
collaborations with other nonprofits is making an agency’s services “better or worse off” 
on a five-point Likert scale in the following areas: 1) ability to respond to community 
needs (2) ability to serve children and families well; 3) accountability to clients; and 4) 
ability to meet key agency performance outcomes.
41
 The second variable, collaboration 
effects on administrative quality, is a sum measure of the degree to which collaborations 
with other nonprofits is making an agency’s administration “better or worse off” in the 
following areas: 1) agency transparency 2) doing paperwork; 3) outside oversight and 
monitoring; 4) relationship with other nonprofits; 5) overall financial outlook; and 6) 
development of new and long-standing programs.
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A lower score indicates that 
collaboration harms an agency’s services or administration while a higher score is 
associated with a collaborative improvement to an agency’s operations.  
 Resource dependency –Funding mix and changing environment. Nonprofits 
dependency on other funding streams has been a well-documented explanation for why 
nonprofits collaborate. In this survey, respondents were asked whether they accepted 
funding from businesses, government, and other nonprofits and foundations. Dummy 
variables are used for business funding, government funding, and nonprofit/foundation 
funding. The dependency of nonprofits on their funding sources is often measured as 
continuous variables; however, given the nature of this survey, respondents were only 
asked whether they received funding from the different sectors. Therefore, two additional 
conceptualizations of environmental constraints and change are used in the model: 
decline in government financial support and increase in services demanded in the last 
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fiscal year. The percentages of these different dummy variables are presented in Table 
4.1. 
Board governance. In the nonprofit and voluntary sector, boards are stewards 
rather than owners of agencies and thus are responsible for how organizations conduct 
themselves but not in the same way for-profit boards have ownership and hold firms 
accountable (Frumkin, 2005, p. 6). The role board members have on influencing 
collaboration has not been thoroughly researched. Respondents were asked if they had 
board members from business, government, and other nonprofits. Three dummy variables 
were created where responses were given a 1 if they had a business, government, or 
nonprofit board member and 0 if otherwise. 
 Agency size and age. A nonprofit’s budget size and age have both been 
demonstrated to have an effect on collaboration. An agency’s operational budget size is a 
categorical variable based on their total annual operating budget with 1 being less than 
$100,000; 2 being between $100,000 - $499,999; 3 being $500,000 - $999,999; 4 being 
$1 million - $4,999,999 million; 5 being  $5 million - $9,999,999 million and 6 being 
greater than $10 million. The agency’s age is calculated from the year an agency began 
providing services in the child welfare system minus the year of survey completion.  
Methods  
The most appropriate statistical method for an ordinal dependent variable is an 
Ordered Probit regression model. However, after running the Ordered Probit models of 
different collaboration frequencies, the results and statistical significance were found to 
be almost identical as an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS). Given that the results 
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were similar, an OLS regression is used and the dependent variable of collaboration 
frequency is converted into a continuous measure. A simple OLS regression allows the 
research question to be easily addressed, that is, how different theoretical explanations 
shape nonprofit collaborations individually and collectively. The results also permit the 
different theoretical models to be compared and the direction of different relationships to 
be explored. Heteroskedasticity is not found to be a problem but robust standard errors 
are used to be cautious. 
Results 
Using OLS, the independent effects of different theoretical explanations for how 
frequently nonprofits collaborate with one another is described in Table 4.2. The 
dependent variable for all models is how frequently nonprofits collaborate with other 
nonprofits to provide services to children and their families. Model 1 is the baseline 
model and shows how collaboration frequency is a function of the control variables only. 
Model 2 show how the sociological/normative institutional pressures influence 
collaboration frequency. Model 3 tests the effects of organizational outcomes from 
previous collaboration on future collaboration endeavors and Model 4 examines the 
varying effects of funding sources and changing environment. Model 5 shows the results 
of having board members from different sectors. And finally, Model 6 includes the 
effects of all variables on collaboration frequency.  
The variation inflation factor (VIF), a common diagnostic test for collinearity, is 
used to check for multicollinearity. As a general rule, VIF should not exceed 10 (Belsey, 
Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). VIF values for all models were below 10. Appendix B reports 
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Pearson’s correlation between variables. Two independent variables had a strong 
correlation with one another and are worth mentioning given that the models report 
robust standard errors: collaborative outcomes on service and administration quality. 
There is a positive relationship between organization’s identifying that collaboration 
improves both their administration and service i.e., if they identify that collaborating with 
other nonprofits improves their services they may also maintain it improves their 
administration as well. 
 Models 1-5 show the statistical significance effects of some key variables and not 
that of others. While each of these models have their own interesting implications, Model 
6 has the best overall fit so I will focus on these results regarding hypothesis testing and 
key findings. Appendix C includes results from all of the hypotheses testing together. 
Given the nature of the dependent variable, coefficients can only be interpreted as having 
a positive or negative influence on the frequency with which nonprofit organizations 
collaborate controlling for other variables in the equation. Hypothesis 1-3 examines how 
normative institutional pressures from government, business, and nonprofits shape 
collaborative behaviors of child welfare agencies. They maintain that while greater 
influence from the business community may lessen collaboration between nonprofit child 
welfare agencies, the more pressure experienced from government and nonprofits may 
increase interorganizational relationships. Support is only found for Hypothesis 1, 
indicating that greater identification with a nonprofit normative ethic leads to more 
collaboration while the direction of business and government influence (Hypothesis 2 and 
3) is as expected but not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.2 
OLS Regression Models of Nonprofit-nonprofit Collaboration Frequency 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Normative Institutional Pressures 
     
The influence of the business 
community  
-0.075 
   
-0.384 
  
(0.469) 
   
(0.460) 
Government control 
 
0.882 
   
0.960 
  
(0.558) 
   
(0.587) 
Nonprofitness 
 
0.813*** 
   
0.471*   
  
(0.226) 
   
(0.261) 
Organizational outcomes 
      
Collaborative effects on 
service quality   
3.160*** 
  
2.488**  
   
(1.003) 
  
(0.990) 
Collaborative effects on 
administration quality   
-1.407** 
  
-1.356*   
   
(0.707) 
  
(0.717) 
Resource Dependency  
      
Receives funding from 
businesses    
8.346* 
 
8.771*   
    
(4.915) 
 
(4.948) 
Receives funding from 
government 
   
5.769 
 
0.266 
 
  
 
(4.803) 
 
(4.840) 
Receives funding from 
nonprofits/foundations    
4.790 
 
2.323 
    
(4.299) 
 
(4.211) 
Experienced a decline in 
government financial support    
5.978 
 
9.239**  
    
(3.742) 
 
(3.874) 
Experience an increase in 
services demanded     
5.442 
 
7.352*   
    
(4.094) 
 
(3.769) 
Board Governance 
      
Business board member 
    
-7.267* -14.076*** 
     
(4.099) (4.028) 
Government board member 
    
1.445 2.189 
     
(4.281) (4.227) 
Nonprofit board member 
    
7.829** 7.019*   
     
(3.709) (3.613) 
Agency Characteristics 
      
Agency's operational budget 
size 
3.429** 2.997** 3.226** 1.770 3.600** 1.973 
 
(1.388) (1.455) (1.377) (1.470) (1.418) (1.416) 
Agency age 0.030 0.044 0.017 0.014 0.038 0.048 
 
(0.069) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.070) (0.058) 
Constant 13.824** -29.433*** 3.83 -0.583 14.234*** -24.123 
  (4.518) (10.784) (13.338) (5.199) (4.890) (15.181) 
R2   0.061 0.162 0.141 0.146 0.099 0.335 
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Adjusted R2   0.049 0.118 0.107 0.107 0.070 0.240 
Note: All models use robust standard errors.  N = 161. Statistical levels are as follows: * p<.10, ** p<.05, 
***p<.01. Available case analysis, more specifically Dummy Variable Adjustment, is used in the 
models to handle missing data in the independent variables and thereby prevents losing observations at 
the case level when a question is not answered (for review of the method see Cohen & Cohen, 1985).
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Hypotheses 4 and 5 posit that if past collaboration with other nonprofits improves 
internal agency operations in regards to its services and administration, then the intensity 
of collaboration should grow. Both Models 3 and 6 lend support for Hypothesis 4, but not 
Hypothesis 5. Thus, positive experiences where collaboration enhances service quality 
can increase future collaborative relationships. Conversely, the same positive experience 
where collaboration improves administration quality actually lowers the likelihood of 
future collaborations. 
 Hypothesis 6 suggests that accepting funding from other organizations will 
increase collaboration with other NPOs. Hypothesis 7 and 8 maintain that when 
nonprofits experience environmental changes of declining government support and 
increasing demands for services they will collaborate more as well. There is only partial 
support for Hypothesis 6 in that that taking funds from businesses increases collaboration 
intensity while this does not hold true for accepting funds from government and 
nonprofits and foundation. Changes in the agency’s environment are shown to increase 
collaboration as theorized in Hypothesis 7 and 8. 
Only partial support is found for Hypotheses 9 indicating that having board 
members from diverse sectors will increase collaboration among nonprofit agencies. 
Interestingly, having a business board member reduces collaboration while having a 
nonprofit board member increases collaboration. There is no evidence that government 
board members have a statistically significant effect. The full model does not lend 
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support for either Hypothesis 10 or 11 that increases in an agency’s operational budget 
size or its age will lead to more collaborative relationships. While agency size is not a 
significant predictor in any model, an agency’s operational budget size is positive and 
significant in 4 out of the 6 models.  
Implications for Intra-agency Collaboration 
Using a multi-theoretical lens, this study offers insight into inter-agency 
collaboration among nonprofit child welfare agencies. The picture portrayed by these 
findings is multifaceted and speaks to new ways of framing the collaboration discussion 
more broadly. First, the results show that identifying with a certain level of nonprofitness 
or nonprofit ethics and norms is likely to increase collaboration among the child welfare 
agencies in this sample. No research to date has sought to explain how identifying with 
nonprofit norms can influence the collaboration level of an agency. Due to the long 
historical nature of child welfare agencies collaborating with one another, an identifiable 
service ethic could be more at work here than in other types of  service delivery NPOs 
although Moulton and Eckerd’s (2012) work shows how there are nonprofit value 
similarities among different organizational types. There does appear to be motivating 
sociological institutions at work that are shaping collaborative practices which is 
consistent with the literatures that view regulative and legal institutions also having 
strong effects on collaboration.  
For example, Foster and Meinhard (2002) identified that environment changes 
and attitudes towards collaboration and competition have a mediating effect on 
interorganizational activities. While the results here did not show statistical significance 
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that organizational attitudes concerning the degree of influence from the business 
community or government control predict collaboration frequency, the direction of the 
relationship is as expected. That is, more government control through regulations and 
accountability may increase collaboration because NPOs try to meet these demands while 
higher perceptions of the influence of the business community through competition with 
other agencies and pressures to generate revenue may lower collaboration. The negative 
relationships between businesses influence and NPO’s collaboration level does lend 
credence to those warning that the effects of competition and the commercialization of 
nonprofits could serve to undermine the inherent goodwill and benevolence of these 
organizations (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). 
One research study of day-care centers (DCC) in Toronto finds that when 
organizations changed their niches so that they competed less, their organizational 
survival improved significantly, and, the probability of collaboration lowers when 
organizations assume competition is beneficial (Baum & Singh, 1996). Therefore, 
organizational attitudes towards how other sectoral practices and expectations for 
behavior shape current within sector behavior could offer new insights into nonprofits 
decision-making, especially given the degree of state-market-civil society interactions 
today. Additional research on the effects of institutional pressures should be expanded to 
include the more sociological and normative elements that are influencing the decision to 
collaborate. Child welfare agencies, in particular, are currently subjected to high levels of 
government control and regulations in addition to facing pressures to compete with other 
organizations for federal funds encouraged under welfare reform. 
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Another implication of this research points to a relationships between how prior 
organizational outcomes of collaboration in the areas of an agency’s services and 
administration will influence future collaboration intensity. In studying why nonprofits 
collaborate with other nonprofits and public agencies, Sowa’s (2009) exploratory 
research suggests that NPOs collaborate both to improve their services and organizational 
operations as a whole. Instead of framing the benefits of collaboration as serving as an 
organizational driver like Sowa, I expand her argument to see how past collaborative 
outcomes influence future collaboration frequency. However, some of the results in this 
area were not as expected. The results show that when collaborating with other NPOs 
benefits an agency’s services to their clients and community, they are more likely to 
partner other NPOs. One explanation is that NPOs are mission-driven and therefore if 
achieving their goals is better accomplished through collaborative efforts, they are willing 
to continue working with others. Furthermore, collaborating with NPOs can create 
greater community awareness of the organization and expands an agency’s networking 
opportunities.  
The surprising finding is that even though past collaborations with other NPOs 
improve an organization’s administration and operations there is a negative effect on 
future collaboration frequency. Many researchers have pointed out that collaboration is 
difficult (Vernis, et al., 2006) and can be problematic for administration (McGuire, 
2006). Additionally, collaboration between NPOs and government has the potential for 
“mission drift, loss of institutional autonomy or public accountability, cooptation of 
actors, greater financial instability, greater difficulty in evaluating results, and the 
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expenditure of considerable institutional time and resources in supporting collaborative 
activities” (Gazley & Brudney, 2007, p. 392). These findings raise questions as to 
whether the challenges presented from cross-sector collaborations hold true for intra-
agency collaboration. Some scholars have gone as far to argue that collaboration should 
be avoided when there is no clear and real collaborative advantages (Huxham, 2003). 
Further research points out that there can be diminishing returns for managerial 
networking with other organizations (Hicklin, O'Toole, & Meier, 2008). Thus, the results 
of this study seem paradoxical. On one hand child welfare agencies report that their 
relationships with other NPOs helps their organization administratively, while on the 
other hand, this advantage of collaboration may result in a devaluing of collaborative 
benefits given that the frequency of their collaboration declines even though these 
relationships improved their administration.  
There are several explanations for these findings. One explanation is that while 
nonprofit organizations see the collaborative benefits provided to their organization 
administratively there may be a point of diminishing returns. Arguably, NPOs could feel 
that improvements in management and operations have made them more stable and 
effective, and given the complexity involved in collaboration, it is no longer in their best 
interest to continue working together. In essence, child welfare agencies may no longer 
see the benefits of collaboration. Another and perhaps more revealing explanation of 
these results is that it is possible that NPOs can become too mission-driven and this could 
come at the cost of the more long-term positive effects of improved administration and 
operations. That is, if collaboration only increases administrative capacity then these 
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NPOs may not perceive these improvements as taking a priority in determining whether 
to collaboration in the future. The implications of these findings raise larger questions 
about nonprofit administration. Referring to unanswered questions in collaborative public 
management, McGuire (2006) asks “do collaborations…evolve over time, such that there 
is an identifiable cycle or sequence to their development? That is, do collaborations 
‘learn’?” While this research does not speak to the latter question specifically, the results 
do suggest that NPOs may only be willing to continue their collaborative interactions and 
‘learn’ if it improves their services and not their administration. 
A third finding in this paper adds to the long line of research maintaining that an 
organization’s needs for resources and stability drive collaborative behaviors. Accepting 
funds from corporations is the only funding source shown to significant increase intra-
agency collaboration. It is possible that business funders may have greater expectations 
that NPOs will collaborate or they may have greater strings attached to their donated 
dollars. However, a limitation of this study is that the specific level of funding from 
business, government, and foundations is unknown and therefore it is hard to make a case 
for a causal relationship. For example, intra-agency collaboration may increase the 
likelihood of receiving money from business. To strengthen the argument for the effects 
of resource dependency and organizational survival, two additional constructs of 
changing a NPO’s environment are included. As theory would suggest, greater instability 
in government funding (a major source of funding for child welfare agencies) and an 
increasing demand of services raises the chance that nonprofits will collaborate with one 
another more.  
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The fourth theoretical contribution of this research comes from the results 
associate with board governance. Research examining the relationships between board 
members and collaboration is almost nonexistent within the nonprofit literature (for 
exception see, C. Guo & Acar, 2005). Thus, the finding that simply having a business 
board member reduces intra-agency collaboration while having a board member from 
another NPOs increases it is curious and raises more questions than it answers. A 
justification for this somewhat counterintuitive finding is that, as suggested  by Miller 
(2003), board members act in accordance with their own professional norms when 
member are not given clear monitoring roles for  how they should help an agency be 
effective. If this supposition is true, then a business board member might be inclined to 
advise a NPO not to collaborate with other NPOs seeing them as a competitor and feeling 
that collaboration could possibly lead their organization to lose any competitive edge they 
may have in service provision or administration. Contrarily, a nonprofit board member 
could see the benefit of have greater network ties with other NPOs and the added 
possibility for organizational improvements through working with agency peers. A lack 
of statistical significance in that government board members neither seem to encourage or 
discourage collaboration is not that unexpected. Government board members may be 
more inclined to encourage collaboration with government rather than nonprofit 
organizations. Or, government board members could be more informed about the specific 
context of the collaborative environment and may be pickier about which nonprofits their 
organization collaborates with. Nevertheless, who serves on nonprofit boards may have a 
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greater influence on direct services than expected and practitioners need to consider how 
board member’s sector affiliations can and do shape organizational behaviors. 
And finally, the agency’s characteristics of operational budget size and age do not 
have statistical significance in the full model. However, budget size is positive and 
significant in some of the other models. Unfortunately, these results add to the mixed 
findings regarding the extent to which specific organizational attributes inform 
collaborative behaviors. The data suggest that in some scenarios (Models 1-4 and 5) a 
greater operational budget size encourages collaboration while an agency’s age is not 
significant in any of the models.  
A limitation of this study is its small sample size and focus on child welfare 
nonprofits. It is possible that a larger sample size would produce more statistical 
significance among the different relationships. Additionally, examining how normative 
institutional pressures are at work in other nonprofit fields could produce different 
findings or results. This paper suggests there are some interesting associations between 
institutional pressures and collaboration that prompt further research and raise important 
questions which need to be addressed in the future.  
Conclusion 
 The goal of this paper is to contribute to the collaboration literature by empirically 
examining why nonprofits in particular choose to partner with one another using multiple 
theoretical lenses. The results of this research shows that the often overlooked, and 
perhaps undervalued, effects of understanding the sociological and normative pressures 
of institutions can help shed light on how we explain collaboration. In addition, while 
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scholars have made a concerted effort to start measuring outcomes of collaborations, 
these outcomes are usually measured as to how interorganizational relationships directly 
impact clientele and not the outcomes at the individual, organizational level. Evidence is 
provided that even when past collaborative experiences improves agency administration 
and service quality, only improvements in services increases future collaboration 
intensity among NPOs. Sector affiliations of board members likewise influence 
collaboration frequency in some unexpected ways. And finally, this work adds to a long 
and well established literature that argues that there are strong relationships between 
resource dependency of organizations on their external environments and collaborative 
intensity.  
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Chapter 5 
IN SEARCH OF A MULTI-SECTOR THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF 
NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT: WHAT FORCES SHAPE CHILD WELFARE 
MANAGERIAL PRIORITIES TO SERVICE CLIENTS, ACHIEVE MISSION, AND 
MAKE FINANCIALLY SOUND DECISIONS? 
Nonprofit organizations exist to serve their mission, clients, and to make a 
difference in society; however, this cannot be accomplished without money (Drucker, 
1990). Each day mangers make choices about how best to achieve multiple goals while 
encountering normative pressures to behave like other organizations in their environment. 
As their environments change rapidly, nonprofits are expected to adapt to the tides of 
managerial reforms (Light, 2000). To ensure organizational survival, nonprofits need to 
create public value through accomplishing mission, serving clients, and simultaneously 
being fiscally responsible through diversifying their revenue streams (Pynes, 2011).  
For nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and their administrators, effective and 
strategic management requires a consideration of three essential dimensions: mission, 
money, and merit (Krug & Weinberg, 2004). First, managers have an obligation to purse 
their agency’s mission and be committed to agency goals while being accountable to their 
funders for how well their agencies operate. Second, executive directors have a duty to 
provide the best possible services to their clients which often includes advocating for and 
being accountable to these individuals for their choices and programs. Thirdly, managers 
have a financial responsibility to pursue more funding, to make fiscally sound decisions 
and save costs, and to operate as efficiently as possible. Though nonprofit managers aim 
 136 
to accomplish all of the goals, outside influences may lead them to place different levels 
of importance on each of these organizational objectives. 
An open-systems approach suggests that agencies rely upon and interact with 
their environments in order to survive and achieve legitimacy (Katz & Kahn, 1978). The 
operating environment of nonprofits and their mangers include pressures from other 
governmental, for-profit, and nonprofit institutions. Just as scholars have noted the 
blurring of management styles and practices between private and public organizations 
(e.g., Boyne, 2002; Rainey & Chun, 2005), the sectors themselves are blurring (Dees & 
Anderson, 2003; Kettl, 1993, 2002; Weisbrod, 1997). Due to the complex interweaving 
web of relationships between organizations, it is difficult to know “where government 
and the private sector begin and end’’ (Rainey, 2009, p. 64). Some research indicates that 
public and business managers hold inaccurate stereotypes about what is the other does 
(Stevens, Wartick, & Bagby, 1988). However, few have sought to explore how managers 
perceive and respond to the roles and norms of government, private, and nonprofit 
organizations. There are several ways to conceptualize the pressures managers could 
experience from their environments through the viewpoint of sectors.  
This paper will explore whether tensions to conform to practices and norms of 
business, government, and other nonprofit organizations, frequency of collaboration with 
other organizations, sector affiliation of board members, and funding sources impact 
nonprofit managerial priorities of serving and being accountable to their clients, 
achieving  mission and goals, and being financially prudent. This paper wrestles with the 
question of whether it is possible for scholars to frame the “sectors” as meaningful 
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constructs in the lives of individuals and their organizations. The broad implication of 
this work hinges on the understanding of what the “sectors” represent in the minds of 
managers and how various perspectives for examining the theoretical constructs of these 
relationships can actually inform management behavior.  
Examining data from approximately 147 child welfare nonprofit managers, this 
paper shows how government, business, and nonprofit organizational perceptions and 
constraints can affect managerial priorities through different mechanisms. Through 
reviewing the literature and identifying gaps, this paper will develop a conceptual 
framework that depicts how nonprofit managers may be influenced by their relationship 
to and understanding of the sectors. After developing a set of hypothetical relationships 
between environmental influences and managerial priorities, results of an Ordinary Least 
Squares regression will be presented. Implications of these findings will be discussed in 
the context of child welfare nonprofits and the sector in general. 
Using the “Sectors” as a Conceptual Framework  
In recent decades, the proliferation of governance research and theory (Bevir, 
2010; Heinrich, et al., 2010; Osborne, 2010c) has raised doubts as to the usefulness of 
employing the sectors as a theoretical construct. One reason for this is that governments 
are hollowing-out (Milward & Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 2007) and privatizing (Donahue, 
1990; Savas, 2000). Governing now demands finding the best partners to accomplish 
goals regardless of institutional form; thereby, lessening the theoretical usefulness of 
clustering organizations by virtue of their various classifications. A related viewpoint has 
been that the borders between government, business, and nonprofit organizations appear 
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to be vanishing (Hammack & Young, 1993), especially in the context of social service 
agencies (Kramer, 1998; Yang & VanLandingham, 2011). Sectoral blurring relies upon 
the basis that new relationships are forming across sectors as organizations expand their 
traditional scope of work and operations (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Even with many 
agencies expanding their scope of work, Kramer cautions not to forget that, historically, 
the boundaries between societal sectors have always been amorphous regardless of 
whether the distinction is “conceptual, legal, political, economic and organizational” 
(2000, p. 3). Others have suggested that these spheres do not exist in isolation and  are 
“multiply embedded” within one another; and yet, “the relations among them [i.e., 
sectors] are inevitably tense, due to the inherent dilemmas of reconciling market, society, 
and state in a capitalist economy” (O'Riain, 2000, p. 191). On one side, the 
appropriateness of employing sectors as a theoretical lens is questioned. On the other, 
there appears to be something fundamental about being a nonprofit, government, or 
business organizations that puts their very nature in contention with one another. 
As these sectoral divisions have broken-down, what has been needed is a 
relational perspective of governance (Catlaw, 2007). Catlaw argues that in order to 
advance ontological and methodological explanations of governing, perspectives are 
needed that study the social world as a place of interacting relationships between people 
and outside forces, or what he terms, an “analysis of composition.” An analysis of 
composition is essentially about how people create meaning through their subjective and 
objective relationship to, and understandings of, their social worlds which then shapes 
their behaviors. What Catlaw is referring to is similar to what Bourdieu called symbolic 
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capital. In discussing symbolic capital, Bourdieu states that it is “nothing other than 
capital, in whatever form, when perceived by an agent endowed with categories of 
perception arising from the internalization (embodiment) of the structure of its 
distribution, i.e. when it is known and recognized as self-evident” (1985, p. 731). From 
these explanations, one may wonder if there is something about the idea—the 
internalization or categorization of the sectors—that people take as self-evident that could 
be shaping their perceptions and actions. 
Related to these theoretical explanations for why the sectors could be a relevant 
perspective on managerial behavior is the sociological and organizational theory view of 
new institutionalism. This approach recognizes that all institutions, to at least some 
extent, are socially constructed, shared understandings and logics of action that offer 
stability and meaning for individuals (Scott & Davis, 2007). It could be argued that 
environmental pressures in the form of informal normative beliefs and mimetic structures 
(i.e., the more deeply held and harder to measure unwritten or social rules of the game) 
placed upon nonprofits and their managers by different sectors could be shaping 
managerial priorities. Moreover, noted organizational theorist Richard Scott and his 
colleague maintain that social institutions have substantial impacts on behavior and they 
can even be more influential than regulative and legal institutions (Scott & Davis, 
2007).To ensure organizational survival and legitimacy, agencies should embody both 
formal and informal rules as well as the social structures of their fields (Meyer & Rowan, 
1991). But, as has been argued in the case of NPOs, when fields are confronting 
isomorphic pressures the “cultural elements, that is, taken-for-granted beliefs and widely 
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promulgated rules…serve as templates for organizing” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a, pp. 
27-28).  
By applying the theories of social institutions, Bourdieu’s symbolic capital, and 
Catlaw’s analysis of composition, the benefits of exploring managerial behaviors as being 
influenced by a multi-sector environment becomes a worthwhile endeavor. And, to the 
extent that human beliefs of tripartite society are a culturally embedded phenomenon, 
isomorphic pressures to conform to other fields could be at work as well. Through the 
process of creating meaning and relating to the prescribed norms and roles associated 
with business, government, and nonprofit organizational operations, an individual’s 
choices may change i.e., the sectors matter to the extent that people think they matter. 
Consequently, these choices can reinforce the very notion of differences between these 
organizational constructs and their boundaries thus creating a feedback loop. Figure 5.1 
depicts how these processes may occur. 
As theory suggests, the sectors and their boundaries in Figure 5.1 are depicted as 
constantly being pushed and pulled towards one another i.e., an isomorphic effect is 
occurring. Managers are simultaneously interpreting, interacting, and assigning meaning 
to their social world and their agency’s environment. Whether they are consciously of 
this or not is another concern. Consequently, pressures from business, government, and 
nonprofit organizations may be shaping managerial behavior through four mechanisms: 
norms and social institutions, collaborative relationships with other organizations, sector 
affiliation of board members, and funding sources. As managers’ filter these influences 
their behaviors may alter. In this case, child welfare administrators may place more or 
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less importance on the agency priorities of being client, mission, and financially-focused 
due to how they interpret and interact with their environment. 
 
 
 
         Figure 5.1. Multi-sector influence on managerial behaviors 
 
The purpose here is not to argue that different types of organizations and 
structures merely exist, but to show how an individual perceives these distinctions can 
and does shape the priorities they set within the confines of their NPO. The explanation 
for how these specific stresses converge and inform managerial priorities is discussed in 
more detail below. 
Nonprofits as Charitable and Philanthropic 
 Beyond their legal distinction and tax-exempt status, nonprofits hold a special 
place between the public and private spheres of society. Historically, nonprofits have 
served as instruments of charity, philanthropy, and self-expression that seek to address 
social problems (Bremner, 1988; Hall, 2006). Research shows that key organizational 
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characteristics and values differentiates them from their for-profits and government 
counterparts (Ott & Dicke, 2012). But what are these values and purposes? Frumkin 
(2005) maintains that NPOs have four distinct functions: to promote service delivery, 
social entrepreneurship, civic and politician engagement, and values and faith. In 
synthesizing the literature, Moulton and Eckerd (2012) find support for a “Nonprofit 
Sector Public Role Index” which identifies six unique roles for NPOs: service provision, 
social change, social capital, political advocacy, citizen engagement/democratization, 
individual expression, and innovation. Taken together, a more distinguishable and 
coherent purpose and normative ethic of the nonprofit sector emerges—what I refer to as 
nonprofitness. 
 There is an underlying theoretical assumption in the literature that identifying 
with these key nonprofit characteristics and values would, or should to at least some 
degree, guide managerial decision-making (Anheier, 2005; Weisbrod, 1997). 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence for this is scarce. One exception is found in the 
recent work of Moulton and Eckerd (2012). They find that certain revenue sources are 
significantly associated with particular nonprofit roles in various subsectors. For 
example, human services organizations “are more likely to perform the innovation role” 
and report “higher performance on the service provision role” whereas an “increase in 
earned revenue is associated with decreased performance on the innovation role” (pp. 
671-673). However, their work does not use the association with these roles as 
explanations of individual action. A theoretical contribution with practical implications 
would be to have a greater understanding of how employees of NPOs identify with the 
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socially constructed roles and values of the sector. Additionally, the research could 
clarify if their understandings of and identification with the nonprofit sector practices and 
norms drive their behaviors. The following hypothesis articulates this: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of identification with nonprofitness will increase the 
likelihood that managers place greater importance on key managerial priorities.  
 
Administrators who have high levels of identification and association with a nonprofit 
mindset may find it imperative to emphasize achieving mission and goals, serving clients, 
and being financially prudent.  
The State as Exerting Control 
 The relationships between charitable organizations and government dates back 
hundreds of years (Hall, 2006). Many scholars have theorized about the close and 
intertwining relationship between government and nonprofits (Boris & Steuerle, 2006; 
Salamon, 1995; Weisbrod, 1997). At times, this relationship may be supplementary, 
complementary, adversarial, or any combinations of the three; but, what remains 
consistent is that their interactions are multidimensional, complex, and constantly 
evolving (Young, 2006). In the last few decades, as government has hollowed out many 
of its social services, nonprofits have filled in the service gap (Milward & Provan, 2000; 
Yang & VanLandingham, 2011). Nonprofits have adapted to government’s reliance on 
and funding of them, and in some cases, they have become agents or representatives of 
the state (Desai & Snavely, 2012). Desai and Snavely argue that the state funds 
nonprofits through contracts, which requires specific performance measures and greater 
professional management; however, “client service becomes the key mission orientation 
[and] the broad concept of serving the public is translated into serving a clientele” (2012, 
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p. 969). They note that efficiency becomes the driving ethos of what NPOs value. Some 
worry that strong governmental influence leads NPOs to become merely vendors, highly 
bureaucratized, and less autonomous; in effect, nonprofits are lead further away from 
their original mission, goals, and clients (Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000; Grønbjerg, 
1993; Salamon, 1995; Smith & Lipsky, 1993).  
Two of the state’s main avenues for influencing NPOs are through perceived and 
actual control and accountability mechanisms. Many have noted the deterministic effect 
government can have on nonprofits through its ability to regulate, restrict, and hold 
nonprofits accountable (Desai & Snavely, 2012; Young, 2006). One framework used to 
explore government’s influence on organizations is through the notion of “publicness” 
(Bozeman, 1987). It is argued that all organizations experience varying level of 
publicness (and privateness) through control mechanisms like regulations, taxation, 
public policies, and contracts (Bozeman & Moulton, 2011). Organizational operations 
and managerial values are thought to be shaped by an agency’s level of publicness 
(Boyne, 2002). Most researchers using the publicness framework, however, have focused 
on comparisons between public and private organizations (Andrews, et al., 2011; Haque, 
2001; Moulton, 2009) rather than nonprofits organizations.
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Closely related to government controls, is the impact that government 
accountability systems may have on NPOs. In developing what they refer to as a 
preliminary theory of informal accountability among social service nonprofit networks, 
Romzek, LeRoux, and Blackmar (2012) argue that informal systems for holding one 
another accountable is just as important as the formal aspects. In addition, these informal 
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accountability procedures occur through the promotion of shared behavioral norms, 
systems of rewards and sanctions, which, taken together, reinforce desired actions among 
network actors. Thus, applying their logic to formal and informal government control of 
nonprofit organizations, we may expect that as nonprofit managers decision-making will 
be informed by both their experiences and perceptions of the state as controlling them 
and holding them accountable. The following hypothesis suggests how government 
control can influence managerial priorities differently: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher perceptions of government control increases the likelihood 
that managers will place more importance on serving their clients and being 
financially responsible. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher perceptions of government control increases the likelihood 
that managers will place less importance on achieving organizational mission 
and goals. 
  
Arguably, the more an agency experiences, or a manager perceives government 
control to be over their organization, the more emphasis they may place on serving their 
clients. And, if social service NPO sometimes operate as government agents, then it may 
be necessary for them to be more strategic and accountable to their principals for their 
financial operations. However, higher degrees of government control can have a negative 
impact on NPO’s ability to focus on their mission because it draws their attention towards 
government priorities and a specified clientele. 
For-profits as Promoting Competition 
For decades scholars have been arguing that the lines between nonprofits and 
businesses are blurring, and therefore, “sector-bending” is occurring (Dees & Anderson, 
2003). NPOs, in particular are imitating, interacting, intermingling, and creating new 
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industries as they employ a greater market orientation towards their work (Dees & 
Anderson, 2003). Some have even questioned whether the relationships between 
businesses and nonprofits will cause the presumed benevolent spirit of the sector to be 
replaced with competition (Bush, 1992). Moreover, there has been a movement of 
businesses into fields traditionally considered the purview of nonprofits, like that of many 
human and social services (Frumkin, 2005; Ryan, 1999). In response, NPOs have been 
adopting more of a market orientation towards their management and operations i.e., 
commercialization (Light, 2000; Salamon, 1993). Some administrators express concern 
about this trend: “There are some common characteristics across the sectors, but we get 
hit by everything. If it works in business, or even if it doesn’t, we’re supposed to do it. 
The idea that nonprofits are well run only when they run like a business is wrong” (Light, 
2000, p. 81). Even though some managers may dislike or try to resist the pressures to 
operate more like a business, they may nonetheless conform to these practices because 
others in their field may be doing so and organizational survival may depend upon it.  
NPOs and their managers are being encouraged to engage in practices 
traditionally considered business-like and to adopt market-like values, norms, and 
rhetoric (Brinckerhoff, 2000; Dart, 2004; Weisbrod, 1997). For example, a new trend 
over the last 20 years has been to charge fees for services which has accounted for 50 
percent of the revenue growth in the overall sector (Aspen Institute, 2001) and 35 percent 
of the revenue growth for social service agencies (Salamon, 2003). There are other 
market-like practices and values that have penetrated the sector such as: competing with 
other organizations (Romzek, et al., 2012; Ryan, 1999), professionalizing employees and 
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sometimes relying less on volunteers (Salamon, 2001, 2005), participating in cause-
related marketing and strategic partnerships (File & Prince, 1998), developing business 
strategies and planning (Rooney, 2001), and experiencing large donor or corporate 
influence on programs and management (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). The dissemination 
of market practices and values into NPOs come with both benefits and costs. 
One side maintains that using market solutions and practices will enable NPOs to 
flourish and continue to survive. The advantages of adopting a market orientation is that 
it can help nonprofits achieve greater resource stability, efficiency and innovation, focus 
on customers’ wants and needs, legitimacy, better performance management, and 
possible greater accountability to the public and key stakeholders (Aspen Institute, 2001; 
Dees, et al., 2001). Those concerned about what marketization may do to the sector warn 
that it could lure nonprofits away from their mission, helping the poorest and hardest-to-
reach clients, utilizing volunteers, promoting democracy and advocacy, sustaining 
valuable community networks, and putting more emphasis on accepted management 
techniques over delivering services (Alexander, et al., 1999; Aspen Institute, 2001; 
Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). To put it more precisely, Frumkin warns that high levels of 
commercialization have “eroded the moral high ground of these organizations and 
transformed nonprofits into shadow businesses” (2005, p. 10). The following hypotheses 
speculate on what happens to managers as they adopt business-practices or norms of 
behavior. 
Hypothesis 4: Higher perceived influences of the business communities will 
increase the likelihood that managers place more importance on serving their 
clients and being financially responsible. 
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Hypothesis 5: Higher perceived influences of the business communities will 
increase the likelihood that managers will place less importance on achieving 
organizational mission and goals. 
  
It is expected that when managers experience or perceive strong business 
influences to compete, generate revenues, or conform to large donor or corporate 
pressures they may be persuaded to focus on their clients as customers and bottom-line 
financial operations. Conversely, these same pressures may draw manager’s emphasis 
away from their agency’s original mission or goals. 
The Level of Collaboration with Other Agencies 
 Another way the relationships between business, government, and nonprofit 
organizations could be informing nonprofit management and practice is through 
collaboration. Some have attributed improvements in management to NPO’s increasingly 
collaborative relationships with others (Vernis, et al., 2006). Since welfare reform there 
has been a proliferation of collaboration among human service agencies (Provan & 
Milward, 1995; Selden, et al., 2006; Sowa, 2008) such child welfare organizations 
(Glisson & James, 1993; Horwath & Morrison, 2007). These collaborative relationships 
are both within and across sectors.  
Collaborating can help nonprofits achieve their mission and goals as well as 
improve agency operations, management, and resource stability (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2004; Bryson, et al., 2006; Grønbjerg, 1993; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Sowa, 2009). 
Funders of nonprofit organizations may give preferential treatment to, or, create 
mandatory requirements for NPOs to collaborate (Graddy & Chen, 2006; Shaw, 2003; 
Snavely & Tracy, 2000). In addition, “to enhance their credibility, civil society 
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organizations should collaborate with each other... Nonprofits will strengthen their 
positioning if they collaborate in joint projects” (Vernis, et al., 2006, pp. 13-14, emphasis 
added). Perhaps, there is an inherent expectation that NPOs should collaborate with 
others, especially due to perceived benevolent spirit and nature of the work that NPOs 
perform. While the majority of literature takes a pro-collaboration perspective, there are 
noted collaborative disadvantages like “mission drift, loss of institutional autonomy or 
public accountability, cooptation of actors, greater financial instability, greater difficulty 
in evaluating results, and the expenditure of considerable institutional time and resources 
in supporting collaborative activities” (Gazley & Brudney, 2007, p. 392). The reason 
being that collaboration may facilitate the spread of normative commitments and values 
from one sector or agency to another and this may have both positive and negative 
influences on managerial behaviors. 
The overall consequences of collaborating with other organizations can have 
critical implications for nonprofit management in terms of organizational outcomes and 
processes. However, there is much we do not know about how collaboration affects 
clients and organizations themselves (Selden, et al., 2006; Sowa, 2009). Underlying 
various collaborative relationships is a concern for how working across organizational 
and sectoral boundaries can influence managerial choices beyond the specific 
collaborative relationship. In a sense, collaboration between and within the sectors allows 
nonprofit managers to see and experience how other organizations operate and are 
managed. In turn, these managers may adopt and replicate the practices and norms they 
observe in other nonprofit, business, and government agencies. Given that the research on 
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intersectoral collaboration is still fairly young (Gazley, 2010), it is expected that 
collaboration frequency these child welfare nonprofits have with other agencies will have 
some influence on managerial priorities. 
Hypothesis 6: It is highly likely that greater collaboration with other agencies will 
influence the importance manager’s place on key managerial priorities. 
 
Theory would suggest that collaboration affects behaviors, but the directionality 
of this relationship is unclear. Even less is known about how collaborations can shape 
agency management beyond the confines of the collaborative relationship itself.  
Board Governance 
 Nonprofit board members have many roles and how they choose to define and 
perform their job could be related to the current sector they work in. Board members 
ensure the overall direction and performance of a NPO and therefore should assist 
agencies in finding the right balance between mission achievement and sound operations 
(Anheier, 2005). In their ethnographic research on the relationship between boards and 
senior management, Cornforth and Edwards (1999) develop four models to explain board 
roles and strategic management. Briefly, the role of the board can keep managers in 
compliance with agency mission and goals; they can add value through ensuring that the 
agency and management are strategic; they can serve as representatives that help create 
policies and monitor the executive; and finally, they can act in a supportive role ensuring 
the organization’s survival. Cornforth and Edwards conclude that “various normative 
institutional pressures have helped to shape current thinking and norms about boards, and 
that board members may draw upon these different and often contradictory sets of ideas 
in interpreting their own role and the role of their board” (p. 348). And while these 
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researchers do not examine the influence of a board member’s sector affiliation, their 
argument that institutional pressures (whether they be coercive, mimetic, or normative) 
shape board operations and their interactions with management is important. 
Other studies of board governance have indicated that business board members 
are highly favored (Worthy & Neuschel, 1984); but overall, greater diversity in 
occupations and affiliations of board makeup is preferable (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). 
For example, occupation diversity among YMCA boards is shown to have positive 
effects on achieving mission and fundraising outcomes (Siciliano, 1996). The story, 
however, of board member’s sway on organizational effectiveness and management is 
complex. Miller (2003, pp. 444-445) discovers that when nonprofit board members have 
unclear and ambiguous roles on how to measure effectiveness, there is a tendency to 
monitor in a manner reflective of “their personal or professional competencies… [e.g.,] 
lawyers tended to ask questions around legal or contract issues… [Moreover, boards were 
there to] ‘help broaden the organization’s perspective.’” In cases where boards are unsure 
of their roles and responsibilities, there may be a tendency to adhere to their own 
professional norms thereby making sector affiliation relevant. Yet, there is little empirical 
research in the nonprofit sector that examines how a board member’s sector affiliations 
could shape managerial priorities. Applying these research findings about board 
governance to managerial priorities, one might expect the following relationship: 
Hypothesis 7: Having board members from different sectors increases the 
likelihood that managers will place more importance on key managerial 
priorities. 
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Funding Sources 
 There are several reason why funding from each sector could impact management 
strategies. From an open-systems perspective, NPOs operate in a broader environments 
where they must interact and sometimes rely upon other organizations to receive 
legitimacy and survive (Buckley, 1967; Katz & Kahn, 1978). Organizations may also be 
constrained by their resources and external environments; thus, they are urged to 
diversify funding sources enabling them to achieve much needed resource stability and 
security (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Essentially, resource dependency theory suggests 
that a nonprofit’s reliance on funding streams whether they be from government, 
business, or other nonprofits can create financial dependencies. If these dependencies 
develop, management’s concern becomes how best to manage this and how to avoid the 
often value-laden expectations that comes with taking money from another organizations.  
Furthermore, research shows that when nonprofits take funding from different 
sources they change their behaviors (Froelich, 1999; Grønbjerg, 1993) and can even 
embrace certain values and societal roles (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012) of the funding 
agencies. However, there may be differences in how nonprofit managers respond to their 
funders. On one side, managers are encouraged to secure resources while on the other 
they must stay in tune with organizational mission and values (Herman & Heimovics, 
2005). Funding from one nonprofit or foundation could have positive effects on 
managerial strategies. One reason for this is that NPOs and foundations may have similar 
purposes and normative commitments. Secondly, funding from other nonprofits may 
come with fewer strings attached that allow agencies to use the money as they see fit. 
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Therefore, one would expect this to encourage managers to strive towards accomplishing 
agency mission and goals, serving customers, and being financially fit and responsible.  
Hypothesis 8: Accepting funding from a nonprofit or foundation increases the 
likelihood that managers will place more importance on key managerial 
priorities.  
 
Accepting money from government may have a different effect on nonprofit 
management. For example, government funding of nonprofits increases 
professionalization (Suárez, 2011), opportunities for access to the political process 
(Chavesc, et al., 2004), and overall survival and growth (Gazley, 2008; Salamon, 2003). 
Government funding may also lead to mission drift and less focus on clients (Frumkin & 
Andre-Clark, 2000; Salamon, 1995) as well as reduce the community’s 
representativeness on nonprofit boards (Guo, 2007). Funding is also one of the key 
dimensions to an agency’s level of publicness (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). The 
findings on government’s influence on nonprofit management is mixed; but there is no 
doubt that government funding to some degree has shaped and will continue to shape the 
nonprofit sector (Desai & Snavely, 2012).  
Hypothesis 9: Accepting funding from government is likely to impact the 
importance manager’s place on key managerial priorities. 
  
Businesses are a vital financial contributor to NPOs. But, scholars are noticing a 
change in why and to whom businesses donate. Corporations seem to be moving from a 
“benign benevolence” to do good to more strategic partnering that leads to corporate 
success and building a firm’s “reputational capital” (Salamon, 2003, p. 65; Young, 2002, 
p. 6). While many firms give money to charity for altruistic motives, one can imagine that 
some corporations may have an agenda and desire to shape nonprofit practices and 
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strategies. In addition, corporate funding could have a compounding effect of promoting 
market-like values such as competition. One of the greatest strengths of private sector 
firms is their ability to focus on the bottom line of making a profit. It is possible that 
business funding, regardless of the intention behind the donation, may actually urge 
managers to concentrate more on their own priorities even when they have multiple 
bottom lines. 
Hypothesis 10: Accepting funding from business increases the likelihood that 
managers will place more importance on key managerial priorities. 
 
Why Child Welfare Agencies? 
 Child welfare nonprofits and their managers offer an interesting lens for exploring 
evolving state-market-civil society interactions. Child welfare nonprofits have been 
balancing their position between the societal spheres since early American history. Due 
to the historic relationship between child welfare nonprofits and their communities, these 
agencies have worked with businesses and government. These long-standing 
relationships may give managers a much needed perspective into the social institutions 
and external environment that influence field norms. Many would argue that to fully 
understand policy there should be a consideration of the historical, processual, and 
contextual governance between public and private actors (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Bevir, 
2010; Heinrich, et al., 2010; Robichau, 2011). Uniquely, child welfare services have 
“always [been] a ‘privatized’ system never an exclusively public one” (Mangold, 1999, p. 
1295) with private, philanthropic organizations providing care and assistance as early as 
the 1800s with little to no public funding or regulation (Flaherty, et al., 2008; Holt, 2006; 
Rosenthal, 2000; Young & Finch, 1977). 
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 Some of these original providers of child welfare services are still in operation 
today including: Child Welfare League of America, New York Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children, and Children’s Home Society. As late as the 1960s, the voluntary agencies 
were entrusted by government and society at-large to provide reasonable care to children 
and their families with little government intervention (McGowan, 2005). For their part, 
these philanthropic and charitable organizations developed and innovated standards of 
practice, adoptions of multi-racial and international children, the foster care and child 
placement system, and temporary shelter to families in need (Boudreaux & Boudreaux, 
1999; Creagh, 2006; Holt, 2006). In the early twentieth century public funding and 
supervision of these agencies received much attention, and at times, was considered 
highly controversial; therefore, charities were responsible for raising money through 
individual and private organizational contributions as well as generating local interests in 
providing services to dependent children (Bremner, 1971, p. 269; Tiffin, 1982). 
 The child welfare system of today is not that different from a century ago. From 
the 1970s onward, government became increasingly involved in service provision itself 
and in  funding private and nonprofit agencies serving children and their families 
(Flaherty, et al., 2008). The privatization of the system following the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act allowed states to relinquish 
many of their official service provisions in favor of a more integrated and collaborative 
relationships with private, nonprofit organizations in the hopes of improving service 
effectiveness (Waldfogel, 1997). The motivation for the states became to work with both 
Faith Based Organizations and “for-profit” firms to provide child welfare services. 
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Additionally, the amendment to the Social Security Act now permitted ‘for-profit’ 
organizations to compete and apply for federal funding dollars and contracts for the 
provision child welfare services (Mangold, 1999; Scarcella, et al., 2006). A national, 
statewide study of public administrators in 2000 discovered that at least 80 percent of 
states were employing nonprofit and private providers to support foster care placement, 
residential treatment, family preservation and family support service family reunification 
programs, special needs adoptions, and recruitment of foster care/adoptive family 
services (U.S. DHHS & ACF, 2001).  
As in the past, these child welfare agencies find themselves as central figures in 
serving abused or abandoned children and their families. But unlike a century ago, NPOs 
are more willing to take state and federal funding and they now must operative in a more 
competitive environment with other nonprofits and for-profits for those dollars. 
Currently, networks are developing among government, nonprofit, and for-profit actors to 
provide servicers where nonprofits often serve as the lead-organizational network for 
child and family service delivery (see Chen & Graddy, 2010; Florida Philanthropic 
Network, 2010; Graddy & Chen, 2006). Many states like Florida, Illinois, Kansas, and 
New York have privatized large portions of their child welfare services through contracts 
(see Flaherty, et al., 2008). Research suggests that when child welfare agencies have a 
proclivity towards collaboration it is ultimately based on their concern for practice (Smith 
& Mogro-Wilson, 2007). And while these nonprofits have been delivery programs and 
services to children for over one hundred years, “very few studies to date have described 
the characteristics of the private agencies providing child welfare services or the 
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challenges these agencies face” (McBeath, et al., 2011, p. 1). This research seeks to tell 
two stories: one of child welfare managers themselves and another of the broader role 
these agencies play in the child welfare system. 
Methods and Data 
Sample 
 
 This research relies upon a national survey conducted of nonprofit child welfare 
agency administrators. The sample comes from the classification of charitable statistics 
using the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes assigned by the Internal 
Revenue Service and the NTEE-Core Codes (NTEE-CC) assigned by the National Center 
for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Organizations were selected only if they were classified 
as a human service foster care agency with the assistance of the Urban Institute where the 
NCCS is housed and managed (Boris, et al., 2010).
45
 While many of these NPOs perform 
a variety of child welfare services (e.g., adoption, advocacy, and family preservation), 
their agency’s classification falls under NTEE and NTEE-CC codes for foster care 
services. The choice to sample the population in this manner does remove some of the 
larger, national agencies like Catholic Charities from the known population of foster care 
providers. However, it is virtually impossible to narrowly identify large nonprofits like 
Catholic Charities through the NTEE and NTEE-CC system because they are often 
classified under more general charity type like human service agencies.
46
 This sample 
does not represent a precise sampling frame of NPOs providing foster care services, and 
as other have noted, this is due in part to the fact that there is no exact count of the 
number of NVOs, as well as for-profit agencies, offering child welfare services 
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nationwide (McBeath, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, this work does begin to at least identify 
a portion of NPOs who are providing child welfare services across the nation. 
 After compiling an initial list of nonprofit foster care agency providers, further 
research online and by telephone was conducted to find email addresses of top 
administrators at each agency and to verify the NPOs provided some form of child 
welfare or advocacy service. A total of 426 managers were included in the sampling 
frame, and of that, 184 individuals participated in this research giving a response rate of 
43 percent.
47
 The data come from an online survey collected between April 12, 2012 and 
June 27, 2012. The design of the survey instrument is derived from a combination of 
literature reviews of nonprofit, public administration, and social work research as well as 
the results of research conducted by the National Quality Improvement Center on the 
Privatization of Child Welfare Services.
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 The 54 question survey should have taken 
respondents between 20 to 25 minutes to complete. Observations come from NPOs in 38 
different states. 
Dependent Variables 
Three different measures were created to determine nonprofit managerial 
priorities associated with child welfare agencies and nonprofits in general. Administrators 
were asked, on a day-to-day basis, how important are 9 areas are in informing your 
decision-making. They were given a five-point Likert scale with 1 being not important at 
all to 5 being extremely important. The first dependent variable, client-based decision-
making, is based on their responses to how important they rated the following areas: 
improving the quality of services to clients, being accountable to my clients and 
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advocating on behalf of those I serve. The second dependent variable, mission-based 
decision-making, is based on their responses to how important they rated the following 
priorities: pursing our mission, commitment to agency’s goals, and being accountable to 
funders.
49
 The last dependent variable, financially-focused decision-making, asked how 
important they rated these following areas: making financially-sound decisions and 
saving costs, pressures to do more with less, and pursuing funding. All questions used in 
the three dependent variables were checked for reliability and internal consistency and 
were found to be acceptable.
50
 Summary scales were created from these questions and 
then standardized so that the coefficients could be interpreted as standard deviations in an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.
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 The mean scores before standardization are 
reported in Table 5.1 of the Descriptive Statistics. 
Independent Variables 
Normative influences of the sectors. The first variable to examine sector 
normative influences on managerial priorities addresses a manager’s identification with 
and perception of the nonprofit sector’s purposes and values i.e., nonprofitness. Similar to 
what others have argued, the distinctive natures of NPOs may be best explained through 
the combination and clustering of roles rather than viewing the nonprofits purposes 
independently (Salamon, et al., 2000). In testing this theory, Moulton and Eckerd’s 
(2012) find support for a  “Nonprofit Sector Public Role Index,” where respondents in 
their sample did  strongly relate to various purposes and values of the sector. In this 
sample, respondents are asked about their level of agreement with the following seven 
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
 Dependent Variables* 
    
 Client-focused priorities 13.463 1.973 4 15 
 Mission-focused priorities 13.459 1.838 5 15 
 Financially-focused priorities 12.678 2.304 4 15 
 Independent Variables 
    
 Nonprofit sector influences 
    
 Nonprofitness** 40.397 7.018 10 49 
 Frequency of nonprofit collaboration+ 3.857 1.359 1 5 
 Nonprofit board member 0.517 0.501 0 1 
 Receives funding from nonprofits/foundations 0.642 0.481 0 1 
 Government sector influences 
    
 Government control** 14.425 3.669 6 23 
 Frequency of government collaboration+ 4.261 1.258 1 5 
 Government board member 0.317 0.467 0 1 
 Receiving funding government 0.799 0.402 0 1 
 Private sector influences 
    
 Influence of the business community** 15.768 4.743 5 29 
 Frequency of collaboration with business+ 2.758 1.398 1 5 
 Business board member 0.821 0.385 0 1 
 Receives funding from businesses 0.783 0.413 0 1 
 Controls 
    
 Female 0.552 0.499 0 1 
 Business background and training 0.114 0.319 0 1 
 *   These are the scores before the dependent variables were standardized. 
 ** Higher scores indicate greater levels of agreement regarding the indicator. These are summated      
     scores.      
  + 
These are categorical variable for collaborate frequency where 1=Never, 2=Year, 3=Quarterly, 
4=Monthly, and     
     5=Weekly. 
 
statements concerning NPO’s role in society to: 1) Act as an alternative to government by 
protecting and promoting individual and community values and interests; 2) Experiment 
or be innovative in programs, processes, and service delivery; 3) Drive social change; 4) 
Serve poor, under-represented, or disadvantaged individuals; 5) Promote causes and 
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policies on behalf of clients and communities; 6) Bring communities together and 
develop social trust; and, 7) Provide or supplement services government and business 
cannot or does not offer. Exploratory factor analysis, along with theory and intuition, was 
employed to construct all scales.
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 Higher scores on nonprofitness indicate more 
agreement with the previous seven statements while lower scores indicate less agreement.  
Research shows that greater government control and accountability on an agency 
can affect its operations and management (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). In this 
study, manager’s perception of “government control” is examined to see if it shapes their 
emphasis on being client, mission, and financially-focused. The government control scale 
is created from six survey questions: 1) If your agency stopped receiving government 
funds, how would this affect daily operations; 2) The level of influence of State Child and 
Family Services Review findings and your state’s Program Improvement Plan on your 
agency’s operations; 3) The level of influence of state regulations on agency operations; 
4) How involved are the public child welfare agencies and 5) state legislatures in holding 
your agency’s operations accountable; and, 6) The extent to which strong governmental 
influence over agency operations presents a challenge to effectively providing services. 
Collectively these questions speak to the nature government pressures like oversight, 
influence, and regulation can having on the behaviors of child welfare managers.
53
  
 A third way normative practices and values from another sector could be shaping 
the behavior of nonprofit organizations comes from the private sector. Researchers have 
argued that NPOs are affected by pressures to conform to market principles and practices 
(Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). There are numerous ways a nonprofit manager could 
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experience and perceive market-like pressures. A summated scale is created to tap into 
these perceptual tensions called the influence of business community. This indicator 
combines Likert scaled questions based on a respondent’s level of agreement and 
disagreement with the following five statements: 1) There is greater competition with 
businesses for government contracts and funding; 2) There is pressure to generate 
commercial revenues and fees-for-services; 3) Businesses providing child welfare 
services presents a challenge to your agency’s service provision; 4) Competition with 
other agencies over funding presents a challenge to your agency’s service provision; and 
5) Large donors or corporations influencing management or programs presents a 
challenge to your agency’s service provision.54 
Collaboration frequency. Collaboration among nonprofits has been flourishing in 
recent decades, including agencies providing child welfare services (Horwath & 
Morrison, 2007). These relationships include both within and cross-sectors as indicated in 
Table 5.1. Administrators were asked how frequently they collaborated or partnered with 
nonprofits, government, and businesses to provide services to families and children: 
never, yearly, quarterly, monthly, and weekly. The frequency of nonprofit, government, 
and business collaboration is a categorical variables that ranges from 1 indicating these 
agencies never collaborate to 5 noting that they collaborate with others on a weekly basis. 
The largest percentage of collaboration among these child welfare agencies and the 
sectors are as follows: 45 percent collaborate weekly with NPOs, 66 percent collaborate 
with government weekly, and 22 percent collaborate quarterly with businesses. 
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Board governance. In the nonprofit and voluntary sector, boards are stewards 
rather than owners of agencies and serve to guide agency and managerial behavior 
(Frumkin, 2005, p. 6). The research on nonprofit boards does not speak to whether a 
board member’s sectoral affiliation can shape managerial practices and priorities. In order 
to address this relationship, respondents were asked if they had board members from 
different sectors. Dummy variables were created to indicate if child welfare agencies had 
nonprofit, business, and government board members. 
Funding streams. Historically, nonprofits have relied upon funding from private, 
public, and other nonprofit organizations to accomplish their mission. The source of the 
funding stream may bring along with it stipulations for usage or it may promote particular 
values that influence behaviors (e.g., Froelich, 1999). In this survey, respondents were 
asked whether they accepted funding from businesses, government, and other nonprofits 
and foundations. Dummy variables are used for receiving business funding, government 
funding, and nonprofit/foundation funding.  
Individual level control variables. Two variables that may affect managerial 
priorities are gender and professional background and training. These variables could also 
be related to how an individual perceives and then responds to normative institutional 
pressures. The verdict is still out on whether there are meaningful differences between 
male and female managers. Many scholars maintain that there is not enough evidence to 
argue for managerial differences between the sexes (Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani, 1995; 
Karsten, 2006; Powell & Graves, 2003). However, some research of public sector 
organizations speculates that males and females may have different attitudes towards 
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public service motivations (Fox & Schuhmann, 1999) and that management activities and 
organizational performance is influenced by gender (Meier, O'Toole, & Goerdel, 2006). 
These differences towards management behaviors may be based on women having 
different personal qualities and life experiences (Stivers, 2002). Therefore, to control for 
any affect gender may have on managerial priorities, a dummy variable is created where 
1 is female and 0 if other. 
 A second dummy control variable is created for a respondent’s professional 
background and training. Respondents were asked what best describes their professional 
background and training. Administrators were given a 1 if they had a business 
background and training 0 for all other backgrounds. Those categorized as other had 
training that included: public administration, family studies, social work, nonprofit, 
criminal justice, or psychology. Business is chosen as the comparison source because the 
other professions—at least at face value—have more of a public service orientation. 
Therefore, to the extent that there may be pressures to conform to institutional norms 
based on sectors, then there may be more parsimony between managers with a business 
background and managers with the other backgrounds listed. 
Results 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to test the relationships 
between nonprofit, government, and private sector influences on three management 
priorities of operating a child welfare agency. The models of client-focused, mission-
focused, and financially-focused priorities produce some evidence for sectoral influences 
on management. The results are presented in Table 5.2. The first hypothesis argued that 
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the more a manager identifies with the purposes and values of the nonprofit sector—i.e., 
nonprofitness—the more likely they are to place a greater importance on serving clients, 
achieving mission and goals, and having financially sound operations. Respectively, a 
one point increase in the nonprofitness indicator is associated with .03, .06, and .06 
increases in the standard deviations of the dependent variables in Models 1, 2, and 3. 
While these magnitudes are small, they do indicate a positive relationship between 
management’s identification with the roles NPOs serve in the broader society and how 
this influences their priorities. 
Only partial support is found for Hypotheses 2 thru 5 regarding government 
control and influence of the business community variables. Higher perceptions of 
government control and influence of the business community is only found to be 
statistically significant in Model 3. That is, a one point increase in the manager’s 
perception of government control and influence of the business community is associated 
with a .05 and .03 increase in the standard deviation of placing more importance on being 
financially-focused in one’s day-to-day decision-making. In most of the other models the 
relationships between government control and the influence of the business community 
on managerial priorities were positive; however, this is not the case between government 
control and being mission-focused. As was expected, a small, but negative relationship is 
found between higher perceptions of government control and placing less importance on 
achieving agency mission and goals as suggested in Hypothesis 3. This same negative 
relationship is not found between the influences of the business community and being 
mission-focused, rather, the association is positive. 
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Table 5.2  
OLS Regression Models of Managerial Priorities 
  
Model 1: 
Client-
focused 
priorities 
Model 2: 
Mission-
focused 
priorities 
Model 3: 
Financially-
focused 
priorities 
 
b/se b/se b/se    
Nonprofit sector influences 
   
Nonprofitness 0.026* 0.055*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.014) 
Frequency of nonprofit collaboration -0.07 -0.190** -0.283*** 
 
(0.099) (0.087) (0.091) 
Nonprofit board member 0.274* 0.061 0.163 
 
(0.155) (0.171) (0.165) 
Receives funding from 
nonprofits/foundations 
0.304 0.097 0.158 
 
(0.212) (0.190) (0.176) 
Government sector influences 
   
Government control 0.026 -0.003 0.050*   
 
(0.026) (0.029) (0.026) 
Frequency of government 
collaboration 
-0.004 0.148 0.141 
 
(0.146) (0.124) (0.104) 
Government board member -0.008 -0.043 0.134 
 
(0.165) (0.184) (0.161) 
Receiving funding government 0.318 0.231 -0.036 
 
(0.276) (0.269) (0.222) 
Private sector influences 
   
Influence of the business community 0.036 0.005 0.032*   
 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.017) 
Frequency of collaboration with 
business 
0.12 -0.039 0.068 
 
(0.094) (0.093) (0.087) 
Business board member 0.365 0.484* 0.272 
 
(0.278) (0.261) (0.228) 
Receives funding from businesses -0.492 0.101 0.196 
 
(0.330) (0.264) (0.240) 
Controls 
   
Female 0.336** 0.233 0.253*   
 
(0.155) (0.166) (0.142) 
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Business background and training 0.244 0.536*** 0.392*   
 
(0.216) (0.166) (0.206) 
Constant -2.768** -2.912** -4.125*** 
  (1.114) (1.179) (0.855) 
N 147 148 146 
R
2 0.237 0.261 0.41 
Adjusted R
2 0.116 0.145 0.316 
Note: All models use robust standard errors. Statistical levels are as follows: * p<.10, ** p<.05, 
***p<.01.  To prevent losing observations among the independent variables, a value of zero is imputed 
for the missing values. Then, a dummy variable equal to unity if a given respondent has a missing 
response is included in the final regression models.
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Hypothesis 6 suggested that as child welfare agencies collaborated more with 
businesses, governments, and other nonprofits it should have some effect on the 
importance they place on different managerial priorities. The findings indicate that the 
more a child welfare agency collaborates with other nonprofits, the less likely they are to 
place more importance on being mission and financially-focused by a standard deviation 
of .19 and .28. Moreover, while there is no statistically significant relationship between 
nonprofit collaboration frequency and being client-focused, the directionality of the 
association is the same as in Model 2 and 3. No statistically significant relationships are 
found between the priorities and collaboration frequency with business and government, 
respectively. What is interesting, however, is that the directionality between business and 
government collaboration frequency and the importance of the different managerial 
priorities changes in each model. While this does motivate further questions, it should be 
approached with caution given the insignificant finding. For example, greater 
collaboration with government is associated with manager’s placing a lower priority on 
being client-focused, but there is a positive association with being mission and 
financially-focused. Conversely, higher levels of collaboration with businesses is 
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positively associated with being client and financially-focused and negatively associated 
with mission-focused priorities.  
There is some evidence that the sector affiliation of a nonprofit’s board members 
may influence managerial priorities as speculated in Hypothesis 7. Having a board 
member from another nonprofit organization increases the importance manager’s place 
on being client-focused by a standard deviation of .27. In addition, having a board 
member from a private firm is associated with an increased importance of a .48 standard 
deviation on achieving agency mission and goals. Even though the other relationships 
between board member’s sector affiliation and managerial priorities were not statistically 
significant, all the relationships between business and nonprofit board members on 
managerial priorities were positive. Unlike their business and nonprofit counterparts, 
public sector board members were negatively associated with being client and mission-
focused. 
 No statistically significant relationships were found in favor of Hypotheses 7 thru 
10. The reason for the lack of statistical significant may be due to funding variables being 
measured as binary rather than continuous. Consequently, it cannot be argued with a high 
degree of statistical certainty that funding from the different sectors shapes managerial 
priorities; however, the various directionalities associated with funding streams and 
managerial priorities are intriguing. Most funding streams are positively associated with 
more emphasis placed managerial priorities; yet, there are negative associations between 
funding from government and being financially-focused and funding from business and 
being client-focused. 
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And finally, it is worth noting that there are several positive and significant 
associations between the individual level controls and managerial priorities. Being female 
is associated with a .34 and .25 increase in the standard deviation of emphasizing client 
and financial priorities. In addition, having a business background and training is 
associated with placing more importance on serving one’s mission and focusing on 
finances. The implications of these results will be further discussed below. 
Limitations and Implications  
There are a few data limitations to keep in mind when considering these findings. 
The data are cross-sectional, rely upon a sample size of respondents, and the results 
produced from the OLS regression are small in magnitude. The small magnitudes are 
most likely a function of the way the dependent variables were measured and the limited 
variations in respondent’s answers. Nevertheless, several interesting statistically 
significant associations were discovered that have important implications for nonprofit 
theory and management. Two intentions of this paper were: 1) To explore how 
managerial priorities of child welfare administrators are affected by their perceptions of 
normative sectoral influences, collaborative relationships, funding sources, and sector 
affiliation of board members; and 2) To develop a broad conceptual framework of the 
“sectors” as a meaningful construct.  
 Agency administrators in this sample strongly identified with the purposes of 
NPOs in American society and their recognition of nonprofitness is positively associated 
with emphasizing key managerial priorities on a daily basis. As theory would suggest, 
managerial behaviors and choices should be affected by fundamental nonprofit 
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characteristics and values (Anheier, 2005; Weisbrod, 2012) and this research finds 
supporting empirical evidence of this. To the extent that scholars could draw 
organizational boundaries, it may only be useful to do so through the perspective of how 
relational interactions between individuals and their broader environment affect action. 
Inherent in NPO’s operating environment are increasing isomorphic pressures to conform 
to business, government, and even nonprofit norms of behaviors and practices. Framing 
the discussion of the position of the sectors more broadly, Bozemen and Moulton argue, 
All organizations are subject to influences of publicness and privateness and they 
vary in the degree to which they are subject to each. This variation permits one to 
identify organizations as ‘more private’ or ‘more public,’ not only as a whole but 
also with respect to key organizational dimensions. (2011, p. i365) 
 
 Their perspective provides a subtle shift in our thinking about the characteristics 
of organizations and their behavior. One goal of this paper has been to add to the public-
private distinction conversation by creating a space for practitioners and scholars alike to 
compare dimensions of nonprofitness, publicnessness, and privateness. While nonprofits 
may assume many government and private characteristics, there is still something unique 
and meaningful about nonprofits in regards to what they are, what they value, and how 
they operate that is worth further research. They hold a symbolic space in society as 
conduits of charity and philanthropy. Moreover, it may be beneficial to educate nonprofit 
students and professionals about a nonprofit normative ethic and to create more 
awareness of NPO’s contribution to society in ways that are distinctive from what 
government and businesses do. 
 Results from this research indicate that while nonprofitness is positively 
associated with emphasizing financially responsibility so too do increases in the 
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perceptions of government control and influences from the business community. 
Manager’s relation to government as controlling their agency’s behavior, and businesses 
as encouraging competition and a market orientation, may lead administrators to better 
financial management. Conversely, one may ask whether concentrating on finances 
comes at the cost of being mission or client-focused. Professionalization of management 
is a noted side effect of succumbing to isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) 
and the potential negative consequences of excessive professionalization within the 
nonprofit sector have been noted (Salamon, 2001, 2003).  
 Another contribution of this research relates to the collaboration literature. Results 
show that with whom these child welfare agencies collaborate with may have both 
positive and negative associations with emphasizing agency’s client, mission, and 
financially-focused priorities. Surprisingly, only greater collaboration with other 
nonprofit organizations shows a negative and statistically significant relationship with 
key managerial priorities. This raises concerns for the possibility that working with other 
nonprofits may draw a manager’s attention away from their own organizational 
objectives and perhaps, more towards the goals and needs of their nonprofit partners. 
This finding confirms that collaboration can influence managerial choices—an area still 
in need of greater research (Sowa, 2009)—and that at times, collaboration may be 
problematic for administration (McGuire, 2006). Nonprofits must not only be strategic 
and consider the ways that collaboration impacts their clients and organizational 
outcomes, but also how it impacts their managerial choices on a daily basis. Others have 
warned that there are disadvantages to collaboration (Gazley, 2010; Gazley & Brudney, 
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2007) and that collaboration should be avoided when there is no clear and real 
collaborative advantage (Huxham, 2003). The results, while not statistically significant, 
do point to positive and negative benefits of greater collaboration with business and 
government. More research is needed that compares how nonprofit management and 
organizational outcomes are affected differently based on the nature of the specific 
collaborative partners. And, it would be interesting to explore how manager’s perceptions 
of normative sector influences may shape the decision to collaborate with other sectors in 
the first place. 
 A third implication of this research concerns how board members’ sector 
affiliations informs managerial practices of these child welfare agencies. Research 
indicates that the manner in which board members interact with senior management is a 
function of their interpretation of and response to normative institutional pressures 
(Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). In this study, having a board member from another NPO is 
positively associated with manager’s placing greater importance on being client-focused 
while having a board member from a private firm is positively associated with being 
more focused on mission and goals. Although they were not statistically significant, the 
directions of business and nonprofit board members were positively associated with 
managerial priorities. It is possible that their presence on the board may encourage 
managers to focus on clients, mission, and finances. On the other hand, it is curious that 
having a board member from government is negatively associated with being client and 
mission-focused. Managers should give a thoughtful consideration of who sits on their 
board and how these members could be influencing their daily operations in different 
 173 
ways. These overall results lend support to previous research addressing why NPOs may 
prefer business board members (Worthy & Neuschel, 1984) and occupational diversity 
(Siciliano, 1996). To the extent that scholars believe the management of NPOs is 
improving, then one reason for this could be related to the various roles board members 
perform and how their actions are informed by their own professional norms and 
occupations as alluded to in Miller’s (2003) work on nonprofit board members. 
 While the sources of different funding streams have been found to impact 
management across various literatures, no empirical support of these relationships were 
uncovered here. The lack of findings may have more to do with the inability of the 
funding dummy variables to adequately capture a relationship. Most likely resource 
dependencies have developed among these child welfare agencies; however, they may be 
more accurately captured and studied as continuous variables where effects between 
levels of funding are explored. 
 Even though the emphasis of this research is not on individual characteristics of 
the managers themselves, the results indicate that women were more likely to place 
greater emphasize on being client and financially-focused. One explanation for this could 
be that child welfare agencies may be more akin to societal roles associated with 
“women’s” work (Stivers, 2002). In their meta-analysis, Eagly, Karau, and Makhinjani 
(1995) found that “male and female leaders were equally effective,” but “gender 
enhances effectiveness, men were more effective than women in roles that were defined 
in more masculine terms, and women were more effective than men in roles that were 
defined in less masculine terms” (p.125). There are certainly other possible explanations 
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for gender differences in these findings, but they are beyond the scope of this research. In 
addition, it is worth noting that the child welfare agency managers in this sample who had 
business backgrounds and training were more likely to place importance on being 
mission and financially-focused. This may be attributed to the normative culture of 
business training programs that prioritizes the bottom line and overall efficiency. For 
these managers, some of their bottom line priorities are to accomplish their mission and 
be financially efficient.  
 And finally, these findings point to a theoretical need for exploring the symbolic 
capital people associate with the sectors. The numerous ways individuals interact with 
and assign meaning to their social worlds can creates logics of action. That is, the 
internalization of the sectors via their associated roles and values in the broader society 
could be taken as self-evident in people’s operating worlds and may inform their 
decision-making. To reiterate, it is not that we can distinguish organizations by various 
typologies and classifications that matters most, but that how people perceive these 
agency’s roles and respond to their perceptions of these organizations that is of most 
importance. While each sector is somewhat embedded in one another, the very nature of 
what it is that they do in a capitalist society puts them at odds with each other (O'Riain, 
2000). And yet, in their own right competition, control, and charity have significant 
purposes in both a democratic and capitalistic society. The fear being for NPOs, however, 
is the possibility of excessive outside control or competition, or the lack of nonprofitness, 
that could be problematic for NPO’s future. It is up to practitioners and scholars alike to 
decide what the future purposes and values are of NPOs.  
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In conclusion, this paper grapples with the theoretical usefulness of employing a 
multi-sector approach to explore nonprofit managerial priorities. The results suggest that 
child welfare managers identify with and may be compelled to conform to sector 
pressures that can be filtered through the mechanisms of: sector norms and social 
institutions, collaborative relationships, and sector affiliation of board members. This 
research points to the advantages and potential disadvantages of nonprofit organizations, 
and their managers, conforming to pressures from business, government, and to a much 
lesser sense, other nonprofit agencies. For nonprofits to maintain their unique and special 
space in the societal sectors, they must stay true to their original purposes as charitable 
and philanthropic organizations (Bremner, 1988; Hall, 2006) who promote public values 
(Moulton & Eckerd, 2012) and offer various societal benefits (Frumkin, 2005; Salamon, 
2003). And to an even greater extent, child welfare nonprofits have an obligation to serve 
their clients, achieve their mission, and be financially responsible to their best ability. 
They have this duty not only because of the nature of the work they do (i.e., caring for 
abused, abandoned or needy children and their families), but also because of their 
historical and significant role as providing this societal good. In exploring whether the 
sectors matter to the extent that managers think they matter, the answer would seem to be 
maybe, but more work is needed to fully address this topic. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, I would like to begin with a personal story. Undergraduate students 
in a Public Leadership and Change course this semester were asked to write papers on 
how a public sector leader handled a change management or innovation challenge. As the 
deadline approached, students began emailing about the various leaders they wanted to 
write about. While many of them named public leaders (e.g., President Obama and 
Michelle Obama, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Senator Elizabeth Warren, and Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke), a handful of them asked if they could write about Steve 
Jobs and Apple, Marc Zuckerberg and Facebook, Bank of America, Disney World, and 
Google. After several emails with one student about which leaders they could not write 
about, she stated “I am having trouble understanding how to determine which businesses 
are public.” This is when I realized some students do not grasp the concept of sectors i.e. 
the differences between private, public, and nonprofit organizations and their leaders.  
Even after I sent out many emails and wrote a grading rubric that specifically 
stated students had to write about a public, government leader, I still received papers on 
Steve Jobs and Apple; Van Phillips the inventor of the Flex-Foot Cheetah blade 
prosthetic; Cannon Power Group an innovative renewable energy company; Dr. Ben 
Carson a leading pediatric neurosurgeon; and John David Arnold, PhD, a creator and 
founder of the nonprofit Portable Practical Education Preparation (PPEP). To some 
degree these students may be right. These are “public” leaders in the sense that the 
general public may know of them, and in some cases, they have made society better off 
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through their innovations. But, can a good argument be made that these individuals are 
“public” leaders even though they do not work for government? Perhaps. Many students 
today may think more like advanced governance scholars where the boundaries that once 
distinguished the public from the private or the nonprofit no longer exist or seem 
relevant. Organizations and their leaders are public to the extent that people know about 
them and can easily access their information the web. In addition, the “multiply 
embedded” nature of sectors within one another—which creates fundamentally 
contentious relations among them in a capitalist system (O'Riain, 2000, p. 191)—
produces theoretical and conceptual challenges as well. 
From a new public governance perspective, the focus is on the co-production of 
services as part of a broader public service system. The state’s role may be indirect such 
as providing public financing or regulation (Osborne, 2010a; Pestoff, et al., 2006). 
Therefore, it is easy to imagine a scenario where the public service system involves 
government partnering with a nonprofit organization to provide educational services to 
migrant workers (e.g., John David Arnold), funding and regulating a renewable energy 
company to produce energy more cleanly (e.g., Cannon Power Group), or supporting an 
inventor to make better prosthetics to help injured or disabled citizens and veterans live 
more active lifestyles (e.g., Van Phillips). These cases of private and nonprofit leadership 
seem like services government would support because they make the “public” better off. 
At the surface level, the question of who produces different societal goods may not seem 
as important as it once did. However, as this dissertation explores, the deeper concern 
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may not be about who produces public service per se, but how and why agencies do what 
they do may be the most important factor in shaping how well they do it. 
The central purpose of this research has been to explore who provides child 
welfare services, how they go about doing it, and why their actions are shaped by various 
societal sector pressures. By striving to understand more about the work of child welfare 
nonprofit and their managers, this research examines their contemporary governance 
practices in light of the historical underpinnings of a state-market-civil society system. In 
addition to studying how child welfare nonprofits are being managed, the results point to 
broader implications for the nonprofit sector. Rather than reviewing and summarizing the 
findings of each individual paper, I will speak to the practical and theoretical implications 
of this research as a whole as well as discuss directions for future research. 
Implications for Practice and Theory 
This research is concerned with how child welfare nonprofits are being managed 
and influenced by external and internal normative and fiscal pressures. Through using a 
new intuitionalism framework, it is discovered that the extent to which an individual 
relates to and understands her social worlds, and specifically the societal sectors, matters. 
The approach used to operationalize the assorted effects—business, government, and 
nonprofit spheres—could have on management practices and agency behavior can be 
conceptualized through some unique measures. Specifically, nonprofitness, government 
control, influence of the business community, funding sources, board of director’s sector 
affiliation, and collaborative relationship within and across sectors can all impact 
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managerial and organizational behaviors in distinctive ways. The broad implications for 
practice and theory will be discussed. 
One theme of this research has been to develop and explore the impact of an 
underlying nonprofit normative ethic—nonprofitness—in guiding managerial and agency 
behaviors among child welfare nonprofits. I have argued that the values and roles 
associated with NPOs within a larger nonprofit sector are meaningful and do shape 
certain behaviors.  For example, it is found that higher identification with nonprofitness 
does not reduce the likelihood that these child welfare agencies will adopt various 
business management strategies. However, nonprofitness is positively associated with 
encouraging more collaboration among nonprofits and increasing the importance 
managers’ place on achieving mission and goals, serving clients, and being strategic 
financially.  
 For child welfare and other nonprofit managers, a need exists for broader 
awareness about the particular values and normative ethic of the sector. Recognizing 
what makes nonprofits distinctive from business and government organizations is not just 
their tax-exempt status, but also the principles and ideals they stand for regarding how 
public goods and services should be delivered in a democratic and capitalist society are 
significant. The major concern being that if a nonprofit ethic for behavior does not exist, 
or at least is not recognized to be important, then these organizations may run the risk of 
becoming too similar to government and business. As Frumkin warns “intense 
commercialization has eroded the moral high ground of these organization and 
transformed nonprofits into shadow businesses” (2005, p. 10). What is the ‘moral high 
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ground’ of these organizations? I have argued that is it a normative ethic for behavior i.e. 
nonprofitness. Nonprofit mangers and their staff must be concerned with how best to 
service their clients and achieve their mission. They must question whether adopting 
commercial practices and even collaborating with other organizations allows them to do 
their jobs better, or whether it merely enables them to keep their doors open at the cost of 
service quality. Moreover, they must be strategic about agency priorities and how outside 
pressures could be influencing the importance they place these priorities. 
 The real problem that emerges from this research involves how the moral high 
ground of nonprofits may be shifting ever so subtly that practitioners and academics alike 
do not fully recognize that it is occurring. And, without acknowledging the various ways 
nonprofits could be turning into government vendors or for-profit organization, it may 
quickly become too late to salvage the unique societal space NPOs occupy between 
business and government organizations. As demonstrated in this dissertation, greater 
influence of the business community is associated with greater adoption of business 
management strategies (e.g., charging fees for services or relying less on volunteers), 
positively shaping the importance managers give to financial priorities, and negatively 
(although not statistically significantly) associated with increasing collaboration among 
nonprofit organizations. Moreover, more government control is also positively associated 
with manager’s placing more importance on being financially-focused. Interestingly, 
government control is not significant throughout most of these research findings. This 
may be attributed to the special and historical relationship between child welfare 
nonprofits and government discussed in the introductory paper of this dissertation.  
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Historically, child welfare nonprofits in the 1950s and 1960s were leery of 
accepting federal funding for service provision because they feared that it would distort 
their charitable mission and other societal purposes as well as their belief that the public 
sector should be the  “primary vehicle to enhance comprehensive services” (Rosenthal, 
2000, p. 294). Social reformer Grace Abbott noted: “By the end of the nineteenth century, 
leaders in social welfare began to appreciate the difficulties inherent in the subsidy 
system and that, once started it was very difficult to abandon” (Abbott, 1938, p. 15). This 
challenge remains true today as the primary service providers of child welfare services 
are nonprofit organizations who are funded to some extent by government agencies. 
Almost 80 % of child welfare agencies in this sample rely upon government and business 
funding to support their operations. This represents another evolution in the governance 
story of the child welfare public service system. While these child welfare agencies have 
played a significant role since early American history, there is a concern that pressures to 
conform to government norms, more specific funding requirements, and competition 
from other nonprofits and for-profit providers may change the nature and motive behind 
serving vulnerable children and their families. This development epitomizes yet another 
way that business and government pressures could be shaping managerial behaviors of 
nonprofits organizations.  
 Broadly, this research also explored the effects that board members from 
business, government, and nonprofit agencies may have on child welfare agency’s 
practices. It has been speculated that these board of directors bring with them their own 
professional norms and values that shape nonprofit managerial behaviors in specific 
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ways. Take for instance, a board member from the business community. These board 
members are shown to increase the likelihood that managers will place more importance 
on “running their agency like a business” and being mission-focused while they may 
lower the intra-agency collaboration among nonprofit organization. Conversely, having a 
board member from another nonprofit increases the likelihood of nonprofit collaboration 
and managers placing greater importance on being client-focused. Overall, it is argued 
that board members inform agency and managerial behaviors and that having a diverse 
board is best. Additionally, managers would benefit from the recognition that board 
members bring their own professional normative ethics and biases to the table that may, 
or may not, be in accordance with a nonprofit ethic or best practices. It is up to 
organizational leadership to determine how their boards should operate and in what 
capacity these members should influence organizational practices. 
 Another theme dealt with in this is collaboration. First, the intensity of 
collaboration between child welfare agencies and other nonprofits is examined as a 
function of varying sectoral pressures. And secondly, the frequency of collaboration 
between child welfare agencies and business, government, and nonprofits is studied as 
having an effect on managerial priorities. The interactions that child welfare agencies 
have with other organizations provides an alternative avenue for considering the extent to 
which sectoral affiliations and normative commitments can lead to the spreading of 
isomorphic pressures among the sectors. The implications for who these child welfare 
agencies collaborate with are many and it is up to agency leadership to decide whether 
collaboration should be pursued. Given the fact that many grant applications and funders 
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of nonprofit organizations encourage collaboration, more research and attention needs to 
be given to whether collaboration provides a strategic advantage for agencies and their 
clients. Results in this dissertation offer a cautionary tale by indicating that the more child 
welfare agencies in this sample collaborated with other nonprofits they less importance 
they placed on focusing on their own mission and finances. 
 While several implications for management of these child welfare agencies have 
been raised, many policy and theoretical consequences should be noted. First, given the 
historical nature of interactions between child welfare nonprofits and government their 
specific niche in service provision overlaps in many respects. With the arrival of for-
profit organizations in the sphere of child welfare services a major concern becomes who 
should be providing what services and to whom. Should policy-makers be worried about 
whether government, nonprofits, or businesses provide these services and do they know 
how client outcomes are being influenced by the specific type of service provider? The 
response would seem to be that yes, there is cause for concern and no, we do not know 
enough about how child outcomes differ regarding whether the servicer is a nonprofit, 
business, or government agency. The fact that the boundaries of the sectors appear to be 
overlapping in many respects would hint at the conclusion that organizational type may 
not matter. However, to the extent that child welfare outcomes have not been accurately 
and longitudinally measured, and business and government are influencing the key 
nonprofit service providers, there is still too much we do not understand about this 
complex service system to judge who will do the best job. And, government must be 
careful about who it chooses as its partner and be sure not to overly control the behaviors 
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of nonprofits, thereby undermining what made them a strategic choice provider in the 
first place. States and local governments must avoid getting into the business of turning 
nonprofits into government vendors because it may weaken the moral high these 
organizations have held in society for hundreds of years.  
 Finally, policy makers and government agencies alike must consider the potential 
changing nature of nonprofit service providers. These agencies are simultaneously being 
subjected to government control and marketization pressures which could potentially 
transform the very essence of who nonprofits are, what they do, and how they do it. 
While there is great potential for this to occur as indicated by the adoption of business 
management practices by these child welfare nonprofits, there is also an underlying 
normative ethic that exists and appears to be driving managerial behavior. In essence, a 
sectoral identity with particular roles and values i.e. nonprofitness, does emerge as a 
meaningful indicator of some managerial behaviors.  However, higher levels of 
identifying with nonprofitness are not associated with lower adoption rates of business 
management techniques implying the power of market orientation influences within the 
sector. As implied in this research, there is something meaningful about individuals in the 
sector adopting a nonprofit ethic and to the extent that scholars, educators, and policy 
makers can foster the further development of a nonprofit normative ethic is worth 
examining. There is a fine line that should not be crossed between these nonprofits 
turning into a government or business organization and how people draw that line today 
will have dramatic implications for the future. 
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Reflections and Future Research 
The process of writing this dissertation and uncovering the business of child 
welfare nonprofits has further spurred my research interest into three specific areas. First, 
the motivating reason why I took up studying child welfare nonprofits stemmed out of a 
concern that we as scholars and citizens know very little about what happens to children 
while they are in the public foster care system. Complicating this fact is that research on 
foster care alumni populations repeatedly shows that long-term outcomes for these 
vulnerable children are poor. For example, these children are more likely than their peers 
to “become homeless, incarcerated, dependent on state services…have lower scores on 
standardized tests and higher absenteeism…and dropout rates…do not have an adequate 
safety net or social network…[and] are among the most at risk for poor life outcomes in 
American society” (Lips, 2007, pp. 1-2). Moreover, it is expected that if nothing changes 
by 2020 “more than 10.5 million children will spend some time in the foster care [and] 
22,500 children will die of abuse or neglect, most before their fifth birthday” 
(FosterClub). These grizzly facts represent all the more reason why the system and those 
providing services need to be studied. Child welfare nonprofits are making decisions on a 
daily basis that impact vulnerable children and their families’ outcomes, and yet, as a 
community the process of providing services remains somewhat hidden and illusive from 
the public’s eye. With the majority of states reporting over 10 years ago that they heavily 
rely upon private, nonprofit providers to assist abused and neglected children and their 
families (U.S. DHHS & ACF, 2001), a great need exists to know more about how well 
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these agencies operate, their decision-making processes, and the results associated with 
what they do. 
A second finding that became apparent in this dissertation and which needs 
further research regards whether child welfare nonprofits and the sector in general, may 
be shredding their altruistic purposes due to various external and fiscal pressures. The 
motivating ethic of these child welfare nonprofits have historically been to deliver 
charitable and philanthropic services to a vulnerable population that lacked a voice i.e., to 
provide both a public good and societal benefit.  And while it cannot be argued that this 
underlying ethic of nonprofitness has disappeared entirely from these organizations and 
the sector, the evidence of governmental control and private sector influences suggests a 
strong possibility that these outside forces may have a crowding out effect on the original 
character and purposes of these organizations. Therefore, the concern becomes whether 
too much governmentalization and marketization of these agencies may distort their 
original vision and mission to serve vulnerable children and their families because it is 
the charitable thing to do. I question whether these outside pressures may lead nonprofits 
to be overly focused on a financial bottom line; and, whether pleasing their government 
principals by being economically efficient will come at the cost of achieving mission and 
doing what is actually in the best interest of this population? 
Determining what is in the “best interest of the child” is something American 
society has struggled over the last 200 years and still no answer exists. Perhaps, this is 
due to the fact that the public child welfare system as is treats all children equally and 
systematically rather than focusing on individual needs and preventative services. It is 
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necessary that we as a community of scholars and practitioners find ways to understand 
the process of nonprofit service provision as it is occurring. Moreover, it may be time to 
ask who really does the best job of providing services to children: government, 
businesses, or nonprofits. Little comparative work exists that examines the outcomes of 
children and their families based on what extent they received services from government, 
nonprofit, or even, for-profit organizations. One way to begin to uncover this is to 
examine states where the foster care system is fully privatized (e.g., Kansas or Florida) 
with states that have varying levels or no privatized services (e.g., Texas, Missouri, 
Michigan). Furthermore, as some researchers have begun to study (e.g., McBeath & 
Meezan, 2006, 2010), data is needed regarding how government performance-based 
contracting is impacting the services child welfare nonprofits provide, how they deliver 
them, and how it affects their clients. 
And finally, I would like to further develop the sectors as a conceptual 
framework. In the final paper, I stated that the sectors may only matter to the extent that 
people think they matter (i.e., the symbolic capital and social interactions people assign to 
private, public, and nonprofit spheres). To fully grasp and develop a theory of the sectors, 
attention should be given to the practitioner’s voice and perceptions. A discourse is 
required about what each societal sphere offers and whether isomorphic pressures will 
improve or hinder people’s relationship to their organizations and society at large. It 
would be interesting to explore commonalities and disagreements about how government, 
nonprofit, and business workers view the work of their organizations and the work of 
other sectors. That is, what role should each sector have in American governance or, have 
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these roles and purposes become so similar that the sectors no longer seems like a 
relevant construct. 
In the beginning of this section I told a story of how some students do not seem to 
fully understanding the construct of “public” organizations and leadership. In their minds, 
the public, governmental space is equivalent with that of nonprofit and business 
organizations. The implications of a society where all spheres are considered equivalent 
could distort the unique public service motives and purposes of government and nonprofit 
organizations with that of for-profits drive for efficiency and profitability. It could bring 
into the question the checks and balances the sectors have on one another. In sum, what 
would a future with no publicness or nonprofitness look like? 
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APPENDIX A  
FULL MODELS: MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC AND ORDERED LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION MODELS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
2
1
3
 
  
 
Charging Fees for 
Services 
Engaging in Marketing 
Alliances with 
Businesses  
Need to 
Professionalize 
Agency 
Running 
My  
Agency 
Like a 
Business 
 
 
Occasionally 
versus 
Never 
Usually 
versus 
Never 
Occasionally 
versus 
Never 
Usually 
versus 
Never 
Neutral 
 versus 
Disagree 
Agree 
versus 
Disagree 
Ordered  
Logit  
 
Independent variables 
Odds Ratio/(SE) Odds Ratio/(SE) Odds Ratio/(SE) 
Odds 
Ratio/(SE) 
 Influence of the business 
community index 1.785 2.364** 1.217   2.486** 1.949* 
   
4.850*** 1.596* 
 
 
(0.670) (0.943) (0.410) (0.967) (0.781) (1.941) -0.396 
 Receives funding from 
businesses 4.450* 1.141 0.552 1.857 0.526 0.662 0.598 
 
 
(3.292) (0.940) (0.358) (1.518) (0.356) (0.450) -0.286 
 Government control index 0.52 0.331** 1.077 1.514 0.887 0.585 0.927 
 
 
(0.216) (0.170) (0.391) (0.694) (0.357) (0.238) -0.251 
 Receives funding from 
government 1.24 0.497 0.289* 0.291 4.648* 0.957 1.991 
 
 
(0.939) (0.384) (0.187) (0.248) (3.722) (0.672) -1.039 
 Nonprofitness index 1.266 0.798 1.204 1.863 0.965 1.294 1.127 
 
 
(0.403) (0.250) (0.310) (0.706) (0.241) (0.358) -0.235 
 Receives funding from 
nonprofits/foundations 0.459 1.762 2.337 0.836 1.049 1.183 0.901 
 
 
(0.271) (1.249) (1.328) (0.562) (0.618) (0.677) -0.374 
 Agency's operating budget 
revenues 1.699* 0.824 1.708** 1.138 0.574** 0.651 1.437* 
  (0.490) (0.257) (0.437) (0.368) (0.156) (0.174) -0.275 
 
     
2
1
4
 
 
Range of services offered 1.344** 1.630*** 0.856 1.122 1.231 1.307* 0.934 
 
 
(0.183) (0.276) (0.100) (0.174) (0.160) (0.179) -0.086 
 Offers advocacy service 0.792 1.248 0.616 0.149** 0.360* 0.353* 0.390** 
 
 
(0.459) (0.812) (0.313) (0.113) (0.204) (0.203) -0.162 
 Business board member 1.084 1.814 1.331 3.549 0.504 0.815 4.752*** 
 
 
(0.799) (1.613) (0.853) (3.162) (0.326) (0.530) -2.402 
 Government board member 1.447 1.052 0.543 0.708 1.66 0.992 1.058 
 
 
(0.762) (0.671) (0.268) (0.443) (0.886) (0.532) -0.406 
 Provides services in rural 
area 0.568 0.678 0.548 1.96 1.736 1.316 0.504* 
 
 
(0.317) (0.430) (0.284) (1.127) (0.882) (0.673) -0.191 
 Female 1.331 0.99 0.911 2.167 1.592 1.824 2.302** 
 
 
(0.716) (0.622) (0.434) (1.277) (0.802) (0.898) -0.869 
 Executive director 1.218 1.314 1.391 0.891 1.68 2.664* 0.967 
 
 
(0.669) (0.811) (0.710) (0.557) (0.927) (1.461) -0.375 
 Education level 0.296*** 0.836 0.441** 1.523 0.289*** 0.309*** 3.395*** 
 
 
(0.136) (0.431) (0.178) (0.753) (0.130) (0.133) -1.117 
 Worked in a business 
corporation 0.497 0.585 0.612 0.945 0.393 1.446 1.237 
 
 
(0.288) (0.417) (0.338) (0.601) (0.261) (0.787) -0.497 
 Business background and 
training 1.166 1.518 3.975 3.082 1.138 1.085 4.103** 
 
 
(0.976) (1.444) (3.621) (3.452) (1.072) (0.863) -2.494 
 
 
Reference category: Never; 
N=151; χ2= 89.068***; Log 
likelihood full model  
-109.484 
Reference category: 
Never; N=149; 
χ2=68.179***; Log 
likelihood full model=       
 -123.828 
Reference category: 
Disagree; N=163; 
χ2=72.690***; Log 
likelihood full model=          
-141.813 
N=148;χ2=62.2
77**; Log 
likelihood full 
model=-
158.408; Pseudo 
R
2
=0.164 
                                                                                                                                                                 * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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APPENDIX B 
PEARSON’S CORRELATION 
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6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.  Collaboration Frequency                 
2.  The influence of the business  
      community 
.108 
               
3.  Government control .213* .411* 
             
4.  Nonprofitness .243* .254* .075 
             
5.  Collaboration effects on service quality .182* .076 -.131 .304* 
           
6.  Collaboration effects on administration    
      Quality 
.049 .043 -.168 .310* .778* 
          
7.   Receives funding from businesses .257* .080 -.106 .221* .292* .215* 
         
8.   Receives funding from government .208* .183* .507* -.124 -.113 .169* .041 
         
9.   Receives funding from  
      nonprofits/foundations 
.208* -.024 -.041 .190* .328* .192* .567* .107 
        
10. Experienced a decline in government     
      financial support 
.171* .228* .377* .060 -.184* -.114 .098 .324* .122 
       
11. Experience an increase in services     
      demanded  
.158 .256* .113 .182* -.007 -.026 .095 .098 .067 .083 
      
12. Business board member -.088 -.030 .117 .034 .019 .010 .142 .020 .183* .136 .025 
     
13. Government board member .055 -.076 -.054 
-
.000* 
-.041 -.005 .082 .064 .256* -.085 .115 .241* 
   
14. Nonprofit board member .161 .050 -.069 -.015 .001 .055 -.009 .082 .019 -.012 -.039 .052 .273* 
  
15. Agency's operational budget size .244* .108 .325* -.050 .016 .041 .208* .429* .134 .162* .107 .255* .067 .057 
  
16. Agency age .150 -.030 .053 .030 .059 -.003 .261* .147* .253* -.016 .022 .144 .121 -.019 .471* 
*p< .05                 
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APPENDIX C 
 
LIST OF HYPOTHESES AND WHETHER SUPPORTED 
  
 
2
1
8
 
Hypotheses Supported 
1. Higher levels of identification with nonprofitness will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. Yes 
2. Greater pressures to conform to the influence of the business community will likely decrease the collaboration frequency with other     
     nonprofits. 
No 
3. Higher levels of government control will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. No 
4. A positive impact on service quality from past collaborations will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. Yes 
5. A positive impact on administrative quality from past collaborations will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other 
nonprofits. 
No 
6. Receiving funding from outside sources will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. Partial 
7. Decreases in government financial support will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. Yes 
8. Increases in services demanded will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. Yes 
9. Having board members from each sector will likely increase the collaboration frequency with other nonprofits. Partial 
10. Older and larger nonprofits will likely collaborate more frequently with other nonprofits. No 
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Q1     Consent Form:   The Governance of Child Welfare Agencies       
 
To Whom It May Concern:     
 
I am a doctoral student under the direction of Professor Thomas Catlaw in the 
Department of Public Affairs at Arizona State University. The title of my dissertation 
research is “The governance of child welfare agencies: Managers’ views of the dynamics 
of today’s nonprofit sector.”  I am conducting a research study on how child welfare 
managers and their agencies are meeting the needs of their clients and communities in 
today’s challenging climate. 
 
I will be conducting an online national survey of experts like you who are determined to 
provide quality services to children and their families. I am inviting your participation, 
which will involve completing an online questionnaire. This survey will take 
approximately 15 minutes of your time. Your participation in this study is voluntary and 
you can choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time; there will be 
no penalty. However, to show my gratitude for those who do complete the survey, I will 
conduct a raffle and give away four $25 VISA gift cards.    
     
Your response to this survey will be used to help better understand the current state of 
child welfare agencies and the role agencies similar to yours play in providing services to 
children and families. I know that your time is very valuable and the work you do is vital 
for children, their families, and our society as a whole. Your contributions and insights 
will be used to inform management practices and to help understand child welfare 
agencies are striving to accomplish their missions and further serve children. Your 
expertise can be used to inform other managers regarding their agency’s operations and 
management practices, and in turn, their experiences may be beneficial to you and your 
agency. I hope to bring greater awareness to the role agencies like yours play in child 
welfare services as well as speak to the broader implications of current child welfare 
policies.        
 
Results from my dissertation will only be shared in the aggregate. Findings may be used 
in reports, presentation, or publications. All responses will be confidential and therefore 
your name and your agency’s name will not be known. There are no foreseeable risks to 
your participation. The responses will be kept in an Excel database where identifying 
markers such as names and phone numbers will be removed for statistical analysis.        
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research team 
at: Thomas Catlaw [Thomas.catlaw@asu.edu] or Robbie Robichau 
[Robbie.robichau@asu.edu or call at 409-363-1266].  
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if 
you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects 
Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and 
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Assurance, at (480) 965-6788.   Completion of the questionnaire will be considered your 
consent to participate.       
 
 
Sincerely,     
Robbie Waters Robichau    
Doctoral Candidate 
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Q2       In this study nonprofits agencies serve a charitable or public purpose, often 
receiving 501(C)(3) status from government; and when profits are earned, they are 
returned back to the organization and not to individuals or board members.  In contrast, 
businesses are profit-seeking agencies that do return profits to investors and board 
members. Lastly, the terms government and public child welfare agencies refers to 
state and local agencies (e.g., Child Protective Services) that directly or indirectly provide 
public services and does not speak to the role of elected officials or legislatures. 
 
Q3   AGENCY CHARACTERISTICS 
Q4 Which of the following best describes your agency? (Please select one) 
 Nonprofit organization (1) 
 Nonprofit foundation (2) 
 Business (3) 
 Other (4) ____________________ 
Q5 Does your agency have 501 (C)(3) status? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q6 Does your agency plan to file for 501 (c)(3) status this or next year? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q7 Please select which types of service(s) your agency provides? (Please select all that 
apply) 
 Foster care placement (1) 
 Adoption (2) 
 Family preservation & reunification (3) 
 Residential treatment or congregate care (4) 
 Case management (5) 
 Crisis or emergency care (6) 
 Counseling, therapy, or mental health services (7) 
 Foster parent recruitment & support (8) 
 Adoptive parent recruitment & support (9) 
 CPS investigation or assessment (10) 
 Advocacy for children & families (11) 
 Independent living (12) 
 Mentoring programs for children (13) 
 Other (14) ____________________ 
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Q8 Please answer the following questions: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Does the state require your agency to be accredited in 
order to provide services to children and families? (1) 
    
Is your agency accredited by an accreditation body? (2)     
Is your agency considered a branch office of a larger 
agency? (3) 
    
Is your agency religiously based? (4)     
 
Q9 Approximately, what was the total annual operating budget revenues for you agency 
in the last fiscal year? 
 Less than $100,000 (1) 
 $100,000 - $499,999 (2) 
 $500,000 - $999,999 (3) 
 $1 million - $4,999,999 million (4) 
 $5 million - $9,999,999 million (5) 
 Greater than $10 million (6) 
Q10 What year did your agency first begin providing services to children and families in 
the child welfare system?______________ 
 
Q11 Did your agency receive funding from the following sources in the last fiscal year? 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Government (state legislature or public child welfare 
agencies) (1) 
    
Individual donations (2)     
Business grants and/or donations (3)     
Fees for services rendered (e.g., client-paid or 
insurance reimbursement) (4) 
    
Other nonprofits or foundations (5)     
Business subsidiaries of your agency (6)     
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Q12 Which of the following provides the largest portion of your agency’s operating 
budget revenues? (Please check one) 
 Government (state legislature or public child welfare agencies) (1) 
 Individual donations  (2) 
 Business grants and/or donations (3) 
 Fees for services rendered (e.g., client-paid or insurance reimbursement)  (4) 
 Other nonprofits or foundations (5) 
 Business subsidiaries of your agency    (6) 
Q13 If your agency stopped receiving governmental funds, how would this affect daily 
operations? (Please select one) 
 The agency does not receive government funds  (1) 
 It would have no impact on my agency (2) 
 The agency would have to substantially cut its services and capacity (3) 
 The agency’s scope and mission would change significantly (4) 
 The agency would have to be shut down (5) 
Q14 AGENCY’S ENVIRONMENT & RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Q15 Please indicate how frequently your agency engages in the following activities to 
provide its services: 
 Never 
(1) 
Yearly 
(2) 
Quarterly 
(3) 
Monthly 
(4) 
Weekly 
(5) 
Collaborates or partners with 
nonprofits to provide services 
to families and children (1) 
          
Collaborates or partners with 
businesses to provide services 
to families and children (2) 
          
Collaborates or partners with 
public child welfare agencies to 
provide services to families and 
children (3) 
          
Interacts or communicates with 
the state legislature regarding 
programs or services (4) 
          
 
 225 
 
Q16 In what state is this agency located? 
 AL (1) 
 AK (2) 
 AZ (3) 
 AR (4) 
 CA (5) 
 CO (6) 
 CT (7) 
 DE (8) 
 DC (9) 
 FL (10) 
 GA (11) 
 HI (12) 
 ID (13) 
 IL (14) 
 IN (15) 
 IA (16) 
 KS (17) 
 KY (18) 
 LA (19) 
 ME (20) 
 MD (21) 
 MA (22) 
 MI (23) 
 MN (24) 
 MS (25) 
 MO (26) 
 MT (27) 
 NE (28) 
 NV (29) 
 NH (30) 
 NJ (31) 
 NM (32) 
 NY (33) 
 NC (34) 
 ND (35) 
 OH (36) 
 OK (37) 
 OR (38) 
 PA (39) 
 RI (40) 
 SC (41) 
 SD (42) 
 TN (43) 
 TX (44) 
 UT (45) 
 VT (46) 
 VA (47) 
 WA (48) 
 WV (49) 
 WI (50) 
 WY (51) 
 Other (52) 
 
 
Q17 How well do the following statements characterize the working environment of your 
agency? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree (4) 
Somewhat 
agree (5) 
Agree 
(6) 
Strongly 
agree (7) 
It is now more 
challenging to 
maintain program 
independence (1) 
              
There is a need to 
develop diverse 
revenue streams (2) 
              
Larger nonprofit 
service providers 
are becoming more 
influential (3) 
              
Managers are using 
more business 
approaches (4) 
              
It is more 
challenging to 
maintain mission 
focus (5) 
              
Large donors are 
gaining more 
influence over 
programs and 
services (6) 
              
There is greater 
competition with 
businesses for 
government 
contracts and 
funding (7) 
              
There is a need to               
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replace volunteers 
with professional 
staff members (8) 
There is pressure to 
generate 
commercial 
revenues and fees-
for-services (9) 
              
There is an 
emphasis on 
bringing 
communities 
together to solve 
social problems (10) 
              
There are pressures 
to provide services 
government and 
businesses cannot or 
does not offer (11) 
              
 
Q18 Does your agency primarily serve clients in rural, suburban non-metropolitan, or 
metropolitan areas? (Please check all that apply) 
 Rural (less than 2,500 urban population) (1) 
 Suburban, non-metropolitan (2) 
 Metropolitan (3) 
Q19 Thinking specifically about your agency's relationship with public child welfare 
agencies in general, what effect has this relationship had on the following areas of your 
agency? 
 It's 
made it 
much 
worse  
(1) 
It's made 
it 
somewhat 
worse  (2) 
It's made it 
neither 
better or 
worse (3) 
It's made 
it 
somewhat 
better (4) 
It's 
made it 
much 
better 
(5) 
Agency transparency 
(i.e., openness, 
communication, & 
accountability) (1) 
          
Ability to respond to 
community needs (2) 
          
Doing paperwork  (3)           
Outside oversight and 
monitoring (4) 
          
Accountability to clients 
(5) 
          
 227 
 
Relationship with other 
nonprofits (6) 
          
Overall financial outlook 
(7) 
          
Development of new 
programs (8) 
          
Development of long-
standing programs (9) 
          
Ability to serve children 
and families well (10) 
          
Ability to meet key 
agency performance 
outcomes (11) 
          
 
Q20 Thinking specifically about your agency's relationship with nonprofit agencies in 
general, what effect has this relationship had on the following areas of your agency? 
 It's made 
it much 
worse  (1) 
It's made it 
somewhat 
worse  (2) 
It's made 
it neither 
better or 
worse (3) 
It's made 
it 
somewhat 
better (4) 
It's 
made it 
much 
better 
(5) 
Agency transparency 
(i.e., openness, 
communication, & 
accountability) (1) 
          
Ability to respond to 
community needs (2) 
          
Doing paperwork  (3)           
Outside oversight and 
monitoring (4) 
          
Accountability to 
clients (5) 
          
Relationship with other 
nonprofits (6) 
          
Overall financial 
outlook (7) 
          
Development of new 
programs (8) 
          
Development of long-           
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standing programs (9) 
Ability to serve 
children and families 
well (10) 
          
Ability to meet key 
agency performance 
outcomes (11) 
          
 
Q21 In regards to the nonprofit sector in general, how well do the following statements 
describe its role in society? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
disagree (3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagreed 
(4) 
Somewhat 
agree (5) 
Agree 
(6) 
Strongl
y agree 
(7) 
Act as an 
alternative to 
government by 
protecting and 
promoting 
individual and 
community 
values and 
interests  (1) 
              
Experiment or 
be innovative in 
programs, 
processes, and 
service delivery 
(2) 
              
Drive social 
change (3) 
              
Serve poor, 
under-
represented, or 
disadvantaged 
individuals (4) 
              
Promote causes 
and policies on 
behalf of clients 
and 
communities 
(5) 
              
Bring 
communities 
together and 
develop social 
trust (6) 
              
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Provide or 
supplement 
services 
government and 
businesses 
cannot or does 
not offer (7) 
              
 
Q22 AGENCY’S OPERATIONS 
 
Q23   How well do the following statements describe the work environment of your 
agency? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
My agency is very 
production oriented. A 
major concern is with 
getting the job done. 
People aren’t very 
personally involved. (1) 
          
My agency is a very 
personal place. It is an 
extended family. People 
seem to share a lot of 
themselves. (2) 
          
My agency is a very 
dynamic and 
entrepreneurial place. 
People are willing to 
stick their necks out and 
take risks. (3) 
          
My agency is a very 
formalized and structured 
place. Rules and 
procedures generally 
govern what people do. 
(4) 
          
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Q24 In the last fiscal year, has your agency experienced the following? 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Decline in government financial support 
(1) 
    
Increase in services demanded (2)     
No or slow growth in private giving (3)     
 
Q25 In regards to your agency in particular, how well does the following statements 
describe your agency's work? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
agree (5) 
Agree 
(6) 
Strongly 
agree (7) 
Act as an 
alternative to 
government by 
protecting and 
promoting 
individual and 
community values 
and interests  (1) 
              
Experiment or be 
innovative in 
programs, 
processes, and 
service delivery 
(2) 
              
Drive social 
change (3) 
              
Serve poor, 
under-
represented, or 
disadvantaged 
individuals (4) 
              
Promote causes 
and policies on 
behalf of clients 
and communities 
(5) 
              
Bring 
communities 
together and 
develop social 
trust (6) 
              
Provide or 
supplement 
services 
              
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government and 
businesses cannot 
or does not offer 
(7) 
 
Q26 Rank the effectiveness of your agency in accomplishing its core mission, with 1 
being not effective at all and 10 being extremely effective: 
 1 (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 4 (4) 
 5 (5) 
 6 (6) 
 7 (7) 
 8 (8) 
 9 (9) 
 10 (10) 
Q27 Please indicate how frequently your agency does the following in providing services 
and programs: 
 Never (1) Occasionally 
(2) 
Frequently 
(3) 
Usually 
(4) 
Innovates and experiments in processes and 
programs (1) 
        
Uses volunteers to help agency operate (2)         
Receives private fees-for-services (e.g., 
client-paid services or insurance reimbursed 
services) (3) 
        
Outsources one or more of your services to 
other agencies (4) 
        
Strategically markets your agency to attract 
volunteers and/or clients (5) 
        
Actively seeks out clients to provide services 
to (6) 
        
Engages in entrepreneurial activities to 
generate revenue (7) 
        
Uses cause-related marketing alliances with 
businesses to market an image, product, or 
service for mutual benefit (8) 
        
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Q28 Does your agency have a board of directors? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q29   What industry are your board members from? And, approximately how many are 
from each industry? 
 Government (1) ____________________ 
 Business (2) ____________________ 
 Nonprofits (3) ____________________ 
 Community members (4) ____________________ 
Q30 How much influence did the following have on how your agency operated in the 
past fiscal year? 
 No 
influence 
at all (1) 
A little 
influence 
(2) 
Some 
influence 
(3) 
A strong 
influence 
(4) 
A very 
strong 
influence 
(5) 
Changes in the agency’s financial 
outlook  (1) 
          
Changes in reimbursement rates  (2)           
Efforts to streamline agency 
operations  (3) 
          
Pressures related to financial risk  
(4) 
          
Staying abreast of best practices  
(5) 
          
Analysis of data regarding agency 
performance/outcome achievement    
(6) 
          
State Child and Family Services 
Review findings and your state’s 
Program Improvement Plan  (7) 
          
Keeping ahead of other agencies  
(8) 
          
State regulations  (9)           
Changes in the needs of children 
and families  (10) 
          
Advice from experts and 
researchers  (11) 
          
Feedback/input from families and 
clients served (12) 
          
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Q31 How well does your agency’s collect adequate data to assess performance regarding 
its services to children and 
families?                                                                                                                                 
                                           
 Poorly (1) 
 Fairly (2) 
 Average (3) 
 Well (4) 
 Excellently (5) 
Q32 Does your agency have a contract with government (state and/or county) to deliver 
any of the following services? 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Child abuse prevention services (primary 
prevention)/family support   (1) 
    
CPS investigation or assessment   (2)     
Family preservation/in-home services   (3)     
Family reunification services   (4)     
Foster care placement services and licensing (5)     
Residential treatment or congregate care   (6)     
Adoption services   (7)     
Foster parent recruitment   (8)     
Adoptive parent recruitment   (9)     
Independent living services   (10)     
Counseling, therapy, or mentoring programs   (11)     
Case management (12)     
 
Q33 How has your agency been reimbursed in the last fiscal year? (Please check all that 
apply) 
 Fixed rate including case or flat rate (1) 
 Cost-reimbursement rate (2) 
 Performance-based rate (3) 
 Other (4) 
Q34 If your agency has a contract with a public child welfare agency to deliver the 
service, is the contract performance-based? That is, does your agency receive additional 
revenue for meeting goals tied to client outcomes or other benchmarks? 
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 Yes (1) No (2) 
Child abuse prevention services (primary 
prevention)/family support   (1) 
    
CPS investigation or assessment   (2)     
Family preservation/in-home services   (3)     
Family reunification services   (4)     
Foster care placement services and licensing (5)     
Residential treatment or congregate care   (6)     
Adoption services   (7)     
Foster parent recruitment   (8)     
Adoptive parent recruitment   (9)     
Independent living services   (10)     
Counseling, therapy, or mentoring programs   (11)     
Case management (12)     
 
Q35 These questions ask more specifically about the effects of contracts: 
 Yes (1) No (2) Unsure 
(3) 
Do performance indicators affect your ability to 
innovate? (1) 
      
Is your agency's performance being evaluated using 
the right outcomes or contractual indicators? (2) 
      
Was your agency involved in creating outcomes or 
contractual indicators? (3) 
      
 
Q36 RESPONDENTS’S EXPERIENCES 
 
Q37 On a day-to-day basis, how important are the following in informing your decision-
making? 
 Not 
important 
at all (1) 
Slightly 
important 
(2) 
Moderately 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(4) 
Extremely 
Important  
(5) 
Improving the 
quality of services 
to clients (1) 
          
Advocating on 
behalf of those I 
serve (2) 
          
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Being accountable 
to my clients (3) 
          
Running my 
agency like a 
business (4) 
          
Pursuing our 
mission (5) 
          
Being accountable 
to my funders (6) 
          
Pressures to do 
more with less (7) 
          
Commitment to 
agency's goals (8) 
          
Pursuing funding 
(9) 
          
Making financially-
sound decisions 
and saving costs 
(10) 
          
 
Q38 Would you take government funding if you did not need it? 
 Yes (1) 
 Maybe (2) 
 No (3) 
Q39 How involved are the following stakeholders in holding your agency’s operations 
accountable? 
 Less than I 
would like (1) 
About right (2) More than I 
would like (3) 
Board of directors (1)       
Public child welfare 
agencies (2) 
      
Clients and their 
families (3) 
      
Community members 
and donors (4) 
      
State legislatures (5)       
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Q40 Do these issues present a challenge for your nonprofits agency’s ability to 
effectively provide services?   
 No 
challenge 
(1) 
Minor 
challenge 
(2) 
Moderate 
challenge 
(3) 
Major 
challenge 
(4) 
Very 
severe 
challenge                           
(5) 
Increases in services 
demanded (1) 
          
Businesses 
providing child 
welfare services (2) 
          
Strong governmental 
influence over 
agency operations 
(3) 
          
Competition with 
other agencies over 
funding (4) 
          
Large donors or 
corporations 
influencing 
management or 
programs (5) 
          
Decreases in 
funding streams (6) 
          
 
Q41 RESPONDENT’S CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Q42 What is your current position in this agency? 
 Executive Director / President (1) 
 Chief Executive Officer  (2) 
 Chief Financial Officer    (3) 
 Program director or administrator  (4) 
 Board member (5) 
 Founder  (6) 
 Other (7) 
Q43 Which best describes the field of your professional background and training? 
 Family and child studies (1) 
 Social work   (2) 
 Business   (3) 
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 Nonprofits   (4) 
 Public administration (5) 
 Criminal justice (6) 
 Psychology   (7) 
 Other (8) ____________________ 
Q44 How many years have you worked with children and families in the formal child 
welfare system?_______________ 
Q45 Have you worked in the following industries and for approximately how many 
years? 
 Your current agency (1) ____________________ 
 Other nonprofit agencies (2) ____________________ 
 Government agencies (3) ____________________ 
 Business corporations (4) ____________________ 
Q46 What is your highest level of education received? 
 Less than a BA or BS degree  (1) 
 BA or BS degree (2) 
 Master’s degree             (3) 
 PhD or Doctorate (4) 
Q47 What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 Rather not answer (3) 
Q48 What is your age? 
 30 years and younger  (1) 
 31-40 (2) 
 41-50            (3) 
 51-60 (4) 
 61-70            (5) 
 71 years and older (6) 
Q49 OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES:  These questions allow you to provide any specific 
thoughts you may have in response to the survey. When you click next, you will be 
directed to enter into the raffle drawing. 
 
Q50 What do you think makes your agency distinctive from public child welfare 
agencies? 
 
Q51 What do you think makes your agency distinctive from businesses? 
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Q52 What are the biggest challenges facing your agency today that would prevent it from 
providing services? 
 
Q53 How has the entrance of business into child welfare services influenced your 
agency's operations? 
 
Q54 Are there any additional thoughts that you would like to share? 
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1
 By 1800 America had only seven orphanages (London, 1999). Most of the established 
orphanages in the nineteenth and early twentieth century helped white children although 
some institutions for the black community did exist (e.g., the Reed Home and School in 
Georgia) (Askeland, 2006).  
2
 The last orphan train sent from NY CAS to the west occurred in 1929 (Creagh, 2006). 
For more reading on the orphan trains see (Cook, 1995; Holt, 1992; Warren, 2001) and 
for specifics on Charles Loring Brace and CAS see (Brace, 1894; O’Connor, 2001). 
3
 The break-down of those housed in some form of institutional care are as follows: 
“74,000 children in orphanages, 15,000 were in reformatories, 5,000 in institutions for 
the feebleminded, 4,500 in institutions for the deaf, and 1,5000 in institutions for the 
blind” (Lindsey, 2004, p. 13). 
4
 The U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor (U.S. Department of Commerce and 
Labor & Bureau of the Census, 1905) report on funding and listings of all benevolent 
institutions in the United States by agency name, type, service, and governmental support 
levels. 
5
 Of the private institutions receiving half of their funding from the state, there were four 
Catholic, three protestant, and one Hebrew Institution and of those receiving more than 
half of their support from government there were ten Catholic, five Protestant and two 
Hebrew institutions (Bremner, 1971, p. 281). The cost to raise a child in a private 
Northern U.S. family was speculated to be more than $100 per child (Bremner, 1971). 
6
 Five years later there were over 33 similar organizations in the U.S. with most rescuing 
children and animals (Mangold, 1999, p. 1304).  
7
 The Sheppard-Towner Act was contested by some states as an invasion of their rights 
and they chose to opt-out of the grant funding. Opponents of the act included the 
American Medical Association and some women’s groups. By 1922, 41 states were 
receiving grants from the federal government. When Massachusetts filed suit with the 
Supreme Court against the legislation in 1922, the Supreme Court dismissed the suit a 
year later for review see Lemons (1969). 
8
 For more discussion on the debates between public and private agency services see 
(Tiffin, 1982). 
9
 Tiffin further notes that “while exact figures are not available, it is estimated that 
somewhere between 18.4 and 21 percent of the country’s dependent and neglected 
children were under government control, as compared with 10 percent at the turn of the 
century” (1982, p. 205). 
10
 The definition of a dependent child was given under the law, section 406, as “a child 
under the age of sixteen who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of 
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the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, 
and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother etc…” 
11
 Following World War II, social workers did change their stance on unwed white 
mothers as ‘curable’; however, they did not extend this graciousness to unwed black 
mothers (for discussion see Creagh, 2006). 
12
 Other strong criticisms of child welfare services were that the system was failing to 
“insure permanency planning, inability to prevent placement, failure to place children in 
need of protection, inherent racism and classism, antifamily bias, violation of parents’ 
and children’s rights, arbitrary decision-making procedures, incompetency and 
inefficiency of its staff, high costs, and mismanagement” (McGowan, 2005, p. 29). 
13
 Curtis (1999) notes that it is a common societal misinterpretation to think that child 
protective services remove children from their households; rather, judges are the only 
ones who can choose to have a child removed from their home permanently.  
14
 Hegar (1999) finds a link between informal care and poverty: “In 1990 as many as half 
of the children in the care of relatives received AFDC because they were eligible in the 
homes of their biological families. Ten percent of the 7.7 million children receiving 
AFDC did so in the homes of relatives other than their parents” (p. 23). At least, 
implicitly there does seem to be some relationships between kinship care, child welfare 
services, and poverty. Moreover, including gender into this conversation, Courtney and 
Maluccio (1999) recognize that typical kinship caregivers are often single women and 
frequently grandmothers. The concern here is who will provide care to children as more 
women choose or are forced to enter the labor force rather than stay at home with their 
children; and in some cases, working women may be less likely to raise foster children 
even when they are paid for it (Courtney & Maluccio). 
15
 For complete federal legislation timeline see 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegisdlink.cfm. 
16
 The effects of PRWORA were especially difficult for poor women and children. In her 
book Backlash against welfare mothers: Past + present, Reese (2005) integrates how and 
why states placed stringent restrictions on welfare recipients that inevitably led to 
multiple negative impacts on welfare mothers and their children. Reese incorporates the 
role racism and the rise of corporatism played in the backlash against certain mothers 
who were often labeled as “welfare queens.” Reese argues that despite the lack of 
national data on the number of women who lost custody of their children due to welfare 
reform and their poverty-stricken conditions, state data alone reflects a significant 
number of women abandoning their children. She states “far from promoting ‘family 
values,’ welfare reform has torn many poor families apart” (p. 17). From reading her 
work, one can implicitly tie links between the rise in U.S. poverty, single mothers, and 
foster care services. 
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17
 Cahn (1999) does a thorough job explaining the race and systemic problems between 
poverty, minorities, and foster care. For example, “poor and African-American families 
are disproportionately more liked to be charged with child neglect…Today, it is 22 times 
as likely that abuse or neglect will occur in families with incomes less than $15,000 per 
year than in families with incomes greater than $30,000 per year” (p. 1198). 
18
 Rosenthal (2000) provides a literature review of the privatization of children’s services 
between the 1950s through the 1970s, while explaining the dynamic relationship between 
private charities who were sometime religious, and government.  
19
 Kamerman and Kahn (1998, pp. 8-9) explain the forms of privatization as including the 
allocation of public functions to the private sector, deregulation, asset sales, vouchers, 
franchising, and contracting. 
20
 In a study of foster alumni, who were provided services by different organizations such 
as those in the Washington and Oregon state system with those in the Casey foster care 
programs, Pecora et al. (2010) uncover some important outcome measures. These 
outcome measures for alumni are mental and physical health, their educational 
achievements, employment and finances, and their relationships and social supports. 
21
 The National Council of Public-Private Partnerships (2011) claims that government’s 
choice of using public-private partnerships stems back over 200 years. 
22
 For some exceptions, see (Heinrich & Fournier, 2004; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012; 
Weisbrod, 1988). 
23
 Frumkin creates a chart that describes the challenges of taking any of these four 
purposes of the sector to an extreme: for service delivery it is vendorism, for social 
entrepreneurship it is commercialism, for civic and political engagement it is 
polarization, and for values and faith it is particularism (2005, p. 165) 
24
 The effects of PRWORA were especially difficult for poor women and children. In her 
book Backlash against welfare mothers: Past + present, Reese (2005) integrates how and 
why states placed stringent restrictions on welfare recipients that inevitably led to 
multiple negative impacts on welfare mothers and their children. Reese incorporates the 
role racism and the rise of corporatism played in the backlash against certain mothers 
who were often labeled as “welfare queens.” She states “far from promoting ‘family 
values,’ welfare reform has torn many poor families apart” (p. 17). From reading her 
work, one can implicitly tie links between the rise in U.S. poverty, single mothers, and 
foster care services. 
25
The NTEE and NTEE-CC code for major activities for this research on foster care is 
P32. 
 242 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
26
 The NTEE classification system can be messy. The IRS does not assign their own 
codes and their coding methodology is not always consistent; however, their codes do 
designate whether nonprofit and voluntary agencies offer child and family services. Thus, 
organizations like the Urban Institute have created a similar coding structure (i.e., NTEE-
CC) to try to overcome  challenges with the NTEE coding structures (Durnford, 2011). 
The sample in this research capitalizes on both coding structures that classified 
organizations as foster care agencies. 
27
 Of the 184 individuals that participated in this research, 148 completed the survey 
(80%) and 36 partial completed the survey (20%). 
28
 The National Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare 
Services is conducting one-of-a kind research in the area of privatization of child welfare 
services. In 2011, they developed and implemented the National Survey of Private Child 
and Family Service Agencies (McBeath, et al., 2011). Their work, funded by the 
Children’s Bureau since 2005, provided much of the inspiration for my research and 
survey design. 
29
 Available case analysis, more specifically Dummy Variable Adjustment, is used in the 
models to handle missing data in the independent variables and thereby prevents losing 
observations at the case level when a question is not answered. For review of the method 
see Cohen & Cohen (1985). Thus, it helps preserve a larger portion of the sample which 
is especially important when creating factor scores since missing one answer from a 
series of questions means that all other responses are dropped from the analysis. Models 
were run before including the Dummy Variable Adjustment technique and no statistically 
significant differences were found. 
30
 The eignevalues-greater-than-one rule or the Kaiser criterion is the “most widely used 
procedure for determining the number of factors” (Fabrignar & Wegener, 2012, p. 55).  
31
 Some may speculate as to why I did not include some type of board level variable as an 
ownership measure of publicness. In the nonprofit and voluntary sector, boards are 
stewards rather than owners of agencies and thus are responsible for how organizations 
conduct themselves but not in the same way for-profit boards have ownership and hold 
firms accountable (Frumkin, 2005, p. 6).  
32
 I did run the test of parallel lines assumption (i.e., proportional odds assumption) to see 
whether these variables did in fact have an ordinal relationship. The assumption is 
violated for charging fees for services (significance 0.0004), using cause-related 
marketing alliances with business (significance 0.0026), and professionalizing agency 
(significance 0.0917); therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and dependent variables 
are determined not to be ordinal. The multinomial logistic model is preferred to using an 
improperly specified ordinal logit model (Liao, 1994, p. 50). 
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33
I did estimate these models using ordered probits, ordered logitistic, and ordinary least 
squares analysis.  Even though these models are not the best fit for this data set, the 
results were very similar reflecting the robustness of the chosen models. 
34
The NTEE and NTEE-CC code for major activities for this research on foster care is 
P32. 
35
 The NTEE classification system can be messy. The IRS does not assign their own 
codes and their coding methodology is not always consistent; however, their codes do 
designate whether nonprofit and voluntary agencies offer child and family services. Thus, 
organizations like the Urban Institute have created a similar coding structure (i.e., NTEE-
CC) to try to overcome  challenges with the NTEE coding structures (Durnford, 2011). 
The sample in this research capitalizes on both coding structures that classified 
organizations as foster care agencies. 
36
 Of the 184 individuals that participated in this research, 148 completed the survey 
(80%) and 36 partial completed the survey (20%). 
37
 The National Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare 
Services is conducting one-of-a kind research in the area of privatization of child welfare 
services. In 2011, they developed and implemented the National Survey of Private Child 
and Family Service Agencies (McBeath, et al., 2011). Their work, funded by the 
Children’s Bureau since 2005, provided much of the inspiration for my research and 
survey design. 
38
 Exploratory factor analysis is used for all scales in this paper but sum scores are used 
in the final regression because they have more meaningful interpretations. Combined, 
these measures have a high eigenvalue score of 4.31 and a Cronbach’s alpha of .91, thus, 
indicating a consistent measure of an underlying concept of nonprofitness.   
39
 The corresponding eigenvalue is equal to 1.53 and the Cronbach’s alpha of .67. Both of 
these scores indicate that the index is capturing the underlying construct of what I have 
termed the influence of the business community.   
40
 The reported eigenvalue from this scale is 1.52 and the Cronbach’s alpha is .67. 
41
 These questions were taken from a survey administrated byThe National Quality 
Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare Services. In 2011, they 
developed and implemented the National Survey of Private Child and Family Service 
Agencies (McBeath, et al., 2011). 
42
 The service quality construction had a reported eigenvalue of 2.48 and a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .86 and the administrative quality had a eigenvalue 3.36 with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .87. 
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43
 This methods helps preserve a larger portion of the sample which is especially 
important when creating scaled measures since missing one answer from a series of 
questions means that all other responses are dropped from the analysis. Models were run 
before including the Dummy Variable Adjustment technique and no statistically 
significant differences were found. 
44
 For some exceptions, see (Heinrich & Fournier, 2004; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012; 
Weisbrod, 1988). 
45
The NTEE and NTEE-CC code for major activities for this research on foster care is 
P32. 
46
 The NTEE classification system can be messy. The IRS does not assign their own 
codes and their coding methodology is not always consistent; however, their codes do 
designate whether nonprofit and voluntary agencies offer child and family services. Thus, 
organizations like the Urban Institute have created a similar coding structure (i.e., NTEE-
CC) to try to overcome  challenges with the NTEE coding structures (Durnford, 2011). 
The sample in this research capitalizes on both coding structures that classified 
organizations as foster care agencies. 
47
 Of the 184 individuals that participated in this research, 148 completed the survey 
(80%) and 36 partial completed the survey (20%). 
48
 The National Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare 
Services is conducting one-of-a kind research in the area of privatization of child welfare 
services. In 2011, they developed and implemented the National Survey of Private Child 
and Family Service Agencies (McBeath, et al., 2011). Their work, funded by the 
Children’s Bureau since 2005, provided much of the inspiration for my research and 
survey design. 
49
 Accountable to funders or donor is placed with the mission-based decision-making for 
two reasons. Theoretically, funders and donors are important stakeholders of NPO that 
help hold them accountable for achieving their mission. Additionally, exploratory factor 
analysis suggested that this measure is more similar to pursing mission and agency goals. 
50
 The Cronbach’s Alpha’s for client-based priorities is .80, for mission-based priorities 
is .71, and for financially-focused priorities is .72. Scores closer to one are considered to 
have more reliability and internal consistency. 
51
 By standardizing the variable the scores are rescaled to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. Pearson’s correlation coefficients between these dependent 
variables are as follows: client-focused and mission-focused (r=.52), client-focused and 
financially-focused (r=.29), and mission-focused and financially focused (r=.45). The 
positive correlation indicates that these priorities are not necessarily competing priorities 
with one another. 
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52
 Exploratory factor analysis is used for all scales in this paper but sum scores are used 
in the final regression because they have more meaningful interpretations. Combined, 
these measures have a high eigenvalue score of 4.31 and a Cronbach’s alpha of .91, thus, 
indicating a consistent measure of an underlying concept of nonprofitness.   
53
 The reported eigenvalue from this scale is 1.52 and the Cronbach’s alpha is .67. 
54
 The corresponding eigenvalue is equal to 1.53 and the Cronbach’s alpha of .67. Both of 
these scores indicate that the index is capturing the underlying construct of what I have 
termed the influence of the business community.   
 
